应急器材柔性采购定价建模与求解

由于当前应急器材储备依然存在“多储”或“少储”风险,为提高储备效益,以企业经济效益与军队采购成本为优化目标,提出了应急器材柔性采购策略。通过建立企业储备策略与军队采购定价最优化模型,求解得到了在不同战争爆发概率及器材现货市场价格区间等外部环境因素下的军队最佳柔性定价及对应的企业最优储备策略,并通过实例分析验证了得出的决策结论。结果表明,最优策略的实施将有利于军队与企业共担应急器材数量储备风险。     

线性模型的海基制导系统误差分离方法性能分析

利用传统制导工具系统误差线性回归模型,对Bayes估计、主成分分析以及正则化分析三种改进的分离方法进行了比较,分析了它们在工程应用上的优缺点,给出了实际应用时的限制因素;同时结合海基导弹特有的初始状态误差,设计了整体估计、分段估计以及迭代估计三种估计策略,给出了相应的分离步骤。仿真结果表明,文中给出的三种误差分离方法在不同的评价标准下具有不同的实际应用意义;而在弹道差评价标准以及方差评价标准下,分段估计和迭代估计策略下的误差分离结果要明显好于传统整体估计结果。     

“Leading from behind”: neoclassical realism and operation Odyssey Dawn

In March 2011, President Barack Obama ordered US air and naval forces to commence Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya to impose a no-fly zone. The decision by the Obama Administration to intervene in a limited and supporting role in Libya is an important development in US foreign policy. Operation Odyssey Dawn presents scholars with a valuable opportunity to analyze and explore how US foreign policy is made and what roles domestic politics and elite perceptions play in decisions to use force. The author argues that neoclassical realism is a useful and compelling theoretic framework with which to analyze Operation Odyssey Dawn. While the Administration intervened in response to perceived external-level threats to US national interests, salient intervening domestic-level variables and elite perceptions shaped and guided the tenor and scope of the operation.     

Size Still Matters: Explaining Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency Victory over the Tamil Tigers

The military effectiveness literature has largely dismissed the role of material preponderance in favor of strategic interaction theories. The study of counterinsurgency, in which incumbent victory is increasingly rare despite material superiority, has also turned to other strategic dynamics explanations like force employment, leadership, and insurgent/adversary attributes. Challenging these two trends, this paper contends that even in cases of counterinsurgency, material preponderance remains an essential—and at times the most important—factor in explaining battlefield outcomes and effectiveness. To test this, the paper turns to the case of the Sri Lankan state’s fight against the Tamil Tiger insurgency, a conflict which offers rich variation over time across six periods and over 25 years. Drawing on evidence from historical and journalistic accounts, interviews, memoirs, and field research, the paper demonstrates that material preponderance accounts for variation in military effectiveness and campaign outcomes (including military victory in the final campaign) better than strategic explanations. Additionally, a new quantitative data-set assembled on annual loss-exchange ratios demonstrates the superiority of materialist explanations above those of skill, human capital, and regime type.     

The Dao of foreign policy: Understanding China’s dual strategy in the South China Sea

In the South China Sea, China neither implements power-maximizing policy nor engages a peaceful approach. Instead, China implements both coercion and cooperation in pursuing its strategic interest in the disputed area. How can we explain China’s paradoxical behavior? This article claims that the best way to explain China’s policy in the South China Sea is to understand the character of dualism in China’s strategic culture. Following constructivist theory that stresses culture, this article argues that Chinese duality approach in the South China Sea is rooted in the philosophy of Daoism. The symbol of Yin-Yang depicts Chinese assertive as well as cooperative behavior in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. Although from a normative perspective Daoism recognizes pacifism and non-violent behavior, the most important feature of Daoism is the assumption that reality consists of two opposing elements that are mutually embedded.     

The Afghan model in northern Iraq

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.