基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统时频同步误差影响分析

时间和频率同步问题是基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统的关键技术之一。为了研究时、频同步误差对其成像的影响,针对系统工作特性,分析了时、频同步误差的产生机理,建立了时、频同步误差模型,并利用二阶距离模型和RD成像算法,建立了完整的时、频同步误差到成像结果的传递模型,仿真验证了理论分析的准确性。理论推导和仿真计算结果指出了基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统对时间同步和频率同步的精度要求。分析结论对于指导基于星载照射源的被动SAR系统设计及同步方法研究具有重要意义。     

一种基于离散混沌系统的S-Box候选算法设计

S-Box是现行分组密码中唯一的非线性部件,主要提供了分组密码算法中必需的混淆作用,其密码强度决定了整个分组密码的安全强度。为进一步提高S-Box的强度,结合离散混沌系统的内在随机性、有界性、非周期性及对初始条件和参数极度敏感等特点,提出一种采用多混沌映射和交叉映射生成S-Box的生成算法。实验分析表明,该算法生成的样本密钥敏感性强,随机性好,既能较好地满足S-Box设计所要求的各项准则和特性,安全性高,同时又能降低计算复杂度,提高计算速度,且易于生成和扩展,因而是一种性能良好的S-Box候选算法。     

IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war

This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.     

Controlled warfare: how directed-energy weapons will enable the US Military to fight effectively in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage

US military operations are increasingly conducted within urban environments and with these operations come the risk of increasing the number of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. The use of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, is one method for minimizing collateral damage. This method enables US military forces to effectively fight within urban environments through force escalation capabilities. Using a series of historical examples and future scenarios for urban warfare, this article highlights deficiencies affecting military capabilities in military urban operations, addresses the consequences of collateral damage, assesses the effectiveness of directed-energy weapons in military urban operations and encourages further funding, research and integration of non-lethal weaponry, such as directed-energy weapons, within the US military.     

Escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies: Insights from Northeast India

Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response.     

The failure of defense planning in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: ascertaining causation and determining solutions

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.     

基于拉盖尔模型的超声信号渡越时间测量性能分析

传统窄带模型仅能通过数值计算统计出超声信号渡越时间的测量性能。针对这一问题,提出基于拉盖尔模型计算理论克拉下限的方法。研究了拉盖尔函数及其时间导数的性质,得到时间导数内积矩阵,并将其应用到费舍尔矩阵中,能够快速精确计算克拉下限。对混合指数模型仿真表明,在高斯白噪声背景下,渡越时间方差与理论克拉下限具有良好的一致性;受窄带噪声和反射等因素影响,实测数据的渡越时间方差与理论克拉下限存在较大偏差。     

GNSS应急辅助定位及精度评估方法研究

在可视卫星数少于4颗、无法进行传统导航解算的恶劣环境下,导航接收机可利用外部高程气压计提供的高程或者内部守时模块的钟差等信息进行应急辅助定位。在该应急辅助定位工作模式的误差分析中,传统导航定位误差传递模型无法适用。针对此问题,本文在研究三星结合高程、三星结合钟差、双星结合高程钟差等几种应急辅助定位原理的基础上,给出了新的应急辅助定位误差传递的分析模型,利用仿真算例验证了该模型的正确性。最后通过对定位精度的分析,说明根据卫星分布特点可以按照本文方法量化得到伪距测量与辅助信息的精度的最优数量级关系,可以用最小代价实现定位精度的提升。该结论可指导接收机外部辅助器件的选择。     

Clash of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their super power sponsors: Implications on the war against Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.     

A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN DEFENCE SPENDING AND GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMENT

Abstract

This paper explains and assesses the UK experience with determining prices and profitability for non-competitive defence contracts. Three periods are considered, namely pre-1968, the 1968 Profit Formula Agreement and the changes introduced in 2014. Two cases of ‘excessive’ profits were major determinants of the 1968 Profit Formula Agreement; but continued dissatisfaction with the 1968 Agreement led to changes in 2014. The historical overview of UK experience provides a basis for understanding current UK policy and offers insights for other countries facing similar policy challenges. A critique is presented of UK policy on single source pricing and profitability.