航空电子综合火控系统驾驶员操作程序(POP)仿真

驾驶员操作程序(POP)是航电综合设计最重要的顶层设计文件,其仿真对支持总体设计具有不可替代的作用。首先从整个航空火控系统的角度阐述了POP的组成及任务操作,然后介绍了POP仿真模型的建立方法和制作思路,并对某型飞机航电综合火控系统POP进行了仿真实现。其结果可用于评价飞机航电综合火控系统的POP操作逻辑关系的正确性。     

基于熵的空中目标识别模型及应用

空中目标识别是现代防空作战的重要研究内容。研究根据不同类型的目标产生不同的辐射和不同的雷达回波信号对目标进行识别。提出利用熵理论来处理目标识别问题,采用层次分析法与熵权的组合来确定指标的权重。仿真实例表明,基于熵的识别是一种运算简单,结果可靠的目标识别算法。     

战车火控系统射击命中三要素函数误差分析

火控系统射击(函数)误差可分解为射弹散布函数误差和火控射击准备函数误差。而射击准备函数则是命中三要素函数即瞄准函数、解算函数和控制函数的合成函数。命中三要素的提出,为火控系统射击误差(精度)的分析提供了新的途径。它们均是命中目标的关键要素,又各具特色,为火控系统射击精度乃至系统反应速度的提高,指出了应该努力的方向。针对此进行了具体的分析。     

一种基于离散混沌系统的S-Box候选算法设计

S-Box是现行分组密码中唯一的非线性部件,主要提供了分组密码算法中必需的混淆作用,其密码强度决定了整个分组密码的安全强度。为进一步提高S-Box的强度,结合离散混沌系统的内在随机性、有界性、非周期性及对初始条件和参数极度敏感等特点,提出一种采用多混沌映射和交叉映射生成S-Box的生成算法。实验分析表明,该算法生成的样本密钥敏感性强,随机性好,既能较好地满足S-Box设计所要求的各项准则和特性,安全性高,同时又能降低计算复杂度,提高计算速度,且易于生成和扩展,因而是一种性能良好的S-Box候选算法。     

IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war

This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.     

Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India

Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response.     

Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many insurgent forces there are, it has become common to base force ratios on the population of the country. In the realm of policy, the question above is posed as, ‘How many of our troops does it take to get the job done?’     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.     

GNSS应急辅助定位及精度评估方法研究

在可视卫星数少于4颗、无法进行传统导航解算的恶劣环境下,导航接收机可利用外部高程气压计提供的高程或者内部守时模块的钟差等信息进行应急辅助定位。在该应急辅助定位工作模式的误差分析中,传统导航定位误差传递模型无法适用。针对此问题,本文在研究三星结合高程、三星结合钟差、双星结合高程钟差等几种应急辅助定位原理的基础上,给出了新的应急辅助定位误差传递的分析模型,利用仿真算例验证了该模型的正确性。最后通过对定位精度的分析,说明根据卫星分布特点可以按照本文方法量化得到伪距测量与辅助信息的精度的最优数量级关系,可以用最小代价实现定位精度的提升。该结论可指导接收机外部辅助器件的选择。