Strategic Ambiguity: Nuclear Sharing and the Secret Strategy for Drafting Articles I and II of the Nonproliferation Treaty

ABSTRACT

Since the 1950s, the United States has engaged in nuclear sharing with its NATO allies. Today, 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons remain on European soil. However, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. The potential discrepancy between text and practice raises the question of how the NPT's negotiators dealt with NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements while drafting the treaty that would eventually become the bedrock of the international nonproliferation regime. Using a multitiered analysis of secret negotiations within the White House National Security Council, NATO, and US-Soviet bilateral meetings, this article finds that NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements strengthened the NPT in the short term by lowering West German incentives to build the bomb. However, this article also finds that decision makers and negotiators in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration had a coordinated strategy of deliberately inserting ambiguous language into drafts of Articles I and II of the Treaty to protect and preserve NATO's pre-existing nuclear-sharing arrangements in Europe. This diplomatic approach by the Johnson administration offers lessons for challenges concerning NATO and relations with Russia today.     

The Canary in the Nuclear Submarine: Assessing the Nonproliferation Risk of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Loophole

ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows states to exempt nuclear material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarine programs. This material, however, could be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes without the knowledge of inspectors, creating a potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty. This article argues that exercising that loophole today would amount to admitting a nuclear weapon program, making it a particularly poor pathway to a weapon for a potential proliferant. Still, if states like Brazil ultimately exempt nuclear material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine effort, they could set a dangerous precedent that makes it easier for others to use the loophole as a route to a nuclear weapon capability. There are several policy options available to mitigate the damage of such a precedent; most promising is the prospect of a voluntary safeguards arrangement that would allow international inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear material even after it has been dedicated to a naval nuclear propulsion program.     

YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.     

The South African Denuclearization Exemplar

ABSTRACT

South Africa's nuclear disarmament is a unique historical case, notable in part for the dramatic shift from deception to cooperation. The unprecedented transparency it demonstrated in order to convince the international community of the veracity of their disarmament is heralded as an exemplar for verifiable denuclearization. Less known is how this case affords insights into how a nuclear weapon program can be clandestinely hidden by the ambiguity provided by an otherwise completely legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy program. Using a variety of open sources, including newly declassified internal South African and US government reports, it can be shown that South Africa employed a variety of deceptive tactics before it disarmed, and even for nearly two years after becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews that information to derive instructive lessons on the lengths that a nuclear proliferant state might go to conceal its true capabilities and intentions, and to thwart international discovery of the existence and full extent of an existing—or, in this case, a former—nuclear weapon program.     

具有时滞的Cohen—Grossberg神经网络的Hopf分支全局存在性研究

摘要：利用泛函微分方程的度理论,研究一类具有时滞的Cohen-Grossberg神经网络的全局分支的存在性,研究结果为该类神经网络的应用设计提供理论基础．     

计数序贯抽样检验方案的OC函数和ASN

根据序贯概率比检验的理论,给出计数序贯抽样检验方案的设计原理,得到国家标准GB／T8051—2008中计数序贯抽样检验方案的OC函数和ASN的计算方法。     

一种基于SIFT特征的抗几何攻击水印算法研究

尺度不变特征变换描述子已经应用于数字图像水印的构造,但图像存在相似区域时易造成误匹配问题,基于此提出一种改进的RIT—SIFT数字图像水印算法．水印嵌入时先对图像进行分块,然后将水印分别嵌入子块的非下采样Contourlet变换低频子带中,既简化了水印嵌人又增加了嵌入容量．图像匹配时利用SIFT算法在原始图像中寻找局部特征点,将旋转不变纹理特征信息融合到传统SIFT特征向量中,更加全面地描述图像信息,提高了匹配精度．实验结果表明,提出的算法是有效的,对全局和局部几何攻击、组合攻击以及常规攻击均具有很好的鲁棒性．     

基于改进LMS算法的复合材料超声检测缺陷识别

在径向基函数（RBF）神经网络实现无人机复合材料超声检测脱粘缺陷识别时,针对最小均方（LMS）算法在确定网络输出权值时存在稳态失调误差和收敛速度相矛盾的问题,提出一种改进的自适应的变步长LMS算法．该算法根据反馈误差自适应确定步长,通过引进动量项加快收敛速度．将改进LMS算法应用到RBF网络缺陷识别中,结果表明该方法在稳态失调误差较小的情况下,能快速确定RBF网络的权值．改进的RBF网络能够较好地识别超声检测脱粘缺陷．     

基于复杂网络的作战体系网络模型分析

运用复杂网络方法,构建了作战体系网络模型,分析了作战体系网络的基本特征,揭示了作战网络主要参数与作战体系真实特性之间的关系,得到了基于信息系统体系作战战法运用的一些启示。     

武器装备人机界面操控性评价方法研究

针对武器装备人机界面操控性难以有效评价的问题,提出人机界面操控易用性的评价指标,利用信息距离对易用性进行分析,并建立武器装备人机界面易用性的评估模型,并通过实例进行武器装备易用性评价分析,为武器装备人机界面操控性设计优化及检验标准的制定提供了借鉴。