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381.
Recent supply‐chain models that study competition among capacity‐constrained producers omit the possibility of producers strategically setting wholesale prices to create uncertainty with regards to (i.e., to obfuscate) their production capacities. To shed some light on this possibility, we study strategic obfuscation in a supply‐chain model comprised of two competing producers and a retailer, where one of the producers faces a privately‐known capacity constraint. We show that capacity obfuscation can strictly increase the obfuscating producer's profit, therefore, presenting a clear incentive for such practices. Moreover, we identify conditions under which both producers' profits increase. In effect, obfuscation enables producers to tacitly collude and charge higher wholesale prices by moderating competition between producers. The retailer, in contrast, suffers a loss in profit, raises retail prices, while overall channel profits decrease. We show that the extent of capacity obfuscation is limited by its cost and by a strategic retailer's incentive to facilitate a deterrence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 244–267, 2014 相似文献
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物业管理是城市社区管理中一个重要的基层管理体系,消防安全管理作为物业管理的一项重要工作,目前还存在着许多亟待解决的问题。从高层住宅物业消防管理的现状入手,分析其存在的问题及原因,探讨解决问题的措施,促进物业消防管理的发展完善。 相似文献
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We study the optimal contracting problem between two firms collaborating on capacity investment with information asymmetry. Without a contract, system efficiency is lost due to the profit‐margin differentials among the firms, demand uncertainty, and information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the optimal capacity level is characterized by a newsvendor formula with an upward‐adjusted capacity investment cost, and no first‐best solution can be achieved. Our analysis shows that system efficiency can always be improved by the optimal contract and the improvement in system efficience is due to two factors. While the optimal contract may bring the system's capacity level closer to the first‐best capacity level, it prevents the higher‐margin firm from overinvesting and aligns the capacity‐investment decisions of the two firms. Our analysis of a special case demonstrates that, under some circumstances, both firms can benefit from the principal having better information about the agent's costs. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 54:, 2007 相似文献
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Emeka Thaddues Njoku 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(6-7):1233-1263
ABSTRACTThere is a dearth of studies on indirect victims of sexual violence in counter-terrorism efforts. Using Nigeria as a case study, this paper argues that global and state-level counter-terrorism policies have generally failed to account for the psychological effects of the engagement of female NGO workers in counter-terrorism operations or mitigating the effects of terrorism in conflict zones. Specifically, there has been an increase in sexual violence perpetrated by some members of the security agencies involved in counter-terrorism operations in North-eastern Nigeria. As a result, female NGO workers carry out Medicare, psychosocial counselling and advocacy for these victims. Female NGO workers become exposed to the trauma of victims of sexual violence, which affects their mental health and thus performances in counter-terrorism activities in the country. This altered their worldview on issues of safety even among secured locations or among the presence of security agents and reinforced feelings of powerlessness. 相似文献
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ABSTRACT Scholars have credited a model of state-led capitalism called the ‘developmental state’ with producing the economic miracles of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This article examines how the developmental state was shaped by the Cold War. US grand strategy focused on accelerating economic development among allies that were under the greatest threat from Communist China and North Korea. American aid agencies became involved in the process of state-building in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and supported economic planning. I verify this claim by contrasting US policies on Taiwan with US policies in the Philippines, which faced a weaker Communist threat. 相似文献