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101.
Beatrice Heuser 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(4):741-753
When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes. 相似文献
102.
崔晓星 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2014,30(10):9-14
在小尺寸试验中重现了火灾火焰的旋转现象,并在没有外部鼓风的情况下,实现了旋转火焰自发产生。对室内火灾的旋转火焰现象进行了描述,得出旋转火焰具有自旋、根部变细、焰柱增长和旋转中心飘移等特征。并进一步分析了房间结构变化对室内火灾旋转火焰火灾危险性的影响,得出随着燃烧池面积的增大、门宽的减小及门高的降低,旋转火焰均呈增强趋势,而随着顶棚开口面积的增大,旋转火焰先增大后减小。 相似文献
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104.
针对装甲装备关键部件维修性验证中出现的小子样问题,提出了基于Bayes理论的小子样维修性验证,重点针对对数正态分布下维修性指标验证的验后似然比验证方法进行了深入研究。通过对装甲装备某关键部件的试验数据的实例分析,验证了该方法在减少样本容量及试验费用方面的有效性和合理性。 相似文献
105.
针对装备软件成本估算时面临的历史数据少的小样本难题,提出把机器学习理论运用到装备软件成本估算研究领域,构建了基于相关向量机的小样本装备软件成本估算模型,采用COCOMO模型数据库中的数据对所构建模型进行训练和验证。为进一步验证所构建模型的合理性,在机器学习领域分别运用支持向量机模型和神经网络模型对相同数据进行估算,实验结果证明了基于相关向量机估算模型在小样本装备软件成本估算时比其他两种模型更精确。 相似文献
106.
为评估炸药在封闭容器内爆炸产生的振动效应对周围环境的影响,对封闭式爆炸容器小药量TNT炸药爆炸产生的爆炸振动效应进行了爆源邻近实地监测和测试。结果表明:小药量炸药爆炸引起的爆炸振动效应对距爆源100 m以外的普通砖结构民用住宅产生的速度强度远低于其临界峰值速度,不会对其结构产生明显影响。 相似文献
107.
Simon Anglim 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):588-608
The period from December 1940 through to the spring of 1941 saw the British Army win a series of rapid and decisive victories over Italian and Vichy French forces in North and East Africa and the Middle East. A key feature of these operations was the extensive British use of fast-moving all-arms mobile formations utilising superior speed and mobility to out-manoeuvre considerably larger Italian formations. A number of reasons have been given for the British Army adopting this mode of warfare, but the paper contends that the best explanation is that they were an organic evolution from methods used by the British Army in ‘small wars’ throughout the early twentieth century, use of mobile ‘frontier columns’ at the operational and tactical level of war being described and recommended by Callwell himself and visible with the Army in practice in operations in India and the Middle East in particular. The inter-war period saw the combination of this model of warfare with post-First World War military technology, notably tanks, close air support and coordination by wireless. Colonial operations in this period also saw some utilisation of what would later be identified as ‘Special Forces’ – also used extensively in the Desert War – the most obvious example being Captain Orde Wingate's Special Night Squads in Palestine in 1938. 相似文献
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109.
Timothy J. Lomperis 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2016,27(1):132-153
In a military intervention, do surges work? I compare the failed ‘surge’ in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: the military dimensions and strategy of the surging forces, the military capabilities of the host forces, the political vitality and will of the host country, and the political commitment in the domestic politics of the intervener. I find that the last feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the American political commitment was lacking. 相似文献
110.