Timing of information acquisition in a competitive environment

This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016     

A strategic model for state compliance verification

The theory of directed graphs and noncooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons‐grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two‐person inspection game played against a multi‐ or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate's expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A prototype software implementation of the methodology and a case study are presented. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 260–271, 2016     

基于风险控制的装备供应链网络设计模型

针对风险管理中的装备供应链正向（供应）网络设计问题,在对装备供应链风险和成本进行量化分析的基础上,综合考虑风险和成本2方面因素,建立了基于风险控制的装备供应链网络设计优化模型。并设计了遗传算法对模型进行求解,给出在指定风险水平下最优设计方案与总成本。最后通过实例分析和计算,结果表明,该优化模型合理、有效、可行。     

武器装备一体化试验鉴定中两类风险管理

在制定武器装备试验鉴定方案时,厂家和部队双方很难协调生产方风险α、使用方风险β和试验成本之间相矛盾的问题。提出的一体化试验鉴定方法,引用F分布构造的统计量,根据试验具有继承性的特点,充分结合先验数据与现场试验数据对产品进行鉴定,证明了2类风险α、β与现场数据样本量n、先验数据样本量m等参数间的内在联系,运用MATLAB软件计算出一体化试验鉴定方法对应的各参数间量化数值表。     

装备采办风险管理风险源分析

装备采办各个阶段都存在着不确定的因素,为加强风险管理,重点研究了在武器装备采办过程中可能出现的13个风险区域,并对各个风险区域可能出现的风险源进行了较为详细的分析。同时详细研究了辨识风险的4种方法,即基于工作分解结构的风险辨识方法、基于项目评审的风险辨识方法、基于费用分析的风险辨识方法和基于试验与评价的风险辨识方法。     

培养军校学员战斗精神的几点思考

战斗精神是军事人才必备的素质,军队院校要把培养学员战斗精神作为自己的神圣职责。军校学员战斗精神的培养主要应从以下几个方面着手,即：把政治理论教育作为培养学员战斗精神的基础环节,把军事训练作为培养学员战斗精神的主要渠道,把严格的日常管理作为促进学员战斗精神生成的主要手段;营造良好的校园环境激发学员的战斗精神。     

柔性长鳍扭波推进数学模型分析

以"尼罗河魔鬼"鱼的柔性长背鳍扭波推进模式为研究对象,通过观察活鱼的游动模式,提取影响扭波推进的运动学要素,建立了描述柔性长背鳍扭波推进时动态曲面的数学模型。研究了鳍条仰角与摆动规律对鳍面的影响。最后,用细长体理论分析并计算出推力分布。研究表明,鳍条仰角在φ=85°的情况下所形成的鳍面与垂直鳍条所形成的鳍面相比,其最大偏离值与鳍长之比为1.7%,可以用垂直于基线的鳍条制作模型;鳍条按正弦规律摆动时所形成的扭波波形鳍面与实鱼鳍面相似。     

Risk‐sensitive sizing of responsive facilities

We develop a risk‐sensitive strategic facility sizing model that makes use of readily obtainable data and addresses both capacity and responsiveness considerations. We focus on facilities whose original size cannot be adjusted over time and limits the total production equipment they can hold, which is added sequentially during a finite planning horizon. The model is parsimonious by design for compatibility with the nature of available data during early planning stages. We model demand via a univariate random variable with arbitrary forecast profiles for equipment expansion, and assume the supporting equipment additions are continuous and decided ex‐post. Under constant absolute risk aversion, operating profits are the closed‐form solution to a nontrivial linear program, thus characterizing the sizing decision via a single first‐order condition. This solution has several desired features, including the optimal facility size being eventually decreasing in forecast uncertainty and decreasing in risk aversion, as well as being generally robust to demand forecast uncertainty and cost errors. We provide structural results and show that ignoring risk considerations can lead to poor facility sizing decisions that deteriorate with increased forecast uncertainty. Existing models ignore risk considerations and assume the facility size can be adjusted over time, effectively shortening the planning horizon. Our main contribution is in addressing the problem that arises when that assumption is relaxed and, as a result, risk sensitivity and the challenges introduced by longer planning horizons and higher uncertainty must be considered. Finally, we derive accurate spreadsheet‐implementable approximations to the optimal solution, which make this model a practical capacity planning tool.© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

采用终端滑模控制实现交会对接逼近段姿态跟踪

针对交会对接逼近段追踪器的姿态控制问题,采用反馈线性化理论推导了非线性姿态动力学方程的相变量模型.基于导出的姿控模型,引入模型误差和随机噪声,结合终端滑模控制理论,给出了能够在有限时间内完成姿态跟踪,并使状态跟踪误差收敛的控制律的设计方法.对具有扰动项的系统,仿真结果仍能满足交会任务对时间的要求,且姿态角跟踪误差趋于0,说明控制律对相变量系统的姿态跟踪控制具有较好的鲁棒性.     

kittel型反铁电相变的自由能

根据kittel型反铁电相变对称性的变化 ,选择轴矢量 R作为序参量是合适的。由Landau理论 ,相变温度附近的自由能F就可以写成 R幂级数展开的形式。令 F R=0 ,可得到关于序参量的方程 ,从而获得相变温度与自由能的关系