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551.
刘凤祥 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2012,(7):44-46,49
消防院校教练员队伍是一支专门从事消防业务理论教育和灭火救援业务技能训练的教育队伍。教练员队伍建设质量的高低决定着消防部队教育训练的发展方向,对提升消防部队整体作战能力起着关键性的作用。以提高消防教练员队伍综合素质为切入点,在分析现阶段教练员队伍现状的基础上,剖析了教练员队伍中存在的问题和原因,总结了新时期消防部队教练员应具备的素质与能力,提出了提高教练员队伍综合素质的措施,并提出了具体、可行的培养方案。 相似文献
552.
基于舰载无人机对岸上目标的观测能力出发研究出的"理想观参",考虑各种因素对舰载无人机在任务区域飞行安全的影响,建立了地理通视性分析模型、地理可飞性分析模型、飞行可控性分析模型、弹道安全性分析模型和观参上限分析模型;综合上述模型,给出了舰载无人机可观测安全飞行空间,满足可观测安全飞行空间的观测参数即为当前环境下的"实用观参";根据本文模型研制的舰载无人机对岸射击观测辅助决策软件,实现了舰载无人机对岸射击观测的科学决策。 相似文献
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555.
美国认为太空已被普遍认定为最重要的作战域之一,未来的太空安全态势将愈发严峻。本文认为, 美国正面向未来太空对抗环境进行全面转型, 从顶层战略、作战理论、组织结构、战备训练、装备技术等方面开展研究、调整和长远布局, 如以我为主要对手谋划布局、发布系列军事航天顶层指导文件、大幅增加太空攻防作战相关经费投入等。 目前, 美军正处于新旧体系转换、 下一代能力构建发展的关键期, 不仅正在变革军队组织体制、重组太空攻防作战力量, 还积极开展系列演习演训, 以加速形成太空攻防实战能力。美军这一系列动向将对未来太空领域安全与发展产生重大影响, 应引起我高度重视。 相似文献
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基于UML的航天发射指挥控制软件建模研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
指挥控制软件是影响SLC2S高效运行的重要因素之一。为了提高航天发射指挥控制软件的综合效能,基于统一建模语言(UML)建模技术,从软件需求分析出发,对航天发射指挥控制软件开发进行了静态和动态建模,增强了软件的一致性和可复用性,为软件开发奠定了良好基础。 相似文献
558.
Diego Esparza Santiago Arca Henon Hope Dewell Gentry 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(3):314-334
ABSTRACT There have been over 90,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world to 78 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in over 125 countries since 1948. Some scholars have made the case that these missions have had a positive impact on the relationship between the military and the civilians they work for. However, other scholars have identified a negative impact on civil military relations (CMR). This paper contributes to this debate by investigating how peacekeeping has impacted civil-military relations in Latin America's most prolific contributor to peacekeeping: Uruguay. This paper finds that PKOs in Uruguay have facilitated post-transitions attempts by civilians to build first-generation control, but not second-generation control. Further, PKOs have marginally improved military effectiveness, but we find that they do not improve societal trust in the armed forces. 相似文献
559.
Colin D. Robinson 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):109-122
ABSTRACTGrouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces than the previous single-type-of-warship formations. This system has evolved and spread to naval forces ashore but remains fundamentally unchanged. It now covers numbers between 1 to over 1000, of which the most prominent is the first 100 or so which U.S. Navy combat forces use. The numbered fleets worldwide utilize the series covering 20-79; 1-19 and 90-99 appear to be reserved for special allocations and Commander, Pacific Fleet; numbers over 80 to the Atlantic; 100-119 for Northern Europe and briefly Tenth Fleet; the 120 series for Second Fleet as a Joint Task Force leader; the 150 series for Naval Forces Central Command; and the 180 series for Atlantic Fleet and now-Fleet Forces Command. 相似文献
560.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):465-479
ABSTRACTOver the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force. 相似文献