The solution to an open problem for a caching game

In a caching game introduced by Alpern et al. (Alpern et al., Lecture notes in computer science (2010) 220–233) a Hider who can dig to a total fixed depth normalized to 1 buries a fixed number of objects among n discrete locations. A Searcher who can dig to a total depth of h searches the locations with the aim of finding all of the hidden objects. If he does so, he wins, otherwise the Hider wins. This zero‐sum game is complicated to analyze even for small values of its parameters, and for the case of 2 hidden objects has been completely solved only when the game is played in up to 3 locations. For some values of h the solution of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations is known, but the solution in the remaining cases was an open question recently highlighted by Fokkink et al. (Fokkink et al., Search theory: A game theoretic perspective (2014) 85–104). Here we solve the remaining cases of the game with 2 objects hidden in 4 locations. We also give some more general results for the game, in particular using a geometrical argument to show that when there are 2 objects hidden in n locations and n→∞, the value of the game is asymptotically equal to h/n for h≥n/2. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 23–31, 2016     

Non‐zero‐sum nonlinear network path interdiction with an application to inspection in terror networks

A simultaneous non‐zero‐sum game is modeled to extend the classical network interdiction problem. In this model, an interdictor (e.g., an enforcement agent) decides how much of an inspection resource to spend along each arc in the network to capture a smuggler. The smuggler (randomly) selects a commodity to smuggle—a source and destination pair of nodes, and also a corresponding path for traveling between the given pair of nodes. This model is motivated by a terrorist organization that can mobilize its human, financial, or weapon resources to carry out an attack at one of several potential target destinations. The probability of evading each of the network arcs nonlinearly decreases in the amount of resource that the interdictor spends on its inspection. We show that under reasonable assumptions with respect to the evasion probability functions, (approximate) Nash equilibria of this game can be determined in polynomial time; depending on whether the evasion functions are exponential or general logarithmically‐convex functions, exact Nash equilibria or approximate Nash equilibria, respectively, are computed. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 139–153, 2017     

坦克稳像火控系统射击精度分析

从射击准备和射弹散布两个方面,对坦克稳像火控系统射击误差进行了较全面地分析,提出了射击误差的计算方法,并在此基础上对坦克使用稳像火控系统射击时的首发命中概率进行了计算     

一种瞄星替代方法方案设计

角度零位一致是舰炮武器系统精确打击目标的前提和基础,鉴于传统瞄星方法的局限性,在舰艇系泊条件下,提出了一种新的瞄星替代方法,该方法选择合适的海上及岸上目标作为瞄准目标,运用相应的算法,可以完成舰炮武器系统角度零位的标定工作.该方法可以作为未来舰炮武器系统零位标定的一种备用方法和手段进行使用.     

差分放大器的误差分析

在差分放大电路中 ,电路的偏置电阻、晶体管 (BJT)的参数、信号源的内阻、工作温度都会引起输出的误差 .通过对典型电路的分析 ,得出了误差计算公式 ,分析了减小误差的方法     

空间拦截零控脱靶量与末段制导能量需求的近似计算

基于理想二体假设下的弹道方程解析式,忽略重力在拦截末段对拦截器和目标运动状态的影响.推导了空间拦截初始制导偏差与终端零控脱靶量之间的线性近似计算式,并以速度增量的大小来近似描述拦截末端主动寻的制导段的能量需求,给出了拦截末段制导最小能量需求与零控脱靶量、探测距离之间的近似关系.通过数字仿真测试了近似计算的准确性.     

某地地导弹控制回路参数测试系统设计

针对导弹的定型试验,介绍了一种通用的地地导弹系统数据采集方案,并对其中所遇到的关键问题加以阐述,对各种火控系统的定型设备研制具有一定的参考价值     

超低空目标侦察与数字化火控技术的发展前景

低空、超低空目标的日益增多,促进了超低空目标侦察技术和防空兵火控观念的改变.对雷达超低空侦察技术、被动声纳超低空预警技术、地面防空兵器数字化火控技术3个方面的发展前景进行了详细论述.     

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR ZERO

The disappointingly slow pace of progress on efforts to prevent proliferation, reduce nuclear weapons, and eliminate nuclear risks has many causes. The factor that might be easiest for individuals in the arms control and nonproliferation community to change stems from their own ambivalence about major questions that must be addressed on the road to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to zero. This essay explores how ambivalence about four key issues—strategic stability, alliance relations, institution-building, and nuclear energy—often leads community members to take positions that play well at home and within their like-minded group but raise unintended impediments to achieving their own long-term goals. The author suggests alternative ways to handle these questions to improve the prospects for domestic and international agreement on practical measures that would eliminate, not perpetuate, nuclear risks.     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006