The origins of the cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 arrow fighter program: A failure of strategy

The story of the demise of Canada's remarkable CF-105 Arrow jet-fighter interceptor has been told and retold by numerous Canadian writers. As told by most, it is a tragic tale. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, in an act as unforgivable as it was incomprehensible, not only destroyed a highly promising all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft but ruined all hopes of Canada ever being an important player in the North American defense industry. This article offers a contrasting interpretation — locating the problems leading to the aircraft's cancellation further back in history, and in particular in serious and determinative failures in strategic thinking and analysis by senior Canadian military officials at the time of the Arrow program's birth in 1953.     

FOUNDATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: PREPARING TO KEEP THE PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the continent of Africa, particularly Greater East Africa, has played an increasingly signifi cant role in United States (US) national security strategy. Transnational security threats and political authoritarianism continue to plague the region, creating calls for greater US and international involvement. Before reacting to the situation, however, it is prudent to pause, reflect, and understand that the United States developed strategic relations with nation-states in the region well before contemporary concerns for international terrorism and ungoverned spaces entered the strategic lexicon. Toward a more comprehensive understanding of Greater East Africa's strategic history, this paper examines the core strategic relationship in the region, US-Kenya relations, its origins and implications, and offers policy recommendations that will affect future international security.     

Deterrence of Nuclear Terror

Nuclear proliferation, lax security standards in the storage of fissile materials, and international apathy in the prosecution of terrorists make nuclear terror a serious threat to the United States and its allies, yet no doctrine of retaliation has been established. To decrease the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, a doctrine of retaliation—a negligence doctrine—should be considered. If the United States can distinguish whose fissile material was used for a nuclear terror event, a negligence doctrine would prescribe retaliation against that state. Where the proximate cause—terrorists—is unavailable for deterrent retaliation, deterring an accessible mediate cause—a state that has failed to adequately secure its fissile material—is one of a few effective alternatives. In the absence of such a negligence doctrine, the United States and its allies are increasingly vulnerable to a nuclear terror attack and the ensuing negative consequences.     

探析美国新军事战略

奥巴马政府2011年以来发布的一系列军事文件,标志着美国新军事战略的形成。文章依据这些文件,结合三年来美军在世界范围内尤其是亚太地区的实际动向,从战略威胁判断、战略指导方针、战略部署调整、作战指导思想和军事力量建设五个方面对新军事战略的内容及实施情况进行了分析。     

军事办公建筑被动式节能设计策略

军事办公建筑的节能设计与使用,对推动节能减排、促进军营建设具有重要意义。通过对被动式节能设计策略的研究,从建筑设计的视角,以军事办公建筑设计为突破口,分析能耗现状,明确设计目标和思路,从空间设计布局、围护结构热工性能、遮阳系统设置、自然通风与自然采光等方面,探讨被动式节能设计策略在军事办公建筑设计中的应用。结合特定环境,寻求贯穿节能设计始终的适宜技术,充分发挥被动式节能技术集成的优势。通过多项节能技术的协同作用,可以强化和扩大节能措施带来的节能效应,在降低能耗的同时创造出健康、舒适、高效的办公环境。     

Colombia: Changing strategy amidst the struggle

From 1965 to the present, Colombia has been confronted by the insurgency of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The threat reached a new level in 1996 with the advent of mobile warfare, whereby large units sought to neutralize the military in an effort to seize power and institute a Marxist-Leninist regime. Unlike Vietnam, what followed was a regaining of the strategic initiative by the government and a decimation of the insurgent threat. This was accomplished with US assistance but from first to last was driven by Colombian leadership and strategy. The strategy which led to this signal change, ‘Democratic Security’, unfolded under the leadership of President Álvaro Uribe. It was a civil–military partnership, which sought to expand the writ of Colombian democracy to all elements of society. Securing the population provided the shield behind which economic, social, and political life could occur as driven by the will of the people. It was the agreement upon legitimacy as the strategic goal and reform as the route to that goal which allowed the Colombians and the Americans to work so well together.     

A best practice for assessment in counterinsurgency

In September 2011, the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan directed the Afghan Assessment Group to redesign the way in which ISAF was assessing the status of the war, and to be ‘revolutionary’ in so doing. The resulting assessment paradigm was novel, non-doctrinal, and effectively addressed the unique complexities of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the needs of the ISAF Commander. It had a two-tier structure consisting of both strategic and campaign assessments. The former focused on answering a set of strategic questions in narrative, analytic form to address the strategic environment, while the latter used a set of standards and accompanying narrative responses to gauge accomplishment of campaign tasks. Both tiers captured the current state of the war while maintaining an eye on future challenges and opportunities. The two assessments and their associated processes were designed to stimulate discussions leading directly to decisions by senior leaders on actions they could take, direct, or request. While any assessment paradigm will have advantages and disadvantages, an examination of the pros and cons of this assessment paradigm makes clear that it should be considered a ‘best practice’ in the field of counterinsurgency assessment.     

Enmeshed in insurgency: Britain's protracted retreats from Iraq and Afghanistan

Ten years of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced little in Britain's national interest. This article examines the political objectives set in these wars and the reasons why they have proved elusive. The core foreign policy aim was to sustain Britain's position as a great power by assuming responsibility for global order. Alliances with the United States and NATO would be the diplomatic tool for pursuing this aim. These alliances brought obligations, in the shape of agreed common threats. Rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorists harboured in failed states were deemed the primary threats to British security. Military means were therefore used in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack them. Whether Tony Blair's vision of global order ever made sense is debatable, and it attracted scepticism from the outset. The article argues experience in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that a strategy to eliminate terrorism (the WMD threat turned out never to have existed) by expeditionary counterinsurgency could only fail. Therefore the attention lavished on operational-level performance by most studies is misplaced, because no amount of warfighting excellence could make up for strategic incoherence. Finally, the article proposes the more important question arising from the last ten years is why the UK pursued a futile strategy for so long. The difficulties associated with interpreting events, a malfunctioning strategic apparatus, weak political oversight, and bureaucratic self-interest are posited as the most significant explanations.     

军械教育发展战略思考

本文从历史和现状入手,展望未来战场对军械保障队伍的需求,提出了90年代军械教育训练发展的思路和对策,其中对军械教育的观念更新、重点发展领域、基础训练的适度规模以及培训质量等几个方面的问题,进行了重点探讨。     

“萨德”入韩引发的地缘政治危机及中国的对策

2016年年初以来,朝鲜先后进行了第四次、第五次核试验,在此背景下,韩国国防部宣布,韩美同意在韩国部署末段高空区域防御系统——"萨德"导弹防御系统,朝鲜半岛地区风云再起。美韩此举使原本不安的东北亚局势更加紧张,诱发并恶化着东北亚地区大国家间潜存的"安全困境"。韩国决定部署"萨德"不仅严重僵化了中韩的国际关系,使得原本对峙局面下的朝韩两国局势更加紧张,更破坏了东北亚军事战略均衡,地区"新冷战"格局逐步形成。