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121.
研究了飞行器碰撞概率计算的一般方法,这种方法通过飞行器和空间物体各自的状态矢量、位置误差协方差矩阵以及形状尺寸来计算飞行器和空间物体的碰撞概率。从位置误差协方差矩阵的一般形式出发,推导了飞行器的碰撞概率计算公式。在推导过程中,将飞行器的相对运动速度看作是方向不变的矢量,从而可以消去平行于相对速度的一维,将三维的概率计算问题转化为和相对速度垂直的相遇平面内的二维概率问题。针对二维概率问题分别研究了三种碰撞概率的计算方法,并比较了它们各自的优缺点。最后通过数值算例验证了三种方法各自的特点及正确性。 相似文献
122.
考虑非线性和椭圆参考轨道等因素,选择编队卫星周期性绕飞的初始条件,设计自然周期性绕飞轨道,对长期编队飞行是十分必要的。然而利用Hill方程确定初始绕飞条件,设计长期编队飞行的轨道,具有很大的误差。本文在考虑非线性和椭圆参考轨道等因素的条件下,利用数字优化技术寻找周期性绕飞的初始条件,设计不消耗任何燃料的编队卫星轨道。优化的结果可用来研究周期性绕飞轨道必须满足的条件,加强对编队机理的认识。数值仿真结果验证了优化结果的正确性和有效性。 相似文献
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124.
提出了一种简单有效的抑制太阳能帆板变形振动的PDA控制方法。其特点主要是在航天工程中常用PD方法的基础上,增加了航天器的刚性姿态加速度反馈,该方法经数值仿真和不同的实验系统证明,对大挠性航天器在姿态机动和位置保持控制时是一种简单可行的振动抑制策略,在大挠性航天器变轨和交会对接工程中具有参考价值。 相似文献
125.
We consider a scenario with two firms determining which products to develop and introduce to the market. In this problem, there exists a finite set of potential products and market segments. Each market segment has a preference list of products and will buy its most preferred product among those available. The firms play a Stackelberg game in which the leader firm first introduces a set of products, and the follower responds with its own set of products. The leader's goal is to maximize its profit subject to a product introduction budget, assuming that the follower will attempt to minimize the leader's profit using a budget of its own. We formulate this problem as a multistage integer program amenable to decomposition techniques. Using this formulation, we develop three variations of an exact mathematical programming method for solving the multistage problem, along with a family of heuristic procedures for estimating the follower solution. The efficacy of our approaches is demonstrated on randomly generated test instances. This article contributes to the operations research literature a multistage algorithm that directly addresses difficulties posed by degeneracy, and contributes to the product variety literature an exact optimization algorithm for a novel competitive product introduction problem. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009 相似文献
126.
就一个仓库、多个零售商,对联合订货费用函数的模型进行分析,给出了一个求解最佳订货周期的多项式时间的算法,且算法的时间复杂性为O(nlogn)。利用文献[8]中的技巧,给出了该库存博弈的核。 相似文献
127.
针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法,在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法.该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立对应关系,再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定.对理论成果的初步应用表明:通过分析由战场情报信息构成的基本概率矩阵的偏序链,可以科学地运用军事欺骗和反军事欺骗战法. 相似文献
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129.
In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016 相似文献
130.
This article investigates the impact of timing on sellers' information acquisition strategies in a duopoly setting. Market uncertainty is captured by a representative consumer who has a private taste for the product's horizontal attribute, and both sellers can acquire this information either before (ex‐ante acquisition) or after (ex‐post acquisition) observing their own product qualities. We identify several conflicting effects of information acquisition that vary significantly in its timing and market characteristics. In the monopoly scenario, information acquisition is unambiguously beneficial and ex‐ante acquisition is the dominant option, because it helps a seller not only design the proper product but also craft better pricing strategy. By contrast, when there is competition, information acquisition eliminates the buffer role of market uncertainty and leads to the fiercest production or pricing competition, which makes the subsequent effects of acquisition detrimental, and a seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in terms of its acquisition cost. Moreover, compared with the ex‐ante information acquisition, ex‐post information acquisition normally generates higher sellers' equilibrium payoffs by postponing the timing of acquisition and maintaining product differentiation. Nonetheless, ex‐post information acquisition also provides the seller with greater acquisition incentive and occasionally makes him worse off than that in the ex‐ante scenario. Thus, in a competitive environment, having the option of information acquisition and flexibility in its timing can be both detrimental and irresistible. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 3–22, 2016 相似文献