ON THE USE OF TERROR WEAPONS VERSUS MODERN WEAPON SYSTEMS IN AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Some of the most active arms races are taking place between developed and less developed countries. The inability of less developed countries to compete financially, as well as technologically, with developed countries may be forcing the former to acquire terror weapons (TWP). The Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s and the events of 9/11 proved that the use of TWP is no longer a mere threat; there are several organizations and countries that will not hesitate to use them. This study develops a model of resource allocation in an arms race between a developed country that is characterized by state‐of‐the‐art technology and high GDP, and a less developed country whose technological capability and GDP are much lower. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries that are engaged in the arms race. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria demonstrates its use.     

Performance measurement in military operations: information versus incentives

We explore the impact of strategic assessment efforts on military organizations at war. To do so, we construct a model to explore the impact of a principal’s choice among imperfect performance metrics for a military operation. In doing so, the principal must consider both the incentivizing and informational properties of the metric. We show the conditions under which uncertainty regarding the nature of the agent, as well as uncertainty regarding the operational environment, drives a metric choice that induces pathological behavior from the agent. More specifically, a poor metric choice can create an overly optimistic assessment and end up prolonging the conflict. We illustrate the model’s insights in the cases of World War II and the Vietnam War.     

What Goes Up Must Come Down: Military Expenditure and Civil Wars

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of civil war on military expenditure. We employ two measures of military expenditure: the share of military expenditure in general government expenditure and the logarithm of military expenditures. We would reasonably expect a priori that military expenditure as a share of general government expenditure increases during a civil war and that such increases would taper off over the duration of a civil war. We also explore whether the termination of a civil war induces a decline in the share of military expenditure as a share of the general government expenditure in the short-run. We find evidence the of share of military expenditure increases during a civil war and falls in the year succeeding the end of a civil war, and, in particular, if a war ends in a peace treaty. The level of military expenditures, however, rises during civil wars and does not appear to decline in the short-term after the end of a civil war.     

A Re-assessment of the Japanese Armaments Production During World War II*

Abstract

This paper examines the nexus between the Japanese strategy and economic–industrial mobilization during the period 1937–1945. From 1937 to December 1941, the country was engaged in a land war of attrition in China. This war requested an immense amount of resources and was associated with armaments procurement strategy with emphasis in the army. However, the Japanese strategic vision assumed that the state was strong enough to engage in one land war against China and in a naval war in the Pacific simultaneously. The basis of Japanese strategy was a utopia. Making things worse, the naval war in the Pacific was conducted against the most industrialized powers in the world [the US and the British Empire (Britain, Australia, India, etc.)]. Finally, the internal Japanese industrial mobilization was associated with immense errors in armaments production (absence of economies of scale and scope, limited raw materials, etc.). Under these circumstances, the defeat was an expected outcome.     

SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the ten years since the establishment of South Africa's first inclusive democratic government, an ambitious, extensive and systematic process of reform has been carried out in the governance of security. The process is widely regarded as having been successful and a model for other processes of ‘security sector reform’ in the context of transitions from authoritarian forms of governance to democratic ones.

That this been achieved with hardly a shot fired in anger is a remarkable achievement and a credit to visionary political leadership as well as organisational capacity, in other words to effective security governance.

At the same time, progress has been uneven and sometimes fragmentary, policy intentions and commitments have not always been translated into practice, the end results have not been to everyone's liking, and transformation has engendered its own pathologies. Thus several challenges remain in improving security governance.

This article provides a broad overview of the roles played by the various actors in the governance of the security sector, including the executive, parliament and civil society. It examines the main policy frameworks and touches on organisational transformation, because it is impossible to deal with governance in isolation from these issues. Policy processes and the frameworks they give rise to—in particular—are critical for effective governance. This article deals with the defence, safety and security and intelligence fields. A comprehensive overview would need to include the governance of criminal justice and foreign policy. The article does not seek to make an overall evaluation of governance, but to identify achievements, shortfalls and challenges.     

MONEY IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLITICS

“Lack of money is the root of all evil”

George Bernard Shaw

In a environment where party financing, private funding in particular, is generally a laissez-faire business, as in most Southern African countries, there is the real risk that interest groups and wealthy individuals will buy influence in political parties and in so doing erode public confidence in the political system. Because they are neither open to public scrutiny nor subject to any legislative restraints, huge private donations can, and often do, come with strings attached. This lack of transparency and openness, as well as mechanisms to prevent it, provides ample ground for influence peddling, where those who pay the piper call the tune. Left unchecked, this party funding scenario will continue to be a serious indictment of the region's democratisation projects, crippling democracy and stunting economic development. This article consid     

THE 3rd PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT SESSION

Frustrated by decades of authoritarian rule, political repression, economic mismanagement, poverty, soaring unemployment and other related injustices, the youth in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya rose up against the state, while Algeria and Morocco narrowly escaped the events of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. This quest for political reform is an indication of a great collective shift that has the potential to reverberate throughout the African continent. However, to what extent can the youth succeed in bringing about the much-desired transition to democracy? This article focuses on the North African youth uprising and the quest for political reform in Africa. It examines the core issues of the youth uprising and the challenges to the attainment of political reform. A youth uprising can lead to genuine political reform if the major challenges in building new democratic forms of governance which can address economic disparity, protection of human rights, justice and security, can be overcome.     

THE LAND IS THE ECONOMY

This article revisits Zimbabwe's land question from the vantage point of having been written five years after the ‘fast-track’ land redistribution programme was launched. Without belittling the accomplishments of land reform in the first 19 years of the country's independence, it is generally clear that the sweeping programme of 2000–2003, the most comprehensive of its kind, created a new paradigm. Clearly, the consequences will take many years to work themselves out through the country's political, economic and social fabric.

The article briefly defines what may be termed ‘old’ and ‘new’ versions of Zimbabwe's land question before outlining the salient aspects of the reform process itself. It then assesses the outcomes of the redistribution, the apparent lacuna between ‘land’ and ‘agrarian’ reform, and the debate that the reform process itself has kindled. Transforming land distribution into qualitative agrarian reform has proved an Achilles heel in the arguments put forward by the proponents of the fast-track programme. Finally, recommendations are provided as to what is necessary to secure land and agrarian reform in the short, medium and long term.     

CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS

Much is made in the security sector reform literature of the role of civil society as an overseer and monitor of the security sector, contributing to improved accountability and governance. This paper looks at how the notion of ‘civil society capacity’ needs to be disaggregated in order to develop meaningful strategies to assist civil society organisations to impact security sector reforms in complex, post-conflict contexts like the Democratic Republic of Congo. It draws on fieldwork conducted with 200 Congolese civil society groups that are attempting to engage in current security sector reform processes, and looks at which capacities are required to improve oversight by civil society groups.     

Police Corruption: Towards a Working Definition

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publication Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, all civilians (including child soldiers) lose their immunity from direct targeting ‘for so long as’ their actions amount to direct participation in hostilities. All civilians can, however, access the revolving door of protection and return to their civilian activities – complete with full immunity from direct targeting – provided the nature of their direct participation was spontaneous and disorganised. Once it can be ascertained that their participation in hostilities amounts to continuous combative functions, they relinquish their access to the revolving door of protection, and can be targeted at all times until they abandon their formal or functional membership of the belligerent group. This piece analyses how the revolving door phenomenon and the notion of continuous combative functions apply in instances where civilian child soldiers are directly participating in hostilities.