利用二坐标R站实现运动辐射源的三维跟踪

本文提出了一种基于目标斜距两次测量值之差和方位角信息的定位跟踪算法,详细分析了该技术的定位原理和可行性。在辐射源匀速直线运动的条件下,如果能够不测俯仰角而只用方位角和距离差实现对目标的定位与跟踪,将不仅可以简化接收站的设备,而且还能够增强其独立性能,因此本文讨论的算法对于单站被动定位跟踪系统的实用性具有重要意义。本文通过典型目标航迹的计算机仿真,对算法的性能做了评估．     

PTL 证明器的实现技术

基于文［１０］中的理论,我们用Ｔｕｒｂｏ─ｐｒｏｌｏｇ编程,在３８６微机上成功地实现了命题时态逻辑定理的证明器。该证明器在处理ｎｅｘｔ幂次、归纳、归结、◇（ｘ∧ｙ）、ｕｎｔｉｌ　等方面,均有独到之处。这些方面,克服了以往工作的不足。证明器界面友好、速度快、能力强。     

用配点法求解四边搁支板的弯曲问题

根据弹性薄板微分方程的一般解和边界条件的配点法来求四边搁支板的弯曲问题,并以对称荷载作用下的正方形板为例进行了分析计算。     

卫星及其诱饵的表面瞬态温度场

文中给出了计算空间目标和诱饵表面温度场的方法,比较了目标和诱饵表面温度特性的差异,指出了这些差异对点目标自动识别的重要意义。     

van der Pol 振子在负反馈作用下的动力性态分析

本文从非线性振动理论和反馈控制论的角度研究了ｖａｎｄｅｒＰｏｌ振子在负反馈作用下的动力性态,用中心流形法和形式级数法分析了ｖａｎｄｅｒＰｏｌ振子的局部稳定性和Ｈｏｐｆ分叉行为,用Ｒｕｎｇｅ─Ｋｕｔｔａ法给出了仿真结果。     

2K-H 行星传动的极限传动比

在行星轮系机构综合中,研究行星轮数目与极限传动比的关系有着极其重要的意义。本文根据２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构的同心条件、安装条件和邻接条件,采用统一的符号,对满足上述条件的所有（六种）２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构,导出了行星轮个数与极限传动比的统一关系式,得到了所有２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构的极限传动比计算公式,为２Ｋ─Ｈ行星轮系机构的综合提供了理论根据。     

炸药装药在压剪加载下的起爆特点

进行了两类压剪加载实验：（１）利用石英的平面正碰撞产生压剪加载的实验,采用电磁质速法测试装药试件内部不同质点的运动情况,分析炸药装药中发生化学反应的可能性;（２）在压剪炮上采用平行倾斜碰撞产生压剪加载的实验,观测炸药装药爆炸的可能性。由实验可以看出：在亚爆轰状态的压缩加载应力条件下,剪切的联合作用对炸药的起爆起到敏化作用,适当比例的压剪加载造成更加敏感的炸药起爆响应。文中给出了起爆响应规律和响应机制的实验分析。     

Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem

The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental managerial function typically involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence of this task in practice, the process is seldom approached as an optimization problem over the reported preferences of all agents. This is due in part to the underlying computational complexity that occurs when intra-team interpersonal interactions are taken into consideration, and also due to game-theoretic considerations, when those taking part in the process are self-interested agents. Variants of this fundamental decision problem arise in a number of settings, including, for example, human resources and project management, military platooning, ride sharing, data clustering, and in assigning students to group projects. In this article, we study an analytical approach to “team formation” focused on the interplay between two of the most common objectives considered in the related literature: economic efficiency (i.e., the maximization of social welfare) and game-theoretic stability (e.g., finding a core solution when one exists). With a weighted objective across these two goals, the problem is modeled as a bi-level binary optimization problem, and transformed into a single-level, exponentially sized binary integer program. We then devise a branch-cut-and-price algorithm and demonstrate its efficacy through an extensive set of simulations, with favorable comparisons to other algorithms from the literature.     

The effect of deployment on first‐ and second‐term re‐enlistment in the US active duty force

Why should deployment affect re‐enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naïve beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re‐enlisting. Empirically, re‐enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non‐hostile deployment increases first‐term re‐enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second‐term re‐enlistment. Interestingly, first‐term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second‐term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re‐enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.     

Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.