基于改进粒子群算法的地空导弹使用保障设备优化配置

地空导弹使用保障过程复杂,很难有效地对使用保障设备进行优化配置。结合地空导弹使用保障需求以及其使用保障作业流程的特点,构建地空导弹使用保障设备优化配置模型。该模型属于典型的NP难问题,基于此提出以改进的粒子群优化方法对模型进行求解。新的粒子群优化方法中,将粒子线性移动改进为非线性移动方式,有效提高粒子的全局搜索能力。粒子的编码方案首次采用位移向量表达方式,并提出一种新的粒子修复策略,有效地简化了模型的求解过程。给出算例并且设计了对比实验。实验结果表明本文方法能够解决地空导弹使用保障设备的优化配置问题,并且对于其他资源配置问题求解也具有重要的参考意义。     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.     

Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes?

Sixteen years after stepping out of the nuclear closet, India's nuclear posture, some of its operational practices, and hardware developments are beginning to mimic those of the original five nuclear weapon states. Several proliferation scholars in the United States contend that India's national security managers are poised to repeat the worst mistakes of the superpowers’ Cold War nuclear competition, with negative consequences for deterrence, crisis, and stability in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. This article takes a contrarian view. It dissects the best available data to show why the alarmist view is overstated. It argues that not only are the alarmists’ claims unsupported by evidence, their interpretation of the skeletal and often contradictory data threatens to construct the very threat they prophesize.     

A nonatomic‐game model for timing clearance sales under competition

We deal with dynamic revenue management (RM) under competition using the nonatomic‐game approach. Here, a continuum of heterogeneous sellers try to sell the same product over a given time horizon. Each seller can lower his price once at the time of his own choosing, and faces Poisson demand arrival with a rate that is the product of a price‐sensitive term and a market‐dependent term. Different types of sellers interact, and their respective prices help shape the overall market in which they operate, thereby influencing the behavior of all sellers. Using the infinite‐seller approximation, which deprives any individual seller of his influence over the entire market, we show the existence of a certain pattern of seller behaviors that collectively produce an environment to which the behavior pattern forms a best response. Such equilibrium behaviors point to the suitability of threshold‐like pricing policies. Our computational study yields insights to RM under competition, such as profound ways in which consumer and competitor types influence seller behaviors and market conditions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 365–385, 2014     

一种基于自适应阈值与边缘跟踪的目标提取方法

介绍了一种基于目标灰度门限和目标之间灰度距离门限的区域自动阈值检测法,用该方法检测出图像区域的阈值进行目标初分割,然后结合形态学中的开启和闭合方法对初分割后的二值图像进行双滤波,再用一种新的区域边缘跟踪标注法对其进行跟踪和标注,找出每个目标的包络矩形坐标,用其对原图进行区域定位,从而可以提取出原图中包含目标的小区域.     

有限次故障小修模型

针对具有小修的维修策略问题,在提出一定的假设条件后,建立经过长期运行后的单位时间期望损失的模型,研究并分析了有限次故障小修模型,最后通过相应的示例验证了研究结果。     

A sequential dynamic pricing model and its applications

Consider a sequential dynamic pricing model where a seller sells a given stock to a random number of customers. Arriving one at a time, each customer will purchase one item if the product price is lower than her personal reservation price. The seller's objective is to post a potentially different price for each customer in order to maximize the expected total revenue. We formulate the seller's problem as a stochastic dynamic programming model, and develop an algorithm to compute the optimal policy. We then apply the results from this sequential dynamic pricing model to the case where customers arrive according to a continuous‐time point process. In particular, we derive tight bounds for the optimal expected revenue, and develop an asymptotically optimal heuristic policy. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

武警后勤保障社会化改革绩效评估与政策建议

为检验武警后勤保障社会化成果,促进其健康发展,抽取了30个样本单位为重点调研对象,搜集整理相关数据,建立绩效评价模型,进行实证研究,对武警部队后勤保障社会化的实施情况进行评估,提出了相应的政策建议。     

大学生入伍动机分析

2009年兵役制度的调整使普通高校在校生有了更多步人军营的机会。不同的入伍动机影响着大学生的个人发展和军队的长期建设。本文运用心理学动机理论,对大学生入伍动机的产生进行分析,探讨如何培养和激发大学生入伍的动机。