恩格斯历史合力论核心观点解析

恩格斯历史合力论认为,各种因素相互作用的历史合力是社会发展的终极原因,在历史合力的诸因素中经济因素归根结底起决定作用,而在具体历史时期具体起主导作用的因素是可变的。     

装甲机械化部队面临高技术局部战争的挑战

本文通过对典型高技术条件下局部战争的分析,指出了装甲机械化部队所面临的挑战及应战的对策.     

军用嵌入式操作系统安全性增强措施

操作系统是紧靠硬件的基础软件,它既是应用软件安全的坚实基础,又是硬件不安全因素的屏蔽器.在操作系统安全隐患和嵌入式操作系统技术特点的基础上,提出信息保护、空间域保护和时间域保护等增强操作系统安全性的几种方法,以提高嵌入式系统抗击系统本身缺陷或敌方恶意攻击等安全威胁的能力.上述几种安全保护技术已在嵌入式Linux中进行验证,并取得满意的结果.     

C4ISR仿真系统分析和设计

分析了指挥、控制、通讯、计算机、信息、监视和侦察(C4ISR)系统的复杂性特点,指出C4ISR系统在应用过程中,需要仿真系统对系统操作员和指挥员进行训练.研究了C4ISR仿真系统及其各子系统的实现模型,最后以舰艇C4ISR为例进行设计,通过分布式交互仿真协议(DIS)实现各子系统信息的互连.仿真结果表明,系统也可以为检测各种实际系统提供仿真环境和数据.     

5G安全及网络监管问题探析

5G作为当今先进的通信技术,其广泛应用将给整个社会生产生活带来全新变革,相关技术和应用的安全问题,事关社会公共安全和军事利益安全,应纳入总体国家安全观视角下重点考量。本文主要梳理5G关键技术可能带来的网络安全风险,以及相关应用可能给网络监管带来的挑战,并从牢牢把控核心知识产权、综合构建安全保障体系、紧跟推进行业法律规范以及着力完善高效应急措施这四方面探讨相关的应对措施。     

美国陆军作战试验部队管理体系研究

作战试验部队是试验鉴定力量体系的重要支撑,是完成装备作战试验的直接载体。美国在装备试验与鉴定方面走在世界前列,建立了一整套行之有效的管理体制,陆军实行试验与鉴定的一体化管理,具有独立的作战试验鉴定部门,没有编设专业化的作战试验部队,试验任务主要根据装备的特性选取未来典型用户的作战部队在真实对抗环境中完成。作战试验部队主要参加作战评估、初始作战试验与评价以及后续作战试验与评价三个阶段的作战试验,在一体化试验小组的协调下,依托靶场完成试验训练任务。本文主要通过对美国陆军试验部队的研究,分析了美国陆军作战试验与鉴定发展概况,重点研究了作战试验部队管理体系,并从整个试验与鉴定系统归纳总结作战试验部队管理及相关工作的主要做法。     

面向大规模容器集群的网络控制技术

针对容器技术在网络层面缺乏控制的问题,设计一套面向大规模容器集群的网络控制架构,分别从容器集群网络的灵活组网、智能适配以及安全隔离三个方向进行研究,主要解决大规模容器集群部署中的网络适配和隔离控制等关键问题。实验结果表明,设计的网络控制架构可以根据网络特点有针对性地实现虚拟局域网的快速划分、网络节点的稳定迁移和节点通信的精确隔离控制。     

Combating nuclear smuggling? Exploring drivers and challenges to detecting nuclear and radiological materials at maritime facilities

International concern over nuclear terrorism has grown during the past few decades. This has driven a broad spectrum of efforts to strengthen nuclear security globally, including the widespread adoption of radiation-detection technology for border monitoring. Detection systems are now deployed at strategic locations for the purported purpose of detecting and deterring the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. However, despite considerable investment in this area, few studies have examined how these programs are implemented or the operational challenges they face on a day-to-day basis. This article seeks to address this with a focus on radiation-detection efforts at maritime facilities. Utilizing practitioner interviews and a survey, this article identifies the factors that influence the planning and use of these systems in this fast-moving environment. The results clearly demonstrate that the implementation of these systems varies significantly across different national and organizational contexts, resulting in a fragmented global nuclear-detection architecture, which arguably undermines efforts to detect trafficked nuclear-threat materials. Greater consideration should therefore be given to developing international standards and guidance, designing and adopting tools to support key parts of the alarm assessment process, and broader sharing of good practice.     

The Damoclean sword of offensive cyber: Policy uncertainty and collective insecurity

Cyberspace is a new domain of operation, with its own characteristics. Cyber weapons differ qualitatively from kinetic ones: They generate effects by non-kinetic means through information, technology, and networks. Their properties, opportunities, and constraints are comparable to the qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. New weapons and their target sets in a new domain raise a series of unresolved policy challenges at the domestic, bilateral, and international levels about deterrence, attribution, and response. They also introduce new risks: uncertainty about unintended consequences, expectations of efficacy, and uncertainty about both the target’s and the international community’s response. Cyber operations offer considerable benefits for states to achieve strategic objectives both covertly and overtly. However, without a strategic framework to contain and possibly deter their use, make state and non-state behavior more predictable in the absence of reciprocal norms, and limit their impact, an environment where states face persistent attacks that nonetheless fall below the threshold of armed conflict presents a policy dilemma that reinforces collective insecurity.     

Offset Contracts as an Insurance Device in Building the National Security

A dynamic multi-stage decision-theoretic approach is introduced to establish the optimal offset and its incidence, the contract price arising from bargaining, and the scale of the acquisition. A new rationale is suggested for offsets in terms of their role as an insurance devise. Results are derived for the pricing of delivery contracts subject to offset claims and their national security implications. It is shown that the national security is strictly convex in the offset transaction. As to the incidence of the offset, the offset claim is shown to be capitalised in the delivery price. The bargaining price is shown to depend on the value of the product to be delivered for the national security, the relative negotiation power of the contracting partners and the social cost of public funds. The analysis highlights the expectation effects of offsets on the bargaining price and the scale of delivery. The results aid in explaining why offsets are widely used in procurement contracts for defence materiel. As they contribute to the national security, they should be allowed to survive and not be denied under competition laws.