India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

Dangerous work: Terrorism against U.S. diplomats

The goal of diplomats is to represent their countries’ interests through diplomacy, not arms. Because they are not military personnel, they may be perceived as at lower risk of being the target of terrorists. However, recent events have called this perception into question. Despite this danger, there has been little research on terrorist attacks against diplomats. Drawing on the terrorism studies literature, this article argues that diplomats are targeted more than non-diplomatic targets in countries where certain U.S. foreign policies are implemented. An empirical analysis of 471 attacks against U.S. diplomats from 1970 to 2011 reveals that while U.S. alliances and foreign aid increase the likelihood of attacks against diplomats, U.S. military intervention and civil war, on the other hand, increase the risk of terrorism against non-diplomatic targets. This finding is relevant because it shows terrorist attacks against diplomats result from certain types of foreign policy.     

Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.     

The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

During the 2016 American presidential campaign, Democrats and Republicans alike repeatedly raised concerns at the prospect of Donald Trump being in charge of America’s nuclear arsenal based on his seemingly unstable personality. Unfortunately, this emphasis on Trump’s character distracted attention from any in-depth investigation into his long-standing interest in nuclear issues. This article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by highlighting the nuclear legacy Trump will inherit from Obama, surveying his statements on nuclear issues over more than three decades, and providing an analysis of constraining factors on his administration’s nuclear agenda, particularly domestic institutions. It finds that most of Trump’s views on nuclear issues are relatively consistent with past Republican presidents. Where he is unique, however, is in his use of social media, which has potential implications on nuclear signaling.     

Sharing security in an era of international cooperation: unmanned aerial vehicles and the United States’ Air Force

The United States’ Air Force (USAF) has developed and used unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology to monitor and assassinate dangerous terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Currently, there are few countries that possess armed UAV and since the US created much of this technology, the USAF is usually part of the training that automatically accompanies the purchase of its UAVs. The research question this article attempts to answer is, “What is the extent of the United States’ Air Force assistance in the training and proliferation of UAV technology to foreign militaries?”     

Perspectives for the development of key industrial capabilities for Canada’s defence sector

With the Canada First Defence Strategy, Canada has put forth a major opportunity to reconcile national security imperatives and industrial policy. The Jenkins Report (2013) set out to examine ways to use that procurement effort to foster key industrial capabilities (KICs) that would put the Canadian defence industry at an advantage both nationally and internationally. The Canadian defence industry should then develop highly focused capabilities with a view to moving up global value chains. As such, KICs that hold the best potential should be selected. They should be sustained through a range of strategies that are however contingent on the elimination of policy gaps. This leads to a balancing act between the need to control intellectual property assets versus accessing them in a world where national boundaries are eroded. Canada’s industry should target opportunities outside North America while continuing to focus on better integration with the North American industry.     

基于改进EMD的信号降噪方法

经验模态分解(Empirical Mode Decomposition,EMD)算法作为新型时频分析方法受到广泛关注,它基于信号的极值特性处理信号,具有自适应强、无需预先确定基函数的优点。但EMD算法本身仍存在模态混叠及EMD强制降噪法易导致信号失真等一系列问题。针对EMD算法的缺陷,提出基于自相关函数的集合经验模态分解方法(Ensemble Empirical Mode Decomposition,EEMD)与小波阈值降噪相结合的改进算法。首先利用自相关函数对高频固有模态函数(Intrinsic Mode Function,IMF)进行选择,然后利用小波阈值降噪法为EEMD设定阈值,最后将改进算法用于信号降噪,并与快速傅里叶变换(FFT)算法、小波阈值算法以及EMD强制降噪算法进行比较。该方法的优点是克服了EMD算法的不足,避免了模态混叠现象,有效地保留了高频信号中分量,降噪效果更好。     

Coordinated pricing and inventory control problems with capacity constraints and fixed ordering cost

This article addresses a single‐item, finite‐horizon, periodic‐review coordinated decision model on pricing and inventory control with capacity constraints and fixed ordering cost. Demands in different periods are random and independent of each other, and their distributions depend on the price in the current period. Each period's stochastic demand function is the additive demand model. Pricing and ordering decisions are made at the beginning of each period, and all shortages are backlogged. The objective is to find an optimal policy that maximizes the total expected discounted profit. We show that the profit‐to‐go function is strongly CK‐concave, and the optimal policy has an (s,S,P) ‐like structure. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

考虑需求相关的可修复系统备件配置模型

对于一个拥有多台相同设备的可修复系统来说,一种备件的需求以及其对应的备件保障方案将影响着系统的可工作设备数量,从而影响着设备其他备件的需求,故假设备件需求相互独立且与系统自身备件保障方案无关而开展备件配置研究是不合理的.在考虑备件需求相关以及备件的保障方案对备件需求的影响的前提下,利用马尔可夫理论描述了备件需求规律,针对不串件拼修和串件拼修两种情况分别给出了可用度的计算方法,并在此基础上以备件配置费用作为优化目标,以可用度作为约束构建备件优化配置模型,给出了边际分析求解模型的方法.通过案例分析,验证了模型的正确性.     

一纲多本:存在的问题对策与建议

"一纲多本"教科书政策是当代社会多元文化的价值诉求,同时也是我国基础教育改革的应然选择。然而,"一纲多本"政策在实施过程中却引发了学生学习负担加重;学生学习结果呈现"两极化"趋势;教科书质量不理想;教师专业能力发展出现困惑等四方面的现实问题。文章在分析"一纲多本"引发问题原因的基础上,从课程标准、教科书质量、学生和教师等几个方面对其未来的发展前景进行了展望。