MONEY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLITICS

“Lack of money is the root of all evil”

George Bernard Shaw

In a environment where party financing, private funding in particular, is generally a laissez-faire business, as in most Southern African countries, there is the real risk that interest groups and wealthy individuals will buy influence in political parties and in so doing erode public confidence in the political system. Because they are neither open to public scrutiny nor subject to any legislative restraints, huge private donations can, and often do, come with strings attached. This lack of transparency and openness, as well as mechanisms to prevent it, provides ample ground for influence peddling, where those who pay the piper call the tune. Left unchecked, this party funding scenario will continue to be a serious indictment of the region's democratisation projects, crippling democracy and stunting economic development. This article consid     

‘Fighting for peace’

In Africa, most of the present conflicts are civil, intra-state wars where belligerent groups use guerrilla tactics to achieve various political, economic or ideological objectives. The atrocities and the effect of these on-going wars on innocent civilians, human suffering, poverty and development are beyond comprehension. Not surprisingly, the majority of current peace operations are in Africa, with more than 70 countries contributing forces to these conflict zones. On the continent, South Africa has come to assume a leading role in peace operations and is now a major troop-contributing country to UN and AU missions. In the past 11 years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has taken part in no fewer than 14 peace missions. This article provides a brief background of the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, the different United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mandates under which peacekeepers had to operate as well as their objectives, and the extent of South Africa's involvement in the various missions. In the last section, the major challenges, that these operations have posed are highlighted.     

基于效果的炮兵行动C2系统动力学建模与仿真

一体化联合作战参战军兵种多、指挥控制(C2)与协调复杂。围绕炮兵行动特点要求,运用系统动力学理论建立联合作战炮兵行动指挥控制的系统动力学模型,研究常规打击和基于效果作战两种指挥控制模式下炮兵行动所产生的不同结果及其原因,并给合作战想定仿真验证,得出较为可靠的结论,为解决联合作战炮兵行动精确指挥控制与协调提供一种有效途径     

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

改进的粒子群神经网络在飞控中的应用

针对BP神经网络对初始值敏感、容易陷入局部寻优且收敛速度较慢,提出用粒子群对神经网络的参数进行优化,同时设计了衰减的指数函数对惯性权重进行动态调整以提高算法性能.并应用该算法对导弹飞控系统的逆误差进行补偿,仿真结果表明,该方法对逆误差进行了有效的补偿,避免了局部寻优并提高了学习效率.     

基于广义模糊函数的MIMO SAR分辨特性分析

多发多收合成孔径雷达（MIMO SAR）是近年来发展起来的一种新型雷达体制。与传统SAR相比,MIMO SAR综合利用了波形分集和空间分集优势,如何衡量系统的分辨特性以及模糊特性成为亟待解决的问题。本文将模糊函数概念推广到MIMO SAR性能分析中,通过数学推导获得了广义模糊函数的解析表示,结果表明MIMO SAR系统分辨率不仅取决于发射波形参数以及合成孔径长度,还与发射波形集的正交性以及收发天线阵列流形密切相关,仿真实验验证了系统模型的有效性和相应分析的正确性。     

应急辅助定位及精度评估方法研究

在可视导航卫星数少于四颗、无法进行传统导航解算的恶劣环境下,导航接收机可利用外部高程气压计提供的高程或者内部守时模块的钟差等信息进行应急辅助定位。在该应急辅助定位工作模式的误差分析中,传统导航定位误差传递模型无法适用。针对此问题,本文在研究三星结合高程、三星结合钟差、双星结合高程钟差等几种应急辅助定位原理的基础上,给出了新的应急辅助定位误差传递的分析模型,利用仿真算例验证了该模型的正确性。通过对定位精度的分析,说明根据卫星分布特点可以按照本文方法量化得到伪距测量与辅助信息的精度的最优数量级关系,可以用最小代价实现定位精度的提升。该结论可指导接收机外部辅助器件的选择。     

The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik)

The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of mission command. It argues that it was heavily influenced by corporate management practices which inherently contradict mission command approach. It continues and investigates how the US Army endeavored to emulate the approach in its doctrine and in major operations.

While it has officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine, it has been less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. This state of affairs has to do with the cultural legacy of the managerial approach to command that still persist. Despite the partial success, the US Army has recently reaffirmed its commitment to this approach.     

Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.     

Reconsidering American strategy in South Asia: destroying terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas

Over seven years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan is again at the forefront of the headlines, faced with a brutal insurgency and a resurgent Taliban. Many scholars and policymakers attribute the instability in Afghanistan to a terrorist sanctuary in the neighboring Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan has attempted to eliminate this sanctuary through negotiation and armed force. This paper argues that Pakistani strategy has failed to achieve its desired results because of local tribal norms, the weak nature of previous agreements, military units ill-equipped for a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism role, as well as ideological fissures in the Pakistani establishment. Afterward, the paper argues that the United States and Coalition forces should pursue their strategy remaining cognizant of local tribal norms, step up training efforts for Pakistani forces, promote development of the tribal areas, and cultivate options for eliminating the FATA sanctuary through covert means.