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191.
Henry Philippens 《Defense & Security Analysis》2012,28(2):176-184
In a succession of disclosures over the summer of 2011, the People's Republic of China acknowledged the near completion of its first aircraft carrier and the initiation of a carrier building program. These revelations have come at a time of increased tension in the South China Sea on top of the wider worries in the region concerning China's overly assertive stance and the pace of its military modernization. This perspective will examine why the status of the vessel and the program have now been made public, in addition to surveying the wider implications this upgrade to Chinese maritime capabilities will have on the stability of the region over the coming years. However, this paper concludes that there is, at present, no reason for the sensationalism nor the threat‐mongering seen in many media outlets, of late. Hastily drawn conclusions based primarily on realpolitik fail to understand the nuances of this issue. 相似文献
192.
由于地理环境、区域位置、生活方式、宗教信仰、社会制度的不同 ,孕育了不同的传统文化及民族性格 ,从而形成了中西方不同特点、风格的传统体育。可以预见 ,在文化背景下 ,由分化走向融洽 ,将是世界体育发展的必然趋势。 相似文献
193.
Sumit Ganguly 《The Nonproliferation Review》2014,21(3-4):255-260
The question of nuclear stability in South Asia is a subject of both academic and policy significance. It is the only region in the world that has three, contiguous nuclear-armed states: India, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan. It is also freighted with unresolved border disputes. To compound matters, all three states are now modernizing their nuclear forces and have expressed scant interest in any form of regional arms control. These issues and developments constitute the basis of this special section, which explores the problems and prospects of nuclear crisis stability in the region. 相似文献
194.
Nancy W. Gallagher 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(3-4):469-498
ABSTRACTSince the end of the Cold War, arms control proponents tried to make the case for deep nuclear reductions and other forms of security cooperation as necessary for strategic stability. While different versions of strategic stability analysis did sometimes produce innovative proposals, constructive negotiations, and successful ratification campaigns in the past, this analytical framework has become more of a hindrance than a help. Treating arms control as a predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect negotiation, ratification, and implementation. This article compares two logics for arms control as a means to enhance strategic stability, one developed by the Cambridge community in the 1960s and one used by the Reagan administration and its successors, with current perspectives on strategic stability in which flexibility and freedom of action are preferable to predictability and arms control. It also contrasts what the Barack Obama administration has tried to achieve through strategic stability dialogues with Russia and China with how they envision security cooperation. It then presents an approach developed during the Cold War by Hedley Bull for thinking about both the technical and the political dimensions of arms control, and suggests that the logic of Cooperative Security (which shares important features with Bull's approach) is a more appropriate and productive way to think about arms control in the twenty-first century than strategic stability analysis is. 相似文献
195.
Dennis M. Gormley 《The Nonproliferation Review》2013,20(2):123-139
ABSTRACTThe dangers and risks of employing a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability greatly exceed the benefits. More suitable, if less prompt, alternatives exist to deal with fleeting targets. Even a niche CPGS capability—consisting of approximately twenty systems—carries risks, to say nothing of proposals to develop hundreds or more. Most dangerously, CPGS could stir the pre-emption pot, particularly vis-à-vis states that correctly perceive to be within the gunsights of US CPGS weapons; other states, too, may feel emboldened to emulate this US precedent and undertake their own form of prompt, long-range strike capability. Compressed circumstances surrounding such a scenario could foster unwanted erratic behavior, including the misperception that the threatening missile carries a nuclear weapon. But the true Achilles's heel of the CPGS concept is the unprecedented demands it places on the intelligence community to provide decision makers with “exquisite” intelligence within an hour timeframe. Such compressed conditions leave decision makers with virtually no time to appraise the direct—and potentially unintended—consequences of their actions. 相似文献
196.
Although the Obama Administration has differed from its predecessor in a number of respects, on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), there is a striking continuity. The Obama Administration has remained committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration. Significantly, this has led to Chinese and Russian balancing in the nuclear sphere. As a result, there is evidence of a security dilemma-type dynamics in US relations with China and Russia. At present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal balancing against the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama Administration. This article fills this gap. 相似文献
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