基于博弈论计算机网络对抗问题研究

针对日益普遍和多样的网络攻击行为,如何对网络各种攻防过程进行分析已逐渐成为热点研究方向。在对计算机网络对抗问题复杂性表现和产生根源进行探讨基础上,从完全信息静态博弈、完全信息动态博弈、不完全信息静态博弈、不完全信息动态博弈4个视角,对计算机网络对抗问题进行分类论述,对各解决方法进行了综合比较,并对今后的研究进行了展望。     

基于对策论的威胁评估模型

数据融合模型一般包括多个层次,威胁评估是其中之一。威胁评估根据态势情况,推测威胁程度及可能的行动方案。在分析对策论和威胁评估的基础上,提出基于矩阵对策的威胁评估模型及分析方法。     

DEA models for two‐stage processes: Game approach and efficiency decomposition

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs). This tool has been utilized by a number of authors to examine two‐stage processes, where all the outputs from the first stage are the only inputs to the second stage. The current article examines and extends these models using game theory concepts. The resulting models are linear, and imply an efficiency decomposition where the overall efficiency of the two‐stage process is a product of the efficiencies of the two individual stages. When there is only one intermediate measure connecting the two stages, both the noncooperative and centralized models yield the same results as applying the standard DEA model to the two stages separately. As a result, the efficiency decomposition is unique. While the noncooperative approach yields a unique efficiency decomposition under multiple intermediate measures, the centralized approach is likely to yield multiple decompositions. Models are developed to test whether the efficiency decomposition arising from the centralized approach is unique. The relations among the noncooperative, centralized, and standard DEA approaches are investigated. Two real world data sets and a randomly generated data set are used to demonstrate the models and verify our findings. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Information disclosure with endogenous channel structure

This article investigates the firms' optimal quality information disclosure strategies in a supply chain, wherein the supplier may encroach into the retail channel to sell products directly to end consumers. We consider two disclosure formats, namely, retailer disclosure (R-C) and supplier disclosure (S-C), and examine the optimal disclosure format from each firm's perspective. We show that either firm prefers to delegate the disclosure option to its partner when the supplier cannot encroach. However, the threat of supplier encroachment dramatically alters the firm's preference of disclosure. The supplier may prefer the S-C format to the R-C format when the entry cost is low and the disclosure cost is high to achieve a higher quality information transparency. Meanwhile, the retailer may prefer the R-C format to the S-C format when the entry cost is intermediate to deter the possible encroachment of the supplier. In this sense, the firms' preferences of disclosure format can be aligned due to the threat of supplier encroachment. The consumer surplus is always higher under the S-C format while either disclosure format can lead to a higher social welfare. We also consider an alternative scenario under which the supplier encroaches after the product quality information is disclosed. An interesting observation appears that the supplier may encroach when the product quality is low but foregoes encroachment when the product quality gets higher.     

Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.     

Double window acceptance sampling

We introduce the concept of a sequential double window procedure and compare the resulting acceptance test with both a fixed sample size method as well as with the Wald sequential probability ratio test. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004     

不同游戏方式下的暴力网络游戏对大学生攻击性的影响

目的:探讨不同游戏方式下的暴力网络游戏对不同攻击性特质大学生攻击性的影响。方法:采用攻击性特质问卷、词汇决策任务和竞争反应时任务对60名大学生进行问卷和实验研究。结果:在不同游戏方式下,被试表现出的攻击性认知和行为存在显著差异(F(2,52)=4.41,P<0.05;F(1,52)=50.06,P<0.001)。高、低攻击性特质者在游戏后的攻击性认知和行为上存在显著差异(F(1,52)=15.25,P<0.001;F(1,52)=82.35,P<0.001)。结论:不同游戏方式下的暴力网络游戏对大学生的攻击性存在不同的影响,相比竞争游戏和单人游戏,合作游戏是一种较好的游戏方式,可以在一定程度减少大学生,特别是高攻击性特质大学生的攻击性认知和行为。此外,暴力网络游戏对大学生攻击性认知和攻击性行为的影响存在一致性。     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

基于模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型

讨论了策略集清晰、支付值模糊的模糊双矩阵对策的一种求解方法,并以某型导弹混编群对抗ARM（反辐射导弹）及载机为案例进行研究,建立了基于模糊双矩阵对策的作战效能评估模型,研究结果对于双方资源分配,提高作战效能具有一定的军事应用价值。     

给定极小样本量的定量截尾序贯检验法及其应用

对现有截尾序贯检验法作了必要的改进,提出定量截尾序贯检验法。结合导弹命中精度验收试验的工程实际需求,在事先给定几种特小样本量的前提下,针对定量截尾序贯检验法的实际应用展开研究,给出了可应用于实际的检验方案。通过对检验实例的比较分析,说明了方案的优越性。