Optimal sample size allocation for tests with multiple levels of stress with extreme value regression

In this article, we discuss the optimal allocation problem in a multiple stress levels life‐testing experiment when an extreme value regression model is used for statistical analysis. We derive the maximum likelihood estimators, the Fisher information, and the asymptotic variance–covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimators. Three optimality criteria are defined and the optimal allocation of units for two‐ and k‐stress level situations are determined. We demonstrate the efficiency of the optimal allocation of units in a multiple stress levels life‐testing experiment by using real experimental situations discussed earlier by McCool and Nelson and Meeker. Monte Carlo simulations are used to show that the optimality results hold for small sample sizes as well. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Production to order and off‐line inspection when the production process is partially observable

This study combines inspection and lot‐sizing decisions. The issue is whether to INSPECT another unit or PRODUCE a new lot. A unit produced is either conforming or defective. Demand need to be satisfied in full, by conforming units only. The production process may switch from a “good” state to a “bad” state, at constant rate. The proportion of conforming units in the good state is higher than in the bad state. The true state is unobservable and can only be inferred from the quality of units inspected. We thus update, after each inspection, the probability that the unit, next candidate for inspection, was produced while the production process was in the good state. That “good‐state‐probability” is the basis for our decision to INSPECT or PRODUCE. We prove that the optimal policy has a simple form: INSPECT only if the good‐state‐probability exceeds a control limit. We provide a methodology to calculate the optimal lot size and the expected costs associated with INSPECT and PRODUCE. Surprisingly, we find that the control limit, as a function of the demand (and other problem parameters) is not necessarily monotone. Also, counter to intuition, it is possible that the optimal action is PRODUCE, after revealing a conforming unit. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Managing components for assemble‐to‐order products with lead‐time‐dependent pricing: The full‐shipment model

We study a component inventory planning problem in an assemble‐to‐order environment faced by many contract manufacturers in which both quick delivery and efficient management of component inventory are crucial for the manufacturers to achieve profitability in a highly competitive market. Extending a recent study in a similar problem setting by the same authors, we analyze an optimization model for determining the optimal component stocking decision for a contract manufacturer facing an uncertain future demand, where product price depends on the delivery times. In contrast to our earlier work, this paper considers the situation where the contract manufacturer needs to deliver the full order quantity in one single shipment. This delivery requirement is appropriate for many industries, such as the garment and toy industries, where the economies of scale in transportation is essential. We develop efficient solution procedures for solving this optimization problem. We use our model results to illustrate how the different model parameters affect the optimal solution. We also compare the results under this full‐shipment model with those from our earlier work that allows for multiple partial shipments. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Analytic solution for the nucleolus of a three‐player cooperative game

The nucleolus solution for cooperative games in characteristic function form is usually computed numerically by solving a sequence of linear programing (LP) problems, or by solving a single, but very large‐scale, LP problem. This article proposes an algebraic method to compute the nucleolus solution analytically (i.e., in closed‐form) for a three‐player cooperative game in characteristic function form. We first consider cooperative games with empty core and derive a formula to compute the nucleolus solution. Next, we examine cooperative games with nonempty core and calculate the nucleolus solution analytically for five possible cases arising from the relationship among the value functions of different coalitions. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

The multiplicative representation for multiple objectives optimization with an application for arms procurement

Multiple Objectives Optimization is much seen in combination with linear functions and even with linear programming, together with an adding of the objectives by using weights. With distance functions, normalization instead of weights is used. It is also possible that together with an additive direct influence of the objectives on the utility function a mutual utility of the objectives exists under the form of a multiplicative representation. A critical comment is brought on some representations of this kind. A full‐multiplicative form may offer other opportunities, which will be discussed at length in an effort to exclude weights and normalization. This theoretical approach is followed by an application for arms procurement. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 327–340, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10014     

A search game on a cyclic graph

There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Optimal switchover times between two activities utilizing the same resource

The “gold‐mining” decision problem is concerned with the efficient utilization of a delicate mining equipment working in a number of different mines. Richard Bellman was the first to consider this type of a problem. The solution found by Bellman for the finite‐horizon, continuous‐time version of the problem with two mines is not overly realistic since he assumed that fractional parts of the same mining equipment could be used in different mines and this fraction could change instantaneously. In this paper, we provide some extensions to this model in order to produce more operational and realistic solutions. Our first model is concerned with developing an operational policy where the equipment may be switched from one mine to the other at most once during a finite horizon. In the next extension we incorporate a cost component in the objective function and assume that the horizon length is not fixed but it is the second decision variable. Structural properties of the optimal solutions are obtained using nonlinear programming. Each model and its solution is illustrated with a numerical example. The models developed here may have potential applications in other areas including production of items requiring the same machine or choosing a sequence of activities requiring the same resource. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 186–203, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.10008     

A general model of heterogeneous system lifetimes and conditions for system burn‐in

Burn‐in is a technique to enhance reliability by eliminating weak items from a population of items having heterogeneous lifetimes. System burn‐in can improve system reliability, but the conditions for system burn‐in to be performed after component burn‐in remain a little understood mathematical challenge. To derive such conditions, we first introduce a general model of heterogeneous system lifetimes, in which the component burn‐in information and assembly problems are related to the prediction of system burn‐in. Many existing system burn‐in models become special cases and two important results are identified. First, heterogeneous system lifetimes can be understood naturally as a consequence of heterogeneous component lifetimes and heterogeneous assembly quality. Second, system burn‐in is effective if assembly quality variation in the components and connections which are arranged in series is greater than a threshold, where the threshold depends on the system structure and component failure rates. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 364–380, 2003.     

Effectiveness of (R,Q) policies in one‐warehouse multiretailer systems with deterministic demand and backlogging

Consider a distribution system with a central warehouse and multiple retailers. Customer demand arrives at each of the retailers continuously at a constant rate. The retailers replenish their inventories from the warehouse which in turn orders from an outside supplier with unlimited stock. There are economies of scale in replenishing the inventories at both the warehouse and the retail level. Stockouts at the retailers are backlogged. The system incurs holding and backorder costs. The objective is to minimize the long‐run average total cost in the system. This paper studies the cost effectiveness of (R, Q) policies in the above system. Under an (R, Q) policy, each facility orders a fixed quantity Q from its supplier every time its inventory position reaches a reorder point R. It is shown that (R, Q) policies are at least 76% effective. Numerical examples are provided to further illustrate the cost effectiveness of (R, Q) policies. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 422–439, 2000     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.