网络中心战中的战场感知能力量化模型研究*

为了定量评价和探索提高网络中心战中的战场感知能力的途径,针对网络中心战的特点,运用集合论、信息论、图论等理论研究了战场感知能力的量化问题.首先分析了影响战场感知能力的主要因素及其作用,然后对主要因素进行了量化建模,提出了传感器对指控节点的信息量贡献模型以及指控节点之间的信息量贡献模型,建立了指控网战场感知能力量化计算模型,最后通过仿真,验证了模型的有效性,说明了提高指控网战场感知能力的有效途径.     

关键征候在潜艇威胁判断中的应用

传统的潜艇威胁判断模型中对关键征候的利用不是很充分,主要运用确定型模型,通过传感器获得目标主动信号的变化等实时信息判断潜艇是否被发现。分析研究了关键征候在潜艇对目标攻击企图的估计和对目标是否确认发现潜艇的估计应用,提出了把各种征候引入到模型中,根据征候的有无和征候发生的程度来对目标的威胁等级划分和排序,提高威胁判断的质量。     

潜艇航行安全战场海洋环境评估

潜艇航行安全环境评估是潜艇战场海洋环境评估的重要内容和基础,潜艇航线的选择,作战海域的确定等都需要安全的战场海洋环境保障。首先分析影响潜艇航行安全的战场海洋环境,遴选出潜艇航行安全的几个重要因子;然后确定各因子对潜艇安全影响的阀值,运用地理信息系统GIS(Geographical Information System)空间分析中缓冲区分析与叠加分析的方法,概略地将海区划分为安全与非安全海域两部分。最后通过对某训练场的实例分析,其结果大致符合实际情况。     

潜射弹道导弹主战系统效能评估模型研究

界定了潜射弹道导弹主战系统的范围,给出了其结构模型;基于扩展ADC效能评估方法,建立了系统可用度、可信度的计算模型以及潜射弹道导弹主战系统效能指标体系,给出了其能力量化矩阵的构建方法。通过该评估模型的研究,能为潜射弹道导弹武器系统的改进和作战使用等提供决策依据。     

信息心理战理论模型以及量化模型探讨

军事理论的研究在心理战方面已经取得了一些成果,但在量化分析方面显示不足。从信息心理战基本作用原理入手,利用数学建模的思想,构建基本信息传播扩散原理模型并且设置合理参数模拟动态过程,从而获得军事行动中心理战的心理攻击信息内部传播动态数学模型,对于未来信息化战争量化分析以及效能分析有一定参考价值。     

悬浮式深弹在水面舰艇规避 尾流自导鱼雷作战中的应用研究*

针对传统对抗方法难以有效对抗尾流自导鱼雷这一问题,籍由悬浮式深弹拦截原理、在分析尾流自导鱼雷可能航向范围的基础上,建立悬浮式深弹作战使用等模型,对悬浮式深弹在水面舰艇规避尾流自导鱼雷中的作战使用问题进行了探讨。仿真结果表明:使用悬浮式深弹能有效地拦截尾流自导鱼雷,从而提高水面舰艇的生存能力。研究成果为研制新型反鱼雷装备、改进现有装备的战术技术性能提供了有价值的参考。     

电子作战目标威胁评估方法初探

为了对电子作战目标进行威胁评估,主要立足于电子战环境,分析了电子作战目标威胁评估的内容与作用,并系统深入地研究了当前常用的目标威胁评估方法,对判断敌情及电子对抗作战指挥具有一定的指导意义。     

基于云模型的物元综合评估方法

将云模型与物元理论相结合,提出了一种基于云模型的物元评估方法,构建了云模型与物元理论相结合的综合评估模型.重点分析了云与数值、云与数值区间以及云与云之间的关联度计算方法,并应用示例说明了该方法的使用.最后由实例可以看出,所提方法实现了基于语言值的不确定评估.     

The danger of “hybrid warfare” from a sophisticated adversary: the Russian “hybridity” in the Ukrainian conflict

The term “hybrid warfare” is a new one that the West began to use to explain its failure to cope with asymmetric threats. Focusing on the war on global terrorism, the West temporarily withdrew its attention from traditional adversaries, such as Russia, which has used this gap and has audaciously returned to the stage as a global actor. Until the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and inflaming the Ukrainian crisis, most Western authors attributed “hybrid threats” mostly to non-state actors. But the Ukrainian scenario showed the true face of “hybridity” in the modern battlefield when practised by a powerful state actor. Russian “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine has already been seen as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods, that have been complemented with other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic and information. The purpose of this article is, through an analysis of the Ukrainian scenario, to demonstrate that although the term “hybrid” is new, the concept itself is old and is a continuation of already seen doctrine from the Cold War era. Although “hybrid threats” can come both from state and non-state actors, the Russian interference in Ukraine is proof that they are especially dangerous for the West if, or when, they are initiated from a traditional, sophisticated adversary that has the capacity to use all forms of warfare.     

Postmodern warfare and the blurred boundaries between war and peace

Each age has its own wars and its own forms of warfare. In today’s evolving world risk society warfare has entered a new development stage. The states of the “global North” adapt their forms of intervention. They increasingly practice postmodern warfare characterized especially by the role of influencing the information space, networked approaches, the incorporation of indirect and covert actions, and the special quality of new technologies. This practice furthers an increasing grey zone between limiting and de-bounding of warfare. The phenomenon of postmodern warfare raises some tough questions and offers a rich research agenda.