Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, I question whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? I answer the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. I then use the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, I consider the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.     

预算视角下美国防建设特点及战略研判

作为国防和装备建设的关键要素,美国防预算是其国家政策和国防战略调整变化的直接"晴雨表",装备预算是表征美装备建设方向重点和资源投向投量的基本指标。本文对美国2001至2016财年国防预算和装备预算数据进行了归集整理。从国防部预算、装备预算、各军种装备预算等多个层面,以及预算性质、预算阶段、预算类别等多个维度进行分析,描绘了美国防预算的基本情况;总结了美国防预算的特点规律;并结合多源情报信息,对战略分析结论进行了综合研判。     

Analysis of the effect of bore centerline on projectile exit conditions in small arms

Most finite element models of small arms focus on an idealized barrel, typically one with a perfectly straight bore centerline. Using five different experimentally measured bore centerlines, this investigation analyzes the effect centerline nonlinearity has on projectile exit conditions. This includes the effect of rotating a centerline through several orientations. Modeled using Abaqus/Explicit, this dynamic analysis simulates a single firing cycle for each centerline. Projectile jump is calculated for each model as a measure of the effects of warped centerlines. The warped centerlines have a small effect on barrel dynamics.     

非对称相互依赖下的美日军事同盟机制分析——以奥巴马政府“重返亚太”为视角

2012年1月5日,美国国防部发表了《保持美国的全球领导地位:21世纪的防务重点计划报告》,在"重返亚太"战略的战略背景下,重点针对美国未来的军事力量结构、全球部署态势、军事战略目标等进行了重新规划。新军事战略调整对整个国际格局和地区性大国产生深远影响。随着美国重返亚太的战略调整,军事上的相互依赖程度体现在美日同盟之间尤为突出。本文仅从军事战略角度,运用《权力与相互依赖》中部分理论对其调整下的美日军事同盟机制进行分析。     

美国网络安全战略管理体系分析

文章从美国政府颁布的政策文件、法律法规和各机构部门的职能三个方面,对美国网络安全战略管理体系进行了介绍和分析。     

Elements of ‘armed non-state actors’ power: The case of al-Qaeda in Yemen

Over the past few years there is an apparent re-regionalization of al-Qaeda activity, intensified by the ongoing Middle East turmoil. Its main characteristic is a trend towards the abandonment of focoist strategies and their replacement by more popular-based ones. This article aims at evaluating their capacity to implement such a strategy shift and sustain the required level of violence. As a means of evaluating this capacity, this article proposes the use of a DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) framework, which will hopefully provide an alternative angle of theorizing and understanding ‘armed non-state actors’ (ANSAs). The model is applied in the case of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which appears to have effectively developed the military and informational dimensions, due partly to its own prowess and partly to the Yemeni state's weaknesses and the shortcomings of counterinsurgency. In contrast, the economic and diplomatic dimensions suffer from the lack of resources and the anti-systemic nature of AQAP.     

要地防空中的光电对抗战术

介绍了光电精确制导武器和光电对抗装备的特点,进而分析得出要地防空中要采用分层对抗战术,并分析了实施方法和运用方式,给出了战术配置原则,从技术、战术和地形气候方面分析了影响战术配置的因素,对部队开展基地训练中的光电对抗战术训练具有一定的参考价值。     

SPARRING ON THE SUBCONTINENT

South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime, by Mario Esteban Carranza. Ashgate, 2009. 208 pages, $99.95.     

South Asia's Missile Expansion

ABSTRACT

Over the past decade, contrary to declarations that they are pursuing “minimum” deterrence, India and Pakistan have considerably expanded their missile forces. India has developed eleven types of missiles while Pakistan has fielded nine. These missile forces have a mixed impact on deterrence stability. Both states' medium-range missiles strengthen their countervalue deterrent capabilities against the other, though India's China-specific missiles still have limitations. India's and Pakistan's short-range missiles and first-generation naval systems raise concerns about nuclear ambiguity, command and control, and escalation across the nuclear threshold, ultimately undermining deterrence stability on the subcontinent.     

US–Russia relations and the future of arms control: how the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could restore engagement on nuclear issues

ABSTRACT

Relations between the United States and Russia are in a prolonged downward spiral. Under these circumstances, cooperation on nuclear issues—once a reliable area of engagement even in difficult political environments—has all but completely halted. There are urgent reasons to find a way out of this situation, particularly the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2021. However, seemingly intractable disagreements about noncompliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and US ballistic-missile defense, compounded by the Ukraine crisis, the conflict in Syria, and the accusations of Russian interference in the US election of 2016, threaten the future of arms control. Against this backdrop, policy makers and practitioners should identify ways to re-engage on nuclear issues now so they can be ready to implement them as soon as feasible. This article considers how the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) could serve as a platform for US–Russia cooperation on nuclear issues when circumstances permit. Taking into account the challenges posed by ongoing US non-ratification, it identifies a menu of CTBT-related activities short of ratification that the two countries could undertake together. It explores how joint work on this issue would advance shared US and Russian interests while helping to create the circumstances necessary for further arms-control work.