智能化电子对抗装备发展

当前,智能化武器装备成为世界各国发展的重点,而电子对抗作为新型作战力量将直接影响战争的胜负。文章分析当前电子对抗装备存在的显著不足,论证发展智能化电子对抗装备的迫切性和必要性,明确提出发展智能化电子对抗装备的若干关键技术,阐述智能化电子对抗装备对未来信息化战争的直接影响,以及智能化电子对抗装备未来的发展方向。     

军民融合产业概念及范畴研究

军民融合产业概念及范畴不明确一直是困扰决策部门和研究部门的问题,影响了军民融合发展的顺利推进。本文在梳理总结军民融合产业概念及范畴的研究现状以及政府文件表述的基础上,认为军民融合作为一种发展模式,定义军民融合产业概念并非易事,但出于当前工作要求,需要相关管理部门整合力量,加强研究,尽快明确军民融合产业概念和范畴,构建科学合理的军民融合产业统计体系。     

国防领域技术预警流程研究

技术预警是对技术突破和由此引起的军事、政治、经济和社会危机的预测,是从国家安全的根本利益出发,以保持己方军事优势、防止敌人"技术突袭"为宗旨的技术发展预测。研究回顾了国内外技术预警研究历程,从前期准备、预警清单、技术调查、分析评估等四个主要环节,全面分析国防领域技术预警的具体流程,为国防领域技术预警系统的构建与应用提供支撑。     

The practice of strategy: South African defence in stasis

The article concerns the strategy development processes of the South African Department of Defence in South Africa. It intends to identify the probable causes of the observed failure of the South African National Defence Force to develop appropriate departmental policy and military strategy. Military strategy comprises force development, force employment, force deployment and the coordination of these elements in pursuit of national, grand-strategic objectives. (See Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-first Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, November 2006, 103). Of these four constructs, the article concerns itself only with the first two. The article analyses two complementary approaches to strategy formation: a resource-driven, inside-out model and an interests-driven, outside-in method. The article concludes that the Department is preoccupied with the inside-out method to the lasting detriment of the declared strategic intent of the defence policy.     

军事安全视角下的军队翻译能力建设

军队翻译能力是军队外语能力的组成部分。军队翻译能力的理论框架包含构成要素、存在形式和转换机制三个组成部分。新的安全形势对我军的翻译保障在广度和深度上都有了新的要求,而军队翻译能力供给相对不足。需要对军队翻译能力进行规划,加强翻译人力资源的储备与管理,提升翻译保障信息化水平。     

大力弘扬改革创新时代精神 加快建设世界一流高等教育院校

习主席在庆祝改革开放40周年大会上的重要讲话,是新时代改革开放再出发的宣言书和动员令。学习贯彻习主席重要讲话精神,关键要全面推进学校深化改革创新,深刻认清弘扬改革创新精神对于建设世界一流高等教育院校的重大意义,牢牢扭住全面深化改革创新的主攻方向,科学处理深化改革创新的重大关系,既以顽强的战略定力坚定不移深化改革,又运用科学的工作方法积极稳妥地推进改革。     

美国空军研究实验室组织管理与科研规划分析

美国空军研究实验室是一个在空中、太空和网络空间领域处于全球领先地位的科研机构,承担着美国空军国防高技术项目的规划、管理和实施工作,是美国空军保持技术优势的重要研究力量。本文剖析了美国空军实验室的使命任务、组织管理和科研规划,总结了实验室在人才培养和科研任务制定方面的经验和方法。     

虚拟现实在心理战中的应用及展望

虚拟现实是用虚拟的情境模拟现实的世界,通过虚拟的多维空间,使用户体验到身临其境的感觉。文章通过深度剖析虚拟现实的历史沿革、发展现状与技术特点,结合其在军事中的运用以及发展前景,提出虚拟现实能够对心理战参战人员的心理训练、战场环境模拟和心理战效果评估提供借鉴和支持。     

An attacker‐defender model for analyzing the vulnerability of initial attack in wildfire suppression

Wildfire managers use initial attack (IA) to control wildfires before they grow large and become difficult to suppress. Although the majority of wildfire incidents are contained by IA, the small percentage of fires that escape IA causes most of the damage. Therefore, planning a successful IA is very important. In this article, we study the vulnerability of IA in wildfire suppression using an attacker‐defender Stackelberg model. The attacker's objective is to coordinate the simultaneous ignition of fires at various points in a landscape to maximize the number of fires that cannot be contained by IA. The defender's objective is to optimally dispatch suppression resources from multiple fire stations located across the landscape to minimize the number of wildfires not contained by IA. We use a decomposition algorithm to solve the model and apply the model on a test case landscape. We also investigate the impact of delay in the response, the fire growth rate, the amount of suppression resources, and the locations of fire stations on the success of IA.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.