Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

永磁无刷直流电机驱动器并联系统环流的抑制

驱动器并联方式能有效扩大驱动容量,但该方式容易引入环流。为了抑制环流,分析了两个独立电源供电的两台驱动器并联结构系统,阐述了环流的特性,并提出了基于环流反馈的控制结构。这种控制结构通过环流的反馈,只需要控制调整其中一台驱动器,就可减小两台驱动器输出电压的差异,实现环流抑制。仿真结果表明:这种控制结构降低了控制的复杂性,能够抑制环流,实现独立电源供电的无刷直流电机驱动器并联。     

Contracts and coordination: Supply chains with uncertain demand and supply

Considering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a “late order,” we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016     

Resequencing with parallel queues to minimize the maximum number of items in the overflow area

This article treats an elementary optimization problem, where an inbound stream of successive items is to be resequenced with the help of multiple parallel queues in order to restore an intended target sequence. Whenever early items block the one item to be currently released into the target sequence, they are withdrawn from their queue and intermediately stored in an overflow area until their actual release is reached. We aim to minimize the maximum number of items simultaneously stored in the overflow area during the complete resequencing process. We met this problem in industry practice at a large German automobile producer, who has to resequence containers with car seats prior to the assembly process. We formalize the resulting resequencing problem and provide suited exact and heuristic solution algorithms. In our computational study, we also address managerial aspects such as how to properly avoid the negative effects of sequence alterations. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 401–415, 2016     

基于参数自适应CS模型的机动目标跟踪算法

为提高对机动目标的跟踪精度,提出一种基于参数自适应当前统计(CS)模型的跟踪算法。即利用加速度增量与位移的关系,自适应调整加速度方差,根据量测残差的统计距离判别目标机动特性,并调整模型的机动频率和滤波器增益系数,提高算法模型与目标机动模式的匹配程度。仿真结果表明,基于参数自适应CS模型跟踪算法能够较好地改善对强机动目标的跟踪性能。     

基于压阻敏感元件的压力信号调理电路设计

针对压力信号测量中压阻式敏感元件的压力信号易受温度影响,并且压力信号中常常会混有噪声干扰信号的问题,设计了一种新的基于压阻式敏感元件的压力信号调理电路。该方案采用恒流源供电方式消除温度影响,通过放大电路将传感器输出的微弱信号放大,再经抗混叠低通滤波电路滤除干扰信号;并对压力信号调理电路中各个模块进行了理论分析和试验验证。通过试验表明:该信号调理电路将温度影响减小到0.01%,并且能够有效地滤除压力信号中的高频信号。     

云南边境地区毒品犯罪特点及对策

当前,云南边境地区毒品犯罪呈现出武装贩毒明显、特殊人群贩毒突出、境内外相互勾结、缅甸籍人员贩毒突出等特点.这源于人们对毒品犯罪的危害认识不足、宣传教育力度不够、受毒品高额利润驱动等原因.要提高打击毒品犯罪实效,必须采取加强综合冶理、完善法律制度、加强区域合作、加强情报调研工作、加大专项打击力度等措施.     

Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon

In this article, we study threshold‐based sales‐force incentives and their impact on a dealer's optimal effort. A phenomenon, observed in practice, is that the dealer exerts a large effort toward the end of the incentive period to boost sales and reach the threshold to make additional profits. In the literature, the resulting last‐period sales spike is sometimes called the hockey stick phenomenon (HSP). In this article, we show that the manufacturer's choice of the incentive parameters and the underlying demand uncertainty affect the dealer's optimal effort choice. This results in the sales HSP over multiple time periods even when there is a cost associated with waiting. We then show that, by linking the threshold to a correlated market signal, the HSP can be regulated. We also characterize the variance of the total sales across all the periods and demonstrate conditions under the sales variance can be reduced. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Supply chain coordination with shelf‐space and retail price dependent demand and heterogeneous retailers

We consider supply chain coordination in which a manufacturer supplies some product to multiple heterogeneous retailers and wishes to coordinate the supply chain via wholesale price and holding cost subsidy. The retail price is either exogenous or endogenous. The market demand is described by the market share attraction model based on all retailers'shelf‐spaces and retail prices. We obtain optimal solutions for the centralized supply chain, where the optimal retail pricing is a modified version of the well‐known cost plus pricing strategy. We further get feasible contracts for the manufacturer to coordinate the hybrid and decentralized supply chains. The manufacturer can allocate the total profit free to himself and the retail market via the wholesale price when the retail price is exogenous, but otherwise he cannot. Finally, we point out that different characteristics of the retail market are due to different powers of the manufacturer, and the more power the manufacturer has, the simpler the contract to coordinate the chain will be. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010