Wisdom without tears: Statecraft and the uses of history

The world is mired in history again, as historical modes of competition return and historical grievances fuel the policies of multiple revisionist actors. If the end of history has ended, then it follows that the time is ripe for an engagement with history’s wisdom. We argue that the making of American statecraft—the deliberate, coordinated use of national power to achieve important objectives—can be significantly enhanced by a better understanding of the past. This essay, which draws on the extensive literature on history and statecraft, U.S. foreign policy, and the author’s own research and experiences, offers a defense of the use of history to improve statecraft, as well as a typology of ten distinct ways in which an understanding of history can improve government policy.     

The rise and fall of counterproliferation policy

The US government initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to address the concern that, in the post-Cold War years, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would be widespread and create a significant challenge to the US military’s combat operations. In particular, non-nuclear states might use chemical or biological warfare agents against US forces with the belief that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in retaliation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, defense strategy and policy shifted to a wider view of the threat of adversarial use of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and the term “counterproliferation” was replaced by “combating” or “countering WMD.” Over time, the Defense Department increasingly moved away from counterproliferation principles with the detrimental effect of losing capabilities that US forces still need for contemporary adversaries. This shift has been aggravated by other US government agencies’ use of “counterproliferation” in lieu of what would have been termed “nonproliferation” activities in the 1990s. The loss of clarity within the US government on these terms has led to the inability to focus the “whole of government” on this significant national security challenge. To alleviate this challenge, the US government needs a top-down initiative to refocus policy on the distinctly different aspects of WMD with respect to military combat operations, combating terrorism, and homeland security.     

Enmeshed in insurgency: Britain's protracted retreats from Iraq and Afghanistan

Ten years of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced little in Britain's national interest. This article examines the political objectives set in these wars and the reasons why they have proved elusive. The core foreign policy aim was to sustain Britain's position as a great power by assuming responsibility for global order. Alliances with the United States and NATO would be the diplomatic tool for pursuing this aim. These alliances brought obligations, in the shape of agreed common threats. Rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorists harboured in failed states were deemed the primary threats to British security. Military means were therefore used in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack them. Whether Tony Blair's vision of global order ever made sense is debatable, and it attracted scepticism from the outset. The article argues experience in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that a strategy to eliminate terrorism (the WMD threat turned out never to have existed) by expeditionary counterinsurgency could only fail. Therefore the attention lavished on operational-level performance by most studies is misplaced, because no amount of warfighting excellence could make up for strategic incoherence. Finally, the article proposes the more important question arising from the last ten years is why the UK pursued a futile strategy for so long. The difficulties associated with interpreting events, a malfunctioning strategic apparatus, weak political oversight, and bureaucratic self-interest are posited as the most significant explanations.     

射频隐身反隐身E&V系统的设计与实现

针对战机射频隐身性能很难评估的现实问题,提出一种射频隐身反隐身实验与验证半实物仿真系统的设计与实现方法。该系统不仅能对战机的射频隐身性能进行验证,同时还可以对飞机的隐身波形、辐射策略等设计提供理论依据和实验支撑。在分析辐射信号模型以及截获模型的基础上,详细介绍了该系统的各功能组成和结构框图。该系统可以开展对于射频隐身的作战需求、管控模型、使用准则等方面的定量研究,对于提高战机的生存能力、突防能力和作战能力具有重要的意义。     

两人多冲突环境下的双矩阵对策集结模型

针对用多个双矩阵对策来描述的两人多冲突环境,首先基于局中人所受到的约束条件,构造局中人面向多冲突环境的可行策略串集合;其次以所有局中人的可行策略串集合建立新的结局空间,构造局中人在新结局空间上的支付函数,进而建立两人多冲突环境下的对策综合集结模型;最后给出了一个军事例子,该算例说明了模型的实用性.     

对篮球教练员谋略的探讨

本文通过对教练员的谋略过程、谋略原则和谋略的艺术等几个方面的分析 ,为教练员在竞赛和临场指挥中正确使用谋略提供理论依据与方法     

案例智能维修训练系统的设计与实现

基于案例的智能维修训练系统将智能教学系统与CBR技术结合起来应用在故障维修领域。在智能教学理论与CBR技术的支持下,围绕案例阐述了智能维修训练系统的设计和实现。给出了系统的通用体系结构;采用框架法实现知识库的设计;分析学生模型的构成并给出学生知识水平和学习能力的评估方法;针对训练策略给出其控制流程及其实现过程。这种基于案例的智能维修训练系统能有效地应用于装备的实际维修训练中。     

“萨德”入韩引发的地缘政治危机及中国的对策

2016年年初以来,朝鲜先后进行了第四次、第五次核试验,在此背景下,韩国国防部宣布,韩美同意在韩国部署末段高空区域防御系统——"萨德"导弹防御系统,朝鲜半岛地区风云再起。美韩此举使原本不安的东北亚局势更加紧张,诱发并恶化着东北亚地区大国家间潜存的"安全困境"。韩国决定部署"萨德"不仅严重僵化了中韩的国际关系,使得原本对峙局面下的朝韩两国局势更加紧张,更破坏了东北亚军事战略均衡,地区"新冷战"格局逐步形成。     

航天器在轨防碰撞自主规避策略

论文提出了航天器与空间目标距离较近时的自主规避策略。分析了航天器与目标的相对运动模型,将相对运动分解为视线瞬时旋转平面内的运动与该平面的转动。对视线瞬时平面内的运动进行了分析,推导了航天器的最佳规避方向。探讨了在三维惯性空间中该方向的确定方法。通过仿真分析,对比了航天器具有不同规避加速度和不同探测距离时,通过机动所得脱靶量的大小,验证了航天器近距离自主规避策略的有效性。     

非对称Colonel Blotto博弈模型下的多信道功率分配抗干扰

针对智能干扰条件下传输速率固定的通信系统多信道功率分配问题,建立了非对称Colonel Blotto博弈模型。在完全信息条件下,推导出了各种功率预算约束下通信方和干扰方的等效单信道最优功率分配策略,进而证明了通信方和干扰方存在唯一混合纳什均衡策略,并求得了纳什均衡收益。基于等效单信道最优功率分布,提出了一种多重扫描直接列元素交换算法,可以快速构建多信道混合功率分配矩阵,且相比于线性规划方法,可适应更多的信道数和更广的功率分布范围。通过数值仿真,验证了所提多信道混合功率分配矩阵构造算法的有效性及多信道功率分配策略的最优性。