Reconciling strategic studies … with itself: a common framework for choosing among strategies

Three distinct, and seemingly irreconcilable, schools of thought are identified within the strategic studies literature. One which searches for “universal principles of war,” a second, “context-dependent,” approach that seeks to embed each instance of warfare within its concurrent social, political, technological milieu and, finally a “paradoxical logic” school, which equates strategy with the generation of uncertainty. The author offers some intuitive concepts from non-cooperative game theory to develop a “dominate-mix” approach to strategy choice. In doing so, he helps to reconcile these disparate approaches and provides a simple framework to assist researchers in framing military decisions as well as to assist planners in choosing among strategies.     

潜艇导弹武器系统攻击海上目标的等概率阵位图

从弹上系统及艇面火控系统精度入手,对各级海情下使用不同攻击方式时,潜艇在不同距离、不同舷角对中小目标导弹攻击的命中概率进行了计算,并绘制了等概率阵位图,从而解决了使用阵位图直接查找潜艇处于不同攻击方式、不同海情下,在不同距离、不同舷角时导弹的命中概率问题,为潜艇部队作战既提供了理论上的依据,又提供了一种直观简便的辅助决策手段。     

一个飞行员模型

航空火控系统,就其实质而言,是一个闭环的人机系统,“人(即飞行员)”是该系统的重要组成部分。因此,在仿真中,找出一个真实可用的飞行员模型是完成仿真任务关键的一步,本文介绍了目前在终端航空武器投放仿真(TAWDS)中广为应用的多轴飞行员模型,分析了该模型的工作原理,并试图通过根轨迹法,绘制出其闭环特征方程的根轨迹图,以确定该模型参数的选取范围。最后通过以F-106飞机为例,对所得的e_(Lv),e_(Lw)时域响应曲线进行了初步的分析,说明其仿真结果和实际情况是基本吻合的,因而,该飞行员模型是可用的。另外,此模型在别的火控系统的研究中,也可作为借鉴或参考。     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACT

The United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.     

THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR LEARNING

This article seeks to elucidate the concept of nuclear learning. It explores both the “nuclear” and the “learning” aspects of the concept. On the nuclear side, it distinguishes between learning basic facts about nuclear arms and drawing inferences about the larger implications of those facts. On the learning side, it discusses three issues: whether to use the term in a normative or value-neutral manner; the difference between learning that leads to a change in means versus learning that leads to a re-evaluation of ends; and whether learning only takes place at the level of individuals or whether there can also be learning by collective entities. The article argues there is no universal best answer to these questions and that the particular concept of learning that should be employed depends on the goals of the analyst. If the goal is to reduce the chances of nuclear war, however, one type of learning that will be important to consider is whether there is shared, cross-national learning.     

Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze,Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm

ABSTRACT

This article explores how two influential American policy makers—Paul Nitze and McGeorge Bundy—wrestled with the idea of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Existing scholarship has overlooked how both Bundy and Nitze came to understand the idea of nuclear non-use, especially related to the credibility of threats to use nuclear weapons. Using documentary evidence from their personal papers, this article illuminates the thinking of Bundy and Nitze, finding that both engaged with the idea of a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons in their strategic writing and thought.     

军事指挥控制中的贝叶斯决策支持

军事指挥控制是一个复杂的决策过程,该过程中信息是结合定性的专家知识和定量的融合数据而得到的.贝叶斯网为指挥控制系统提供了一个框架来处理这种专家知识和具体数据相结合的问题,并且影响图作为贝叶斯网的延伸可被用于分析指挥控制系统中某个决策的可行性.进一步地,为了减少所需指定的条件概率的数量并引入时变的概念,提出动态影响网作为一种新的决策支持方法.     

Switching costs,dynamic uncertainty,and buyer–seller relationships

We analyze strategic relationships between buyers and sellers in markets with switching costs and dynamic uncertainty by investigating the scenario wherein a representative buyer trades with two foreign sellers located in the same foreign country. We show that, under exchange rate uncertainty, switching costs may lead to switching equilibria where both sellers co‐exist in the market with the buyer, or no‐switching equilibria where either seller captures the market. The presence of exchange rate uncertainty facilitates competition by allowing the sellers to co‐exist in the market with the buyer. However, if the level of uncertainty is beyond a threshold, the only viable equilibria are those where one of the sellers captures the market. Further, depending on the level of exchange rate uncertainty and the sellers' variable costs, switching costs may either raise or lower the level of prices in long‐term contracts between the buyer and the sellers. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapon Posture

This essay provides an overview of the ongoing quantitative and qualitative changes in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and their impact on deterrence stability vis-à-vis India. Prominent among these trends is a major expansion in fissile material production that enables the manufacture of lighter and more compact warheads optimized for battlefield missions; the development of cruise missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles possessing dual-use capabilities; and a greater emphasis in doctrinal pronouncements on the need for strike options geared to all levels of conflict. Although these trends pose problematic ramifications for the risks of unauthorized and inadvertent escalation, deterrence stability in South Asia is not as precarious as many observers fear. The challenges of fashioning a robust nuclear peace between India and Pakistan cannot be lightly dismissed, however, and policy makers would do well to undertake some reinforcing measures.