Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.     

Excess procurement strategies by a dominant buyer under constrained supply

Supply chains are often characterized by the presence of a dominant buyer purchasing from a supplier with limited capacity. We study such a situation where a single supplier sells capacity to an established and more powerful buyer and also to a relatively less powerful buyer. The more powerful buyer enjoys the first right to book her capacity requirements at supplier's end, and then the common supplier fulfills the requirement of the less powerful buyer. We find that when the supplier's capacity is either too low (below the lower threshold) or too high (above the higher threshold), there is no excess procurement as compared to the case when supplier has infinite capacity. When the supplier's capacity is between these two thresholds, the more powerful buyer purchases an excess amount in comparison to the infinite capacity case.     

复杂网络影响力极大化快速评估算法

分析复杂网络中影响力极大化问题,设计一种新的启发式算法框架。针对信息传递中节点的交互方式进行分析,给出节点在任意时刻处于信息接收态的概率。通过期望计算得到种子节点集传播影响力的近似估计,实现集群影响力快速计算,进而得到基于序列采样的影响力极大化快速评估算法。特别地,对于六个来自不同领域的真实网络上的影响力极大化问题进行了研究,仿真结果表明：该方法能够高效识别网络中具有重要传播影响力的节点集,在三种常见度量准则下的表现均明显优于三种影响力极大化问题基准算法。     

Purchase and retrieval competition for seasonal produce

We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.     

军事物流服务商准入标准设置和甄选研究综述

军事物流服务商甄选研究是新军事变革下供应商管理发展的重要方向,是有效完成后勤保障任务、顺利实施作战行动的重要保证。基于此,本文从供应商关系理论和发展、物流服务商指标体系选择以及结合其他方法对物流服务商甄选三个方面对国内外研究现状进行总结概述,对整个军事物流服务商的选择过程加以研究,将其科学客观地运用于军事物流服务商选择的实际操作中,对于加强军事物流服务商需求管理、提高选择质效以及优化工作流程具有重大意义。同时,分析现有研究成果的不足,并对其未来发展前景提出展望,针对性地提出了军事物流服务商初步准入标准以及后续复选的方法,为军事物流服务商选择体系的完善提供参考。     

多目标模糊微分对策

多目标问题是微分对策研究的一个重要而困难的方面.多目标微分对策是动态向量对策,结合了多目标规划与动态对策,扩大了微分对策在分析冲突问题时解决问题的范围,多具有非线性和不确定性特点.为避免非线性带来求解上的困难和处理不确定信息等,基于T-S模糊微分对策思想,构造出多目标微分对策的模糊线性化模型,然后在模糊线性多目标微分对策系统下对控制器的设计方法作出探讨.对一个1∶2对策问题做了仿真,其效果说明了解决问题方法的可行.     

一种新的高分辨率SAR图像目标自动鉴别方法

目标鉴别是SAR图像目标识别系统的关键环节,用以消除预筛选阶段因异常检测产生的大量虚假的感兴趣区域切片。针对目标鉴别问题,提出了一种新的目标自动鉴别方法,首先对CFAR检测的结果做基于面积特征的预鉴别处理,而后对获得的ROI目标切片提取鉴别特征,并在特征分析的基础上设定特征判决阈值,实现序贯鉴别处理。利用X波段SAR图像数据检验了上述方法,给出了鉴别输出的ROI切片。     

基于GMAW堆焊成形的顺序焊道搭接量模型

焊道搭接量对保证三维堆焊成形过程的顺利进行以及成形件的精度都有较为重要的影响。根据焊接熔滴过渡的物理特性,建立了GMAW堆焊三维成形的顺序焊道搭接量模型,在此基础上计算了平整堆焊层的相邻两道焊道的理论间隔,采用实际焊接试验对理论模型进行了验证,得到的理论间隔为L=2/3W,并进一步计算了平整堆焊层的高度为h=H/1-θ,实际试验得到的结果与理论结果相吻合,从而为焊接成形过程的自动化奠定了基础。     

New product introduction against a predator: A bilevel mixed‐integer programming approach

We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

联合补充博弈的费用分摊

就一个仓库、多个零售商,对联合订货费用函数的模型进行分析,给出了一个求解最佳订货周期的多项式时间的算法,且算法的时间复杂性为O（nlogn）。利用文献[8]中的技巧,给出了该库存博弈的核。