A new kind of fictitious play

Gass, Zafra, and Qiu (1996) introduce a modified version of fictitious play for matrix games where only the more successful player's strategy is retained. This paper introduces additional modifications that appear to converge faster. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.* Naval Research Logistics 48: 270–280, 2001     

基于SPRT的组合导航故障检测与隔离互辅算法

针对SPRT(序贯概率比检验)算法无法准确判断缓变故障结束时间的问题,提出了一种故障检测与隔离互辅算法。采用SPRT算法对滤波残差进行故障检测,确认故障后隔离故障观测量,重新建立卡尔曼滤波观测方程并完成量测更新,将隔离后的滤波结果作为下一时刻的滤波初值辅助故障检测。仿真结果表明,该方法能准确定位故障观测量并判断出故障的结束时间,提高了系统可靠性。     

The Banzhaf value and communication situations

Myerson 3 and 4 proposed and characterized a modification of the Shapley value in the context of communication situations. In this paper we propose several characterizations of the extension of the Banzhaf value proposed by Owen 7 to communication situations. In particular we characterize this value with the properties of fairness, isolation, and pairwise merging. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Variables inspection for SPC‐quarantined production

When a control chart signals an out‐of‐control condition for a production process, it may be desirable to “quarantine” all units produced since the last in‐control SPC sample. This paper presents an efficient procedure for variables inspection of such “SPC quarantined” product. A Bayesian sequential inspection procedure is developed which determines whether the out of control production is of acceptable quality. By inspecting the units in reverse of the order in which they were produced, the procedure is also capable of detecting the point at which the process went out of control, thus eliminating the need to inspect units produced prior to the onset of the out of control condition. Numerical examples are presented, and the performance characteristics of the procedure are demonstrated using Monte Carlo simulation. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 159–171, 2001     

干扰方式选择方法的研究

为实现对雷达的有效干扰,应选择最佳干扰方式。将干扰效能分为干扰效果和干扰效率2个方面,并对这2方面进行了定量描述,提出了新的干扰效能评估算法,建立了雷达对抗策略矩阵,在此基础上运用对策论的相关原理,研究了干扰方式的选择问题,最后结合实例进行了检验。结果表明,该方法可以有效得出最佳干扰方式。     

Franchising cooperation through chance cross‐constrained games

This paper explores the role of franchising arrangements in the context of game theory. We assume a single franchisor and a single franchisee channel and address the impact of fixed lump‐sum fees, royalties, wholesale price, and retail price on the franchise contracts. We start with the chance cross‐constrained noncooperative situation where the franchisor, as the leader, first specifies his/her strategies. The franchisee, as the follower, then decides on his/her decision. We then relax the assumption of franchisee's inability to influence the franchisor's decisions and discuss cooperative situation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Nash's bargaining model is utilized to select the best Pareto‐efficient payment scheme for the franchisor and the franchisee to achieve their cooperation. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 669–685, 2000     

联合补充博弈的费用分摊

就一个仓库、多个零售商,对联合订货费用函数的模型进行分析,给出了一个求解最佳订货周期的多项式时间的算法,且算法的时间复杂性为O（nlogn）。利用文献[8]中的技巧,给出了该库存博弈的核。     

Network routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis framework

Problems in counterterrorism and corporate competition have prompted research that attempts to combine statistical risk analysis with game theory in ways that support practical decision making. This article applies these methods of adversarial risk analysis to the problem of selecting a route through a network in which an opponent chooses vertices for ambush. The motivating application is convoy routing across a road network when there may be improvised explosive devices and imperfect intelligence about their locations. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Capacity allocation with traditional and Internet channels

In this paper we study a capacity allocation problem for two firms, each of which has a local store and an online store. Customers may shift among the stores upon encountering a stockout. One question facing each firm is how to allocate its finite capacity (i.e., inventory) between its local and online stores. One firm's allocation affects the decision of the rival, thereby creating a strategic interaction. We consider two scenarios of a single‐product single‐period model and derive corresponding existence and stability conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We then conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium solution with respect to price and cost parameters. We also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a generalized model in which each firm has multiple local stores and a single online store. Finally, we extend the results to a multi‐period model in which each firm decides its total capacity and allocates this capacity between its local and online stores. A myopic solution is derived and shown to be a Nash equilibrium solution of a corresponding “sequential game.” © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006