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531.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):465-479
ABSTRACTOver the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force. 相似文献
532.
Doreen Horschig 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(3):352-371
ABSTRACT Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation. 相似文献
533.
ABSTRACT The growing area of military bio-technologies, especially the use of cogniceuticals, raises several ethical concerns for military physicians. These include the role of military physicians in prescribing amphetamines whose long-term effects are largely unknown, and the possible undermining of the ethic of “do no harm,” since amphetamines may diminish a soldier’s moral responsibility. Below, we outline some important questions relating to the ethics of amphetamines and medical military physicians. 相似文献
534.
Gregory D. Koblentz 《The Nonproliferation Review》2019,26(5-6):575-598
ABSTRACTInternational efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished. 相似文献