Casualty Rates of US Military Personnel During the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

Abstract

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, which ended in August 2010, nearly 3500 hostile deaths occurred among US military personnel and 32,000 more were wounded in action (WIA). More than 1800 hostile deaths occurred during Operation Enduring Freedom (in and around Afghanistan) through 2014 and about 20,000 were WIA. A larger proportion of wounded personnel survived in Iraq and Afghanistan than during the Vietnam War, but the increased survival rates were not as high as some studies have asserted. The survival rates were 90.2% in Iraq and 91.6% in Afghanistan, compared with 86.5% in Vietnam. The casualty rates varied between the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and before, during, and after the respective surges. Amputation rates are difficult to measure consistently, but I estimate that 2.6% of all WIA and 9.0% of medically evacuated WIA from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters combined resulted in the major loss of a limb. Elevated non-hostile death rates (including deaths due to accidents, illnesses, homicides, or suicides) resulted in about 220 more deaths in Iraq and about 200 more deaths in Afghanistan than would have been expected in peacetime among populations of the size deployed to those two conflicts.     

A Good Ally - Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001-2014

The article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission’s findings, it focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway’s relations with the US, a close and long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-making dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway’s record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was charged with bringing security, good governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed relations with the US highlights and helps to problematise the challenges – political, practical and moral – facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside the US. Norwegian efforts in Faryab are revealing of the dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway’s experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.     

Competitive Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently a Specific Setting or Deconstructing its Weak Sovereign State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?

Abstract

Libya in 2011 witnessed a real process of political change, though different from all the policy-oriented jargon equating transition with a teleological transition to democracy. Due to the resilience of the Qadhafi regime in power and with the essential role of NATO intervention, the process was eased out by a eight-month civil war. Governance in post-Qadhafi Libya was not done through the rebuilding of centralized authorities. But it took the specific form of the emergence of multiple non-state actors embedded in local dynamics and then connected with weakened central authorities that had access to the huge Libyan resources. That raised complex questions about the quality of this mode of governance, especially at a time of pressing problems for Libya and its neighbors, whether direct ones (Tunisia, Egypt, Mali) or farther countries across the Mediterranean sea: terrorism with the expansion of Da’esh into the country and flows of refugees crossing Libya’s uncontrolled borders and flowing into Italy and then Europe by thousands.     

A Question of ‘Government’ Control: Afghanistan DDR Programs Since 2001

Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have funded and led three different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki (militia). This article explores why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this article argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile and/or reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who controlled these areas balked at these programs.     

强爆轰驱动超高速碎片发射装置设计因素分析

为了得到发射装置设计因素和超高速碎片性能间的关系,考虑了药型罩的材料、炸药种类、装药长径比、药型罩的锥角、药型罩的厚度、药型罩顶部靠近装药侧的曲率半径等设计因素,采用AUTODYNTM,结合正交试验,对超高速碎片的发射过程进行数值模拟。结果表明,3种发射装置结构分别可以提供质量为1. 533 g的紫铜碎片、速度为11. 649 km/s的铝碎片、动能为85. 6 k J的铝碎片; 2种发射装置结构均可以提供质量大于1 g、速度高于11 km/s的密实结构圆柱状碎片。验证了仿真方法的可信性,对影响碎片性能的设计因素进行了分析、排序,并得到了这些设计因素与碎片质量、速度、动能的关系。     

信息化条件下基于大数据的后装一体化保障构想

由于契约的不完全性、专用性资产的存在,导致民企参军的谈判过程中,一方可能利用另一方因专用性资产投资的锁定效应,而采取机会主义行为将另一方套牢,攫取可占用专用性准租金。这种套牢风险不是单向的,而是双向的,双向套牢风险的存在不仅会降低军品科研生产项目建设质量,而且还会严重挫伤民营企业承担军品科研生产任务的积极性。为有效防范双向套牢风险,本文将从博弈论的角度,建立民营企业与军队采办部门的期望收益与专用性资产投资的函数关系和博弈矩阵,分阶段讨论民营企业与军队采办部门所面临的套牢风险大小及各自的最佳行为选择。以降低民企参军面临的套牢风险,引导更多优势民营企业进入军品科研生产与维修领域,推动军民融合的深度发展。     

面向快速响应发射的机动测控力量构建

快速响应发射是太空作战背景下实现快速进入、反击作战及重建太空信息支援作战能力的重要保障。立足未来太空作战需要,本文提出构建全域机动测控力量的设想。该测控力量以快速响应发射、应急航天搜救以及商业航天发射为目标,并具备全面对抗条件下全域范围内机动作战、独立遂行测控任务的能力。文章研究分析了测控力量作战编成,并对后续作战应用进行探讨,以完善现有测控力量体系、提升测控作战能力。     

Bringing Military Conduct out of the Shadow of Law: Towards a Holistic Understanding of Rules of Engagement

In this article, I outline a holistic approach to the military concept of “Rules of Engagement” (ROE), which complements the legal aspects of ROE with considerations of operational and political requirements for the use of military force. Drawing upon two illustrative cases from the US military experience with the use of ROE, I demonstrate that ROE for any particular military operation should be formulated to balance optimally, if not harmonize fully, the legal, operational and political concerns related to the use of force. In this task, political decision-makers and military practitioners alike are confronted with unavoidable and real-life dilemmas. How these dilemmas are handled has significant implications for how legal requirements concerning accountability and concerns for civilian lives in military combat can be preserved through ROE.     

作战数据工程建设与发展

战争形态正加速向信息化战争演变,数字化作战成为主要形式,作战数据以前所未有的深度广度进入战争全脉络,成为作战的核心,影响着战争进程甚至决定成败。习主席高度重视作战数据建设,多次指出我军数据积累严重不足是军事斗争准备的短板弱项。因此,建设完善配套的作战数据库和形成战时高效的作战数据保障能力,对获取作战信息优势、提升指挥控制能力至关重要,对于提高我军基于网络信息体系的联合作战能力具有重要的支撑作用。     

国防领域技术预警流程研究

技术预警是对技术突破和由此引起的军事、政治、经济和社会危机的预测,是从国家安全的根本利益出发,以保持己方军事优势、防止敌人"技术突袭"为宗旨的技术发展预测。研究回顾了国内外技术预警研究历程,从前期准备、预警清单、技术调查、分析评估等四个主要环节,全面分析国防领域技术预警的具体流程,为国防领域技术预警系统的构建与应用提供支撑。