非匀速直线运动SAR导引头目标回波快速模拟

传统的二维频域快速回波模拟方法是针对平台为匀速直线运动,合成孔径雷达(SAR)导引头一般是非匀速直线运动的,二维频域仿真方法在SAR导引头中并不适用。针对SAR导引头非匀速直线运动情况,在分析回波信号频域特点基础上,提出了非匀速直线运动SAR导引头回波信号快速频域模拟方法,详细介绍了该方法的原理和推导过程。最后,进行了相关仿真实验,实验结果验证了该方法的有效性与合理性。     

基于物理声学法的目标双基地散射场计算

运用物理声学法预报水下目标双基地散射特性时,由于忽略了阴影面对散射场的影响,存在随着分置角的增大计算误差越来越大的缺点。针对这一问题,提出对目标表面散射积分区域进行修正的方案,从而将物理声学法的适用范围推广到任意分置角。对刚性球体和有限长柱体的散射特性计算结果表明:文中所提出的方法提高了目标大分置角声散射特性的计算精度,可以用于水下目标双基地散射场预报。     

系统频率偏差对同时全极化测量的影响及其校准

目标极化散射矩阵的精确测量是全极化雷达极化信息处理的前提和基础。基于正负线性调频信号,针对采用数字解线性调频处理的同时全极化测量体制雷达,分别推导了雷达中频频率偏差和采样频率偏差对同时全极化测量影响的数学模型,提出一种雷达中频频偏和采样频偏的联合估计与校准方法。仿真和实测数据表明：雷达系统频率稳定度会引起不同通道极化测量结果峰值位置和相对相位的变化,采用所提方法能够有效校正峰值偏移,补偿相位误差,提高目标极化散射矩阵测量的精度。     

有限数量机载雷达目标覆盖价值算法

针对有限数量机载雷达目标覆盖价值问题,建立了机载雷达载机待选轨道中心点(COCP)概念;分析了COCP和目标点之间的关系,给出了有限数量机载雷达目标覆盖价值问题的数学模型。通过分析有限规模COCP集合的方法,建立了多个机载雷达部署约束条件的数学模型。通过对COCP集合和目标点集合进行约束排除和聚类,简化了研究问题。总结出了有限数量机载雷达目标覆盖价值数学模型的最优解和启发式次优解,实例仿真结果表明该模型和算法的有效性。     

高频地波超视距雷达述评

高频(HF)地波超视距雷达(GW-OTHR)利用雷达波束绕地表面衍射作用,能探测视距外的舰船、低空飞机和巡航导弹,不仅覆盖面积大、费用低,能弥补常规微波雷达低空盲区和天波超视距雷达的近距盲区,也无需注意电离层的变化,且可反隐身、抗反辐射导弹(ARM),因而在许多国家的国民经济和国防领域中得到了广泛的应用。论述了地波沿海面传播的特性和探测能力,并对超视距雷达的发展和应用进行了介绍。     

战区弹药保障敏捷供应链优化模型及实现算法

针对现有的供需矛盾,在分析战区弹药保障供应链管理任务需求的基础上,初步构建了战区弹药保障敏捷供应链管理框架及运行机制,分析了战区弹药保障敏捷供应链的供需协同机制,重点对多级库存优化控制模型、多级弹药配送决策优化模型及实现算法进行了研究,提出了战区弹药保障敏捷供应链建设的具体对策。     

武警学院实验教学示范中心建设的实践与思考

总结在实验教学示范中心建设中的经验,阐述了示范中心建设需要把握的重点和需要处理的问题,为建设好示范性的实验教学基地提供参考。     

自然背景中伪装网的散射偏振度与成像研究

偏振遥感以目标散射光或辐射光的偏振特性作为识别信息,具有常规强度遥感所不具备的优点.为了研究伪装网的偏振伪装效果,在不同条件下对伪装网的散射偏振度和成像特征进行了测试.结果表明,伪装网的表面偏振散射特征受光照条件、探测条件和材料本身特性的影响,其散射光的偏振度与入射角度成正比,与表面反射率成反比.相对于草地背景,伪装网的偏振度较大,可以在偏振度图像中被清晰地识别出来,能够有效对抗多光谱遥感等传统侦察手段的伪装网在偏振遥感侦察下失去了伪装效果.偏振遥感对伪装技术提出了新的挑战.     

The myth of Afghan electoral democracy: the irregularities of the 2014 presidential election

ABSTRACT

This article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election, the first transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor, using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June ‘runoff election.’ As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds voting based on ethno-linguistic preferences, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly finds extremely strange voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all 600 votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results were illegitimate. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as to the long-standing conflict in the country.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’