DEA models for two‐stage processes: Game approach and efficiency decomposition

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs). This tool has been utilized by a number of authors to examine two‐stage processes, where all the outputs from the first stage are the only inputs to the second stage. The current article examines and extends these models using game theory concepts. The resulting models are linear, and imply an efficiency decomposition where the overall efficiency of the two‐stage process is a product of the efficiencies of the two individual stages. When there is only one intermediate measure connecting the two stages, both the noncooperative and centralized models yield the same results as applying the standard DEA model to the two stages separately. As a result, the efficiency decomposition is unique. While the noncooperative approach yields a unique efficiency decomposition under multiple intermediate measures, the centralized approach is likely to yield multiple decompositions. Models are developed to test whether the efficiency decomposition arising from the centralized approach is unique. The relations among the noncooperative, centralized, and standard DEA approaches are investigated. Two real world data sets and a randomly generated data set are used to demonstrate the models and verify our findings. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

航天器轨道追逃动力学与控制问题研究综述

随着航天器交会与接近操作技术的快速发展,轨道追逃问题逐渐成为航天领域的研究热点。从动力学与控制视角,对航天器轨道追逃问题的研究现状进行综述。给出了基于定量微分对策的轨道追逃问题模型的一般形式,系统梳理了各种类型的轨道追逃问题;对于追逃策略求解,分别针对闭环策略和开环策略,分析了各种方法的优缺点;围绕人工智能算法与轨道追逃问题的结合,阐述了基于深度神经网络和强化学习的轨道追逃策略的研究现状。关于未来展望,提出了追逃博弈态势分析、多航天器博弈控制、三体条件下博弈动力学与控制等发展方向。     

A sequential partial information bomber-defender shooting problem

A bomber carrying homogenous weapons sequentially engages ground targets capable of retaliation. Upon reaching a target, the bomber may fire a weapon at it. If the target survives the direct fire, it can either return fire or choose to hold fire (play dead). If the former occurs, the bomber is immediately made aware that the target is alive. If no return fire is seen, the true status of the target is unknown to the bomber. After the current engagement, the bomber, if still alive, can either re-engage the same target or move on to the next target in the sequence. The bomber seeks to maximize the expected cumulative damage it can inflict on the targets. We solve the perfect and partial information problems, where a target always fires back and sometimes fires back respectively using stochastic dynamic programming. The perfect information scenario yields an appealing threshold based bombing policy. Indeed, the marginal future reward is the threshold at which the control policy switches and furthermore, the threshold is monotonic decreasing with the number of weapons left with the bomber and monotonic nondecreasing with the number of targets left in the mission. For the partial information scenario, we show via a counterexample that the marginal future reward is not the threshold at which the control switches. In light of the negative result, we provide an appealing threshold based heuristic instead. Finally, we address the partial information game, where the target can choose to fire back and establish the Nash equilibrium strategies for a representative two target scenario.     

视场约束下V-bar撤离控制的解析计算方法

利用解析方法研究在视场约束条件下交会对接V-bar撤离的控制问题。描述交会对接V-bar撤离的径向冲量机动方案,说明径向机动撤离方案具有减少羽流污染和故障情况下能够避免飞行器碰撞的优点。基于CW方程推导出已知径向冲量求最大视场角和已知视场角约束求容许冲量的解析公式,同时得到求最大视场角时刻和冲量作用后V-bar方向撤离距离的计算公式。最后,数值和解析两种方法的比较验证了解析方法的正确性。     

基于雷达波束篱笆的空间碎片数量的置信区间估计

针对雷达波束篱笆空间碎片探测模式,提出了一种估计碎片数量置信区间的方法.对于给定的轨道高度范围,将轨道倾角和雷达散射截面足够大的碎片是否真正穿越波束篱笆这一事件用(0-1)分布来建模,根据所获取的轨道高度数据,得到该轨道高度范围内碎片穿越波束篱笆的平均概率,进而采用中心极限定理估计出该范围内碎片总数量的置信区间.仿真实验验证了方法的有效性.     

载人航天器低空救生仿真

在载人航天器低空救生中,回收系统开伞点的初始状态参数如速度、离地面高度、弹道倾角对返回舱能否安全着陆有很大影响.与正常返回类似,低空救生中的回收系统同样经过多级伞的拉直、充气、全充满等运动过程.通过建立回收系统着陆过程的动力学模型,经过大量仿真对比分析,得到开伞点离地面高度为低空救生中返回舱安全着陆的首要因素,同时对低空救生中回收系统多级伞开伞减速过程有了详细的分析.     

游戏：走向教学对话的本真

教学对话是教师、学生与文本之间实现的智识共享、双向理解和意义创生,达成多重视界的融合。教学中教师的独白、预设的问答以及片面的对话向我们展现的是遮蔽的教学对话。游戏与教学对话有着某种契合,游戏与教学对话的相融,教师、学生和文本之间达成智识共享、共同在场、意义的创生、全面的对话直至多重的视界相融,使教学对话真正走向本真之境。     

海军兵棋演习系统研究

兵棋演习系统是我军未来开展模拟训练的重要手段,针对国内外对兵棋推演系统现状及技术发展趋势进行研究,提出海军兵棋演习系统的发展方向和设计方法,并结合海军兵棋推演的研究内容重点,给出作战规则建模、指挥关系建模等主要关键技术的解决方法,为我国海军未来兵棋推演系统设计、研究和发展提供技术支撑。     

Validation of a strategy for harbor defense based on the use of a min‐max algorithm receding horizon control law

We present a validation of a centralized feedback control law for robotic or partially robotic water craft whose task is to defend a harbor from an intruding fleet of water craft. Our work was motivated by the need to provide harbor defenses against hostile, possibly suicidal intruders, preferably using unmanned craft to limit potential casualties. Our feedback control law is a sample‐data receding horizon control law, which requires the solution of a complex max‐min problem at the start of each sample time. In developing this control law, we had to deal with three challenges. The first was to develop a max‐min problem that captures realistically the nature of the defense‐intrusion game. The second was to ensure the solution of this max‐min problem can be accomplished in a small fraction of the sample time that would be needed to control a possibly fast moving craft. The third, to which this article is dedicated, was to validate the effectiveness of our control law first through computer simulations pitting a computer against a computer or a computer against a human, then through the use of model hovercraft in a laboratory, and finally on the Chesapeake Bay, using Yard Patrol boats. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 247–259, 2016     

‘Look like the innocent flower,but be the serpent under’t’: mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations

This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signalling game. Combining the signalling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat, it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second-period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked in the first period than if it were attacked.