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81.
Some U.S. military leaders have asserted that the United States, Japan, Australia, and India and the Republic of Korea are developing multilateral defense cooperation to deter aggression and uphold norms much like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has in Europe. Frequent military exercises and China’s threats to freedom of navigation (FoN) and North Korea’s nuclear missiles comprise the motive force for such cooperation. However, cooperation thus far has been trilateral and minimal, given divergent national interests and dispersed geopolitical locations. Cooperation among Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States is increasing given the threat, but ROK’s public opinion is divided about Japan. Australia, Japan, and India have increased cooperation with the United States but are reluctant to conduct FoN operations with the United States to challenge China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. If China becomes more aggressive and blocks FoN or seizes territory, development toward an Asian NATO is possible. 相似文献
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为了得到发射装置设计因素和超高速碎片性能间的关系,考虑了药型罩的材料、炸药种类、装药长径比、药型罩的锥角、药型罩的厚度、药型罩顶部靠近装药侧的曲率半径等设计因素,采用AUTODYNTM,结合正交试验,对超高速碎片的发射过程进行数值模拟。结果表明,3种发射装置结构分别可以提供质量为1. 533 g的紫铜碎片、速度为11. 649 km/s的铝碎片、动能为85. 6 k J的铝碎片; 2种发射装置结构均可以提供质量大于1 g、速度高于11 km/s的密实结构圆柱状碎片。验证了仿真方法的可信性,对影响碎片性能的设计因素进行了分析、排序,并得到了这些设计因素与碎片质量、速度、动能的关系。 相似文献
83.
Per Marius Frost-Nielsen 《Journal of Military Ethics》2018,17(1):21-35
In this article, I outline a holistic approach to the military concept of “Rules of Engagement” (ROE), which complements the legal aspects of ROE with considerations of operational and political requirements for the use of military force. Drawing upon two illustrative cases from the US military experience with the use of ROE, I demonstrate that ROE for any particular military operation should be formulated to balance optimally, if not harmonize fully, the legal, operational and political concerns related to the use of force. In this task, political decision-makers and military practitioners alike are confronted with unavoidable and real-life dilemmas. How these dilemmas are handled has significant implications for how legal requirements concerning accountability and concerns for civilian lives in military combat can be preserved through ROE. 相似文献
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George Joffé 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2016,27(1):1-21
Although the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is seen as a novel manifestation of Islamic extremism, it is in fact the latest, albeit perhaps the most effective, of a long line of revivalist movements in the Islamic and the Arab worlds. Its motivations – hisba and jihad – differ little from its predecessors and its ambitions – to create a state organised in accordance with the precepts of the Islamic caliphate – reflect a long-standing Islamic ambition. It differs, of course, in terms of the sophistication of its political and military strategies, which mirror the contemporary complexities of the world in which it operates, but its objectives recall long-standing Islamic ideals, even if articulated in radically brutal and extremist ways. More importantly, perhaps, ISIS or Da’ish, to give it its Arabic sobriquet, reflects the enormous degree of resentment inside the Middle East at the ways in which Western powers have intervened in regional affairs over recent years, particularly their support for regimes and economic systems there that have betrayed, in the popular imaginary, the essential principles of social justice that lie at the root of Islamic vision of ideal social order. Indeed, in many respects, its analysis of the world in which it operates and of the objectives it seeks differ little in essence from those any other resistance and rejectionist movement, whether religious or sectarian. More specifically, it has been the sectarian conflict that resulted from the reversal of political order in Iraq as a result of the 2003 American-led invasion that has driven the success of the movement in capturing widespread Sunni support. Whether it can manage the complexities of the administration of a state remains open to question. 相似文献
86.
Andreas Lutsch 《战略研究杂志》2016,39(4):535-558
ABSTRACTRecent nuclear-weapons-related consultation in NATO within the framework of the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review sheds light on historical experiences with nuclear consultation in NATO. In the early years of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which became the main forum for multilateral nuclear consultation in the alliance, developing a nuclear weapons first use doctrine was of particular importance. This process led to the adoption of the Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs) on the threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. With a focus on West Germany as the primary addressee of the NPG, it will be postulated that nuclear consultation functioned and may still be seen as an essential tool to manage the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence in the framework of NATO. 相似文献
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Assessing missile defence through the prism of offence–defence theory requires primarily an examination of legal and structural constraints on future development. New weapons technology is frequently cited as having the most critical impact on the offence–defence balance. Yet, the method for assessing the introduction of a new weapons technology tends to neglect projected maturity and instead focus excessively on the initial rudimentary capabilities. It is argued here that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) missile defence is set to incrementally become more advanced in terms of quality, quantity and mobility, which is supported by a strategy that is increasingly favouring offence. As the system gradually enhances the offensive advantage vis-à-vis Russia, NATO categorically rejects any legal or structural constraints on future deployments. 相似文献