面向决策的一体化建模方法及其在兵力筹划中的应用

在对军事决策问题的主要特点进行分析的基础上,提出从军事概念模型到数学模型再到定性推理模型的一体化建模思想.以空军航空兵遂行直接航空火力支援任务为想定背景,根据EATI模板,利用基于UML的Rose工具依次对想定任务的实体、任务、交互等进行分析;对于兵力筹划中的结构化问题建立了机会约束多目标规划数学模型;对于非结构化问题则构造了推理机,推理机体现了定量与定性相结合的决策分析思想.最后,以一个实例验证文章思路的可行性.     

基于"联合指数"的联合作战编组集团能力量化分析

随着科学技术的发展,以信息技术作为联结手段、由各军兵种部队参加的一种新的作战方式———联合作战,已经正式登上人类战争的舞台.而对于联合作战编组集团的作战力量的量化分析,是摆在联合作战模拟人员面前的一个重要而紧迫的任务.文中以“联合指数”方法为基础,就联合作战编组集团能力量化问题特别是对不同武器装备作战单元的能力量化进行了探讨.     

The comparison of military budgets of the eastern and central European countries

The evolutions of military expenditures in Eastern and Central European countries are difficult to estimate and to compare, due to the lack of available data for these states. Some results of the extent of cuts in defence spending since 1990 are interesting to interpret, but it is difficult for econometricians to use these figures even carefully. The structures of national military expenditure have been modified to the detriment of arms equipment. Thus, the disarmament process needs a special analysis of the arms industry.     

On the normality and abnormality of offsets obligations

Defence offsets have often been described as government‐to‐business compensation arrangements or contracts involving “reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market exchange”. This paper argues that it is irrelevant and misleading to use this notion as a criterion for defining offsets.

The paper also explores the apparent inconsistency between the maximising efficiency in defence procurement and the application of offsets requirements. It is shown that defence offsets are a subset of all the price‐quality‐quantity trade‐offs which in general characterise negotiations surrounding complex transactions.

It is argued that although reciprocal or offsetting arrangements are a normal aspect of commercial transacting, the operation of certain offsets schemes namely mandatory offsets obligations, may inhibit the buyer's flexibility in negotiating deals and result in inefficient procurement. This leads us to ask why these offsets schemes have persisted for so long.     

AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL OF CAPITAL AND ARMS ACCUMULATION

This paper attempts to examine the effect of an anticipated foreign military threat on the steady‐state growth rate and the transitional behavior of the economy. The modeling strategy follows the Sandler and Hartley (1995 Sandler, T. and Hartley, K. 1995. The Economics of Defense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  [Google Scholar]) and Dunne et al. (2005 Dunne, J.P., Smith, R.P. and Willenbockel, D. 2005. Models of military expenditure and growth: a critical review. Defence and Peace Economics, 16: 449–461. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) viewpoints to emphasize the role of national defense in affecting growth from the perspective of both the demand and the supply sides. We thus combine the public capital version of endogenous growth with a framework of competitive arms accumulation. It is found that the key factor determining the steady state and the transitional effects of a rise in the foreign military threat on the home weapon–capital ratio, the consumption–capital ratio, and the rate of economic growth, is the degree of relative risk aversion.     

NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship,Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy

In nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, many governments pursue multiple objectives, and changes in policy can occur rapidly—and often unexpectedly. For these reasons, understanding nonproliferation requires empathy and imagination rather than just historical fact. This article considers one teaching tool to encourage such insight—simulations—and demonstrates how teaching and scholarship can interact to improve our understanding of the complex decisions and negotiations involved in nuclear nonproliferation. The article consists of five parts: first, it explains the benefits of simulations as both a policy development tool in Washington and as a teaching tool in universities; second, it describes the pedagogical strategy of the Stanford University simulation program; third, it shows how the simulations have identified and highlighted theoretical and substantive insights that are often neglected in scholarly studies of nonproliferation; and fourth, it describes how students are tested to enhance the learning experience from the simulation. Fifth and finally, the article provides concluding observations about how using simulations in the classroom can help scholars develop insights that improve their understanding of real-world nuclear negotiation dynamics and outcomes.     

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.     

PREVENTING DIRTY BOMBS

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as “sources”). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the “peaceful uses” aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources.     

From the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the Intervention Brigade

The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been characterised by chaos and insecurity for a number of years, but the rise of the M23 rebellion in 2012 once again highlighted just how dire the humanitarian and security situation is. For most of 2012, the crisis was addressed through negotiations between M23 and Kinshasa, mediated by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). However, 2013 marked the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement (PSC Framework), and the United Nations Security Council's adoption of Resolution 2098, which contains the mandate of the long-awaited Intervention Brigade (IB). The PSC Framework calls on Kinshasa to implement substantial political reforms while also urging the neighbours of the DRC to stop interfering in its internal affairs. The IB is mandated to carry out targeted operations against the so-called ‘negative forces’ that operate in the eastern DRC. For now, hope of resolving this ongoing crisis hinges on the continuing ICGLR negotiations, the implementation of the PSC Framework and the success of the IB. However, there are critical questions about all of these processes that need to be answered and understood, as the expectations for these processes – especially in the case of the IB – are extremely high. Will the ICGLR manage to negotiate a peace agreement and will the IB succeed, or will they go down in history as yet another failure to save the eastern DRC?     

ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA AND THE BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

A truly universal ban on anti-personnel mines cannot be realized without engagement of armed non-state actors and armed groups operating outside state control, including rebels and national liberation movements. Events after 9/11 have complicated engagement with organizations that can be classified as ‘terrorists’. Yet, the use of anti-personnel landmines itself can be viewed as an act of terrorism and African leaders have, on various occasions, classified the use of landmines and the presence of unexploded ordnance as engendering insecurity and a serious impediment to development. The success of a total ban ultimately depends upon ensuring that armed non-state actors act in accordance with international humanitarian law. The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action (DoC) might be described as an alternative instrument to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and can serve an important and impartial channel of communication with non-state actors. Already 18 armed groups in Africa have signed the Geneva Call DoC.