舰艇CGF搜潜过程马氏决策规划模型

舰艇搜索潜艇的过程可以近似地看作一种马尔可夫过程.研究了潜艇训练仿真系统中舰艇CGF(计算机生成兵力)搜索潜艇过程中的状态转移过程和随机搜索发现目标的概率模型,将舰艇CGF搜索潜艇的过程分为若干独立的阶段,建立了搜潜过程马氏决策规划模型,提出了在各种不同初始搜索状态下的舰艇搜索策略.仿真结果给出了舰艇CGF的最优搜索策略集合和发现概率,验证了马氏决策规划模型的有效性.     

武警初级指挥学院应树立“院本科研”的指导观

从武警初级指挥学院的实际情况出发,提出了“院本科研”的指导观,并从科研积极性的调动、科研课题选择、分层分类指导等三个方面对如何加强武警初级指挥学院的科研指导做了探讨。     

复杂电磁环境下搜索雷达探测概率仿真分析

为了具体分析复杂电磁环境对舰载搜索雷达的影响,针对搜索雷达干扰方式的数学模型,从研究搜索雷达探测概率的角度建立了作战效能模型.以这些数学模型为基础和依据,对海军作战仿真系统中,复杂电磁环境下舰载警戒搜索雷达探测概率进行了多次定量仿真计算,给出了主要数据结果.仿真计算结果与理论值基本吻合,证明仿真计算的结果是可靠的,能够反映复杂电磁环境对搜索雷达探测概率的实际影响.     

信息时代青年政工干部能力构成的新变化

在信息时代,社会生活对青年政工干部的能力构成要求正在悄然发生变化,其中包括理性生活的能力、控制情绪的能力、克服偏见的能力、待人以善的能力、信任同志的能力、寻找需求的能力、正视付出的能力、把握机会的能力。关注信息时代青年政工干部能力构成的微妙变化具有积极的现实意义。     

无源RFID系统中推断式二进制搜索算法

在现有的RFID标准中,一般标签ID都由几个不同含义区间组成。针对这种特点,提出推断式二进制防碰撞算法：在识别每个区间段的ID时,利用某个特定读写器中的前缀库推断该区间段各个位的取值,以便减少待识别标签ID的位数。同时,通过调整参数u,可以对系统可靠性进行控制。仿真实验表明,在没有新前缀出现的情况下,推断式二进制防碰撞算法能够将QT算法的识别速度提高3倍、标签平均响应次数降低3／4。     

Becoming a disarmament champion: the Austrian crusade against nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

The making of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has put Austria and its involvement in nuclear disarmament in the spotlight. This study highlights several factors that led Austria to become a prominent voice in nuclear-disarmament debates. First, its involvement dovetails with the emphasis on humanitarian disarmament it has promoted since the 1990s. Second, a strong antinuclear identity pervades Austrian society. This “nuclear allergy” combines antimilitarism inherited from the Cold War and, more broadly, an aversion to nuclear power, including for energy purposes. These two considerations form the background to the increased activism of the Austrian Foreign Ministry on nuclear disarmament in international fora. But, equally, Austria’s crusade for the TPNW can be attributed to the engagement of a small team of diplomats implementing personal as well as national preferences in favor of disarmament.     

“The major prize”: apartheid South Africa’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1988–91

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the final years of South Africa’s nuclear-weapon program, particularly on the decision-making process leading up to the signature of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the South African government in 1991. In August 1988, after two decades of defiance, negotiations between the apartheid government and the NPT depository powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) ensued at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Despite South Africa being the only state to give up its indigenously developed nuclear weapons and subsequently join the nonproliferation regime, little is known about how the national position on NPT accession and IAEA safeguards evolved. Research carried out in multiple archives using hitherto untapped primary sources and interviews with key actors from several countries show how domestic and regional political dynamics influenced Pretoria’s position on entering the nonproliferation regime. In the process, the F.W. de Klerk government managed to skillfully exploit international proliferation fears to advance its own agenda, thereby connecting South African NPT accession with that of the neighboring Frontline States coalition of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.