The end of the “INF Treaty” and the US-China military balance

ABSTRACT

Whereas much of the debate about the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has focused on the European context and Russia’s alleged treaty violations, Asia looms large in the minds of proponents of the United States’s immediate withdrawal from the treaty. For many proponents, the fast-changing military balance in Asia and China's conventionally armed missiles constitute a sufficient cause for withdrawal. What does the end of the INF Treaty bode for the US-China military balance? This article argues that, although there are some near-term benefits for the US position in the conventional military balance with China, the advantages offered by prohibited missiles are minor and can be readily substituted by extant capabilities that are compliant with the treaty. Given the negative implications of the end of the INF Treaty for the future of arms control, the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the treaty require further examination; the military balance in Asia is an unpersuasive rationale for withdrawing from an important part of the arms-control architecture.     

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LOW NUCLEAR NUMBERS

President Barack Obama has outlined a course toward lower numbers of US nuclear weapons. Much attention has been paid to the US-Russian context, where deterrence is believed to be basically stable and conditions ripe for gradually reducing arsenals on both sides. But considerably less attention has been paid to the possible implications of lower nuclear numbers on other regions of the world and the reactions of both adversaries and US allies. If nuclear reductions are to be stabilizing and beneficial to security, reassurance and strengthened nonproliferation efforts in various regions need to accompany nuclear cuts. But the specific problems and remedies across regions vary. This article summarizes the results of a multi-author study. It concludes that regions with US allies and formal extended deterrence pledges may pose more vexing problems than those areas of the world without such close allies or commitments.     

ASSESSING RUSSIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD PHASED,DEEP NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).     

NUCLEAR STABILITY AT LOW NUMBERS

Chinese writings on the workings of nuclear stability, deterrence, and coercion are thin and politicized. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean, from direct and inferential evidence, rather pessimistic conclusions regarding Chinese views of nuclear stability at low numbers. While China has been living with low numbers in its own arsenal for decades, today it views missile defense and advanced conventional weapons as the primary threat to nuclear stability. More generally, China views nuclear stability as wedded to political amity. Because none of these would be directly addressed through further US and Russian arsenal reductions, China is unlikely to view such reductions as particularly stabilizing. While there is little in Chinese writing to suggest lower US and Russian numbers would encourage a “race to parity,” there are grounds to worry about China becoming more assertive as it gains confidence in Beijing's own increasingly secure second-strike forces.     

Transforming Mexico’s energy field: the intended consequences of a drug war

ABSTRACT

By utilizing the theory of Strategic Action Fields (SAFs), the present article explains how a new meso-level social order seems to have emerged in Mexico as a result of the paramilitarization of organized crime, militarization of security, and the opening of Mexico’s energy sector to private investment. This work describes the transformation of Mexico’s energy field after a process of major constitutional and economic changes that were the consequence of a security crisis and an agenda of energy reform for which the so-called ‘drug war’ was a key underlying foundation.     

Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort

A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

熵、信息与战略欺骗

熵最初用于描述宏观物理系统的热力学状态,之后被广泛应用于控制论、概率论、数论、天体物理、生命科学等领域,但是在军事领域的应用研究还很少。以熵、信息等基本概念为基础探讨军事领域中在战略欺骗方面的应用,通过对战略欺骗的热力学分析,提出了负信息馈送原理,并给出了两种实施战略欺骗的操作技术。     

战略联盟中知识转移影响因素概念模型构建：网络角度的思考

根据知识转移的一般过程,从社会网络视角出发,不同于以往研究中二元维度的分析,从网络结点能力、网络关系和认知、网络结构三个维度提出了影响战略联盟网络组织中知识转移绩效的关键影响因素,并深入分析各个关键因素的细分变量对知识转移绩效的影响作用机理,最后提出战略联盟网络知识转移影响因素的相关假设和概念模型,为下一步对假设的验证做铺垫。     

爱民固边的战略思维论要

爱民固边战略是＂十一五＂时期公安边防部队在建设社会主义和谐社会中的一项重大战略部署。＂十二五＂时期,形势任务更加严峻,必须进一步找准爱民固边是促进边境经济社会发展的新型人民战争的战略定位,完善以战略目的、战略原则、战略力量、战略措施为主要内容的战略架构体系,有效探索＂爱民—固边—发展—固边—利民＂的战略路线图,突出＂维稳主导、服务民生、强基固本、多元联动＂等战略重点,坚持＂并轨发展、标本兼治、无缝对接＂基本战略路径,使爱民固边战略更加系统化、规范化,纵深推进,打造公安边防特有品牌,不断产生更大的政治社会价值。