COURTING THE GLOBAL SOUTH WITH “DUAL-BENEFIT” NONPROLIFERATION ENGAGEMENT

President Barack Obama and an array of other Western leaders continue to assert that the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-state actors is one of most pressing challenges to global security today. Yet, Western efforts to engage governments—particularly governments across the global South—in a practical nonproliferation dialogue have largely yielded disappointing results. This viewpoint examines the need for a new strategy to engage the developing world in nonproliferation programs. It argues that strategies focused strictly on WMD nonproliferation are unsustainable, and ultimately are destined for failure. An alternative “dual-benefit” nonproliferation engagement strategy utilizes the enlightened self-interest of partner governments needed to achieve broad-based buy-in among all partners. In a concluding section, we recommend that the “Group of 8” Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction standardize this model of nonproliferation engagement as it sets out to identify and fund WMD nonproliferation capacity-building initiatives beyond the states of the former Soviet Union.     

ACHIEVING THE VISION OF THE NPT

This article assesses the prospects for a strategy of incrementalism to lead to achievement of the core bargain of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: non-nuclear weapon states' nuclear nonproliferation in exchange for nuclear weapon states' nuclear disarmament to the point of “global zero.” Game theory, prospect theory, and liberal international theory are used to evaluate the potential of a strategy of incrementalism. While separately each has insights to offer, it is when all three theoretical approaches are used in tandem that meaningful explanatory gains emerge. The article concludes that incrementalism probably cannot lead to complete nonproliferation and global nuclear zero. Instead, signal events (as described by prospect theory) are needed to “punctuate” incremental processes in negotiations (best explained by liberal international theory) in order to move past hindrances such as international structural constraints (exemplified by game theory) and the conservative risk-taking propensities of state elites (described by prospect theory).     

All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

ABSTRACT

The popular use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) can be understood to imply a relationship between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation insofar as it assumes that the separate weapons technologies can be usefully grouped into a single analytic category. This article explores whether WMD is actually a useful construct. It begins by reviewing the literature on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, including a recent study that sought to estimate the relationship between the pursuit and acquisition of these different weapons. It then explores some policy inferences that academics and policy makers may be tempted to draw from these studies, particularly regarding the Barack Obama administration's pursuit of deep nuclear reductions. It argues that many of these policy inferences are premature at best and misleading at worst. It concludes with a call for additional research into the causes and consequences of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, and a call for scholars to remain cautious in their desire to draw premature policy implications from their studies in order to be “policy relevant.”     

THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

The Asia-Pacific is emerging as a critical region in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an aggressive global strategy designed to interdict the transport of these weapons and associated technologies. However, some observers have suggested that the Asia-Pacific has given the PSI a less than enthusiastic reception. The authors posit a more sanguine view. They caution against taking such a holistic approach to the region. Asia does not speak with one voice when it comes to security, and opposition to the PSI is not as widespread nor deep-rooted as may have been anticipated. In addition, the PSI's informal structure encourages flexibility, enabling states to participate in certain activities while eschewing others that may be technically or politically untenable.     

ALBANIA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS CON

In 2003, the Albanian government declared that in late 2002 it had discovered a heretofore unknown cache of 16 tons of chemical weapons. Tirana requested and received assistance from the West in securing and destroying the materials, a task completed in 2007. Albania has been lauded for its responsible handling of the discovery and for being the first nation to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This article argues that the Albanian government has always knowingly possessed the weapons, keeping them a secret until a post-September 11, 2001 international focus on weapons of mass destruction made it politically worthwhile for Tirana to declare and destroy them. The likelihood that the governments of the West turned a willful blind eye to this chain of events is troubling for the credibility of the CWC and confidence in nonproliferation measures in general. Finally, the author recommends measures to avoid and address similar situations in the future.     

VERIFIABILITY,RELIABILITY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S. Senate in October 1999 could have been avoided, and the consequences of that vote still loom in the minds of supporters of the treaty. President Barack Obama has embraced the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and a key element of the Obama administration's arms control agenda is delivering on U.S. CTBT ratification. In order to secure the two-thirds majority in the Senate necessary to ratify the treaty, senators that remain skeptical of nuclear disarmament must also be convinced that the entry into force of the CTBT is in the national security interest of the United States. This article provides an analysis of the issues surrounding U.S. CTBT ratification divided into three segments—verifiability of the treaty, reliability of the U.S. stockpile, and the treaty's impact on U.S. national security—and concludes that CTBT ratification serves the security objectives of the United States. The CTBT constitutes an integral component of the multilateral nonproliferation architecture designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it constrains the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, thereby hindering efforts by states of concern to develop advanced nuclear weapons.     

探析美国新军事战略

奥巴马政府2011年以来发布的一系列军事文件,标志着美国新军事战略的形成。文章依据这些文件,结合三年来美军在世界范围内尤其是亚太地区的实际动向,从战略威胁判断、战略指导方针、战略部署调整、作战指导思想和军事力量建设五个方面对新军事战略的内容及实施情况进行了分析。     

加强网络国防建设战略运筹需要强化的六种意识

针对网络国防的现实需求,文章就加强网络国防建设的战略运筹指出了需要强化的六种意识：忧患意识,全局意识,创新意识,主动意识,重点意识,优势意识。在分析了三个方面的忧患意识,归纳了服务于国家安全战略、加强全局筹划、强化长远效益的全局意识。总结了理论创新、法律创新、技术创新为主要领域的创新意识等基础上,提出了维护国家根本利益、聚力局部竞争优势、拓展综合防卫能力的重点意识,探讨了主动探索建设途径、主动加强机制建设、主动构建核心能力的主动意识．分析了尽快形成战斗力生成模式优势、尽快形成防御力量和人才优势、尽快形成军民融合发展体系的优势意识。     

The Tower of London and Firearms in the Reign of Edward IV

Little attention has been paid by historians to the production of firearms in the Tower of London in the fifteenth century before the reign of Henry VII. This is due to the lack of surviving records for the office of the ordnance prior to the 1490s. The discovery of the earliest surviving set of accounts by a Master of the Ordnance based at the Tower, however, means that it is now possible to examine the manufacture and refurbishment of guns at the Tower in the early 1470s. This evidence demonstrates that Edward IV was responsible for the re-establishment of the Tower as the principle facility for the production and storage of firearms in England, which laid important foundations that his Tudor successors built upon.     

变质心再入飞行器自抗扰控制器设计(英文)

再入飞行器采用变质心控制不但可以保持较好的气动外形,还町以增大机动能力,但变质心控制较强的非线性和耦合性大大增加了控制系统设计难度,使控制器设计和实施的代价较高。针对这一问题,基于自抗扰控制技术,设计了变质心再入飞行器双通道解耦控制器。通过构造连续光滑扩张状态观测器,不加区分飞行器的各类干扰与耦合,对其统一进行估计:利用非线性状态反馈控制律,并自适应调节控制参数对其进行补偿,实现对飞行器姿态的解耦控制。仿真结果表明:该方法大大降低了对系统模型精度的要求与控制器设计实施代价,对变质心再入飞行器非线性、耦合性以及参数摄动具有较强的鲁棒性。