一种有价值的预防维修策略

当前,在系统的维修性方面,有许多概念是模糊的;许多行为是盲目的,至少是经验主义的。本文针对这些情况,提出了完整的科学维修的概念。以一个有使用价值的预防性维修策略为例,通过讨论,使这种科学维修的概念具体化,并且给出了系统的首翻期、维修周期以及更换期的严格定义和确定方法。     

对我国高新技术产业政策调整的几点建议

在以知识经济为背景的高速经济增长时代 ,高新技术产业作为经济增长支柱的作用日益突出。由于高新技术产业不同于传统产业的特点 ,客观上要求政府采取有力的措施来促进高新技术产业的发展。     

The mercurial development of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation

Russia's 2006 renationalisation of its aerospace industry heralded a new era in industrial policy. Symbolising a return to the importance of securing sovereignty over the Federation's strategic assets, it also posits, powerfully, that sectors like aerospace and shipbuilding are too important to be left to the market. In what now appears a reversal of this policy approach, Moscow is promoting partial privatisation and encouraging partnership with Western aerospace companies. Foreign infusion of capital and technology is viewed as the catalyst for Russian dominance in the global military and commercial aerospace industries.     

Optimal inventory control policy for periodic‐review inventory systems with inventory‐level‐dependent demand

We consider a setting in which inventory plays both promotional and service roles; that is, higher inventories not only improve service levels but also stimulate demand by serving as a promotional tool (e.g., as the result of advertising effect by the enhanced product visibility). Specifically, we study the periodic‐review inventory systems in which the demand in each period is uncertain but increases with the inventory level. We investigate the multiperiod model with normal and expediting orders in each period, that is, any shortage will be met through emergency replenishment. Such a model takes the lost sales model as a special case. For the cases without and with fixed order costs, the optimal inventory replenishment policy is shown to be of the base‐stock type and of the (s,S) type, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

Greek response to the Cyprus invasion

The contemporary history of three countries was marked on July 1974 when the Greek colonels overthrew the legitimate government of Cyprus, Turkey invaded the island to preserve her interests and Greece returned to democracy, but withdrew from NATO. The apathy of her allies was a bitter experience for Greece, considering that the government in Athens was struggling to cope with the consequences of the invasion and Turkey's aggression, as well as with the diplomatic isolation caused by the seven-year dictatorial rule. This paper examines the response of the Greek government and makes particular reference to Karamanlis's archives and Greek parliamentary proceedings. The purpose of the present study is to explore whether Greece was genuinely committed to the settlement of the Cyprus issue and failed due to lack of support or simply ignored the appeals of the Cypriot people and pursued more vital foreign policy objectives, thus contributing to the partition of the island.     

The strategic utility of New Zealand Special Forces

In 1955, the New Zealand government authorised the creation of a Special Forces unit to operate with British forces in Malaya to counter a communist-inspired guerrilla insurgency. Drawing upon the operational experiences of the New Zealand SAS largely taken from the Cold War period, and underpinned by Colin Gray's Special Forces essentials of ‘economy of force’ and ‘expansion of choice’, this article will show how New Zealand's SAS is now accepted not only as a respected and relevant part of the nation's military capability, but also empowers its political decision-makers with the confidence to take on significant, and at times difficult, strategic foreign-policy choices.     

Cognitivism,prospect theory,and foreign policy change: a comparative analysis of the politics of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Afghanistan

This article investigates the cognitive limitations on policy change in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts by examining why American decision-makers failed to revise their government strategy substantially while fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2003–2014 and why their British counterparts were more successful in adjusting their policies in the Malayan insurgency in 1948–1954. Unlike most of the COIN literature that concentrates on military strategy and tactics, the analysis of government policy-making in Malaya holds some important political lessons for American leaders today despite differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and British Malaya. As a response to the criticism of COIN studies in general that they lack theoretical guidance, this article utilizes an integrated cognitivist-prospect theory framework. It is argued that some of the COIN literature mistakenly suggests that a more difficult strategic situation was primarily responsible for American failure in Afghanistan. Instead, American decision-makers faced a more difficult task cognitively than their British counterparts, as policy change in Afghanistan would have required greater ideational change. American principals were much more attached to their beliefs emotionally, had no alternative problem representation, and had to shift between frames in order to engineer a response that was more in line with events on the ground in Afghanistan. Regarding prospect theory, findings indicate that gains frames appear to be unhelpful in monitoring progress until catastrophic failure endangers the reference point, and that decision-makers often have more than one reference point to attune their policies to, which often results in suboptimal choices with regard to at least one reference point.     

The convergence and divergence of three pillars of influence in gender and security

This article explores the convergence between three pillars of influence – feminist security studies, civil society activism and policy decision-making – and its role in the adoption and implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. It argues that these three pillars, individually and collectively, have made important contributions to the debate and action on the gender and security agenda, but that they remain organically disconnected. Their convergence has the potential to achieve path-breaking results in the sphere of gender and security, whilst their divergence makes transformation unattainable. We show the disconnect in the application of UNSCR 1325 in Africa and argue that this is partly the reason why, despite enormous efforts, the gains realised in terms of gender equality in the peace and security arena have been negligible.     

The symbolic politics of ballistic missile defense: seeking the perfect defense in an imperfect world

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) politics present an interesting evolution in how the USA, especially Congress, has come to think about BMD both as operational reality and as a symbolic policy. The argument here is that BMD's operational reality is increasingly overshadowed by its symbolic aspects. Such a status arose from rapidly changing international and domestic politics. The end result is a situation in which BMD policy in a sense floats above the question of its actual combat effectiveness. Its primary mission in part is sustaining US capacity to remain a global power and support its allies.     

TERRORISM AND DETERRENCE POLICY WITH TRANSNATIONAL SUPPORT 1

This study provides an explanation of terrorism by examining interactions between the terrorist group with a minority as a potential pool of recruits and the government supported by a majority. A hawkish deterrence policy makes it more risky for terrorists to launch attacks, but heightens the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group. In addition, the payoff for the government depends not only on the payoff loss associated with the level of terrorism, but also on the political payoff from the action itself of adopting a hawk policy due to its politicians’ vested interests. We first show that whether the deterrence policy should be ‘hawk to ‘dove is closely dependent on the relationships among the risk associated with terrorism, the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group, and the political payoff for the government. This study then introduces transnational support enhancing the capability of a terrorist group to intensify its activity and shows that the emergence of transnational support may cause the government to reform its deterrence policy from ‘dove’ toward ‘hawk,’ with terrorism intensified in the society.