有限维修能力下多级保障系统装备时变可用度评估及保障方案优化

备件库存和站点维修能力是影响备件维修周转的重要因素,制约着装备的使用效果。针对备件需求随任务阶段动态变化时装备保障方案的评估和优化问题,考虑站点维修能力对备件维修过程的影响,结合METRIC建模方法和动态排队理论,建立了有限维修能力下多级保障系统装备时变可用度评估模型。在评估模型基础之上,以保障费用为优化目标、装备可用度为约束条件,建立任务期内多级保障系统保障方案优化模型。以任务期内的最低可用度所对应的备件短缺数为观测值,分析各项资源的边际效益值,采用边际优化算法对各项资源进行优化计算。算例分析表明,评估模型能够计算多级保障系统任务期内各阶段装备可用度;保障方案优化模型和方法能够得到各项保障资源的优化配置方案。提出的模型和优化方法能够为装备保障人员制订合理的保障方案提供决策支持。     

搜索路径给定时的搜索对策问题及其应用

搜索路径给定时的最优搜索方案问题,也可以理解为是关于搜索者和目标的二人对策问题,主要讨论了当搜索路径给定时的单个搜索者和单个目标的搜索对策问题。首先根据问题的特点,利用动态规划和迭代的方法,确定关于目标逃逸路径混合策略的最优分区,证明该分区是多面体凸集;针对目标不同逃逸路径的分区,求出搜索者的最大期望收益,再将问题转化为二人有限零和对策,计算出搜索者的支付矩阵,确定最优搜索策略。最后结合海军护航行动,对我舰载直升机搜索小型海盗船进行分析和计算,说明搜索路径给定时的最优搜索对策对于双方的资源分配和提高搜索效率具有一定的应用价值。     

军民融合产业创新集群的形成

在军民融合发展战略与创新驱动发展战略深入推进进程中,军民融合产业创新集群成为军民融合产业发展的重要创新形式,其形成问题研究更是对其发展与演化具有重要影响。以军民融合产业创新集群的内涵着手,通过刺激—反应模型与演化博弈模型,分析其形成过程与促进措施。研究表明,军民融合产业创新集群作为复杂适应系统,创新主体的适应性能力及其内在关系是集群形成的关键所在;为使合作创新行为成为演化博弈的稳定策略,从合作创新能力系数和合作创新成本、拥有的创新资源以及政府资金支持三个方面剖析集群形成的促进作用,对军民融合产业创新集群的发展与演化研究奠定基础。     

飞机电磁弹射系统发展及其关键技术

总结论述了美国和英法国家的飞机电磁弹系统工程化应用研制的发展状况,综述了电磁弹射用直线电机的方案选型设计、仿真技术、性能优化和控制方法等方面的关键技术和研究现状,针对电磁弹射技术的发展前景和应用给出了相关建议,为国内电磁弹射相关技术的发展提供了借鉴。     

侧贴碳纤维布加固连续梁非线性有限元分析

为研究不同初始荷载作用下侧贴碳纤维布及侧贴预应力碳纤维布加固钢筋混凝土连续梁的加固效果,采用有限元分析软件ABAQUS对其进行数值模拟,并将有限元分析结果与试验结果对比。有限元分析表明：钢筋混凝土连续梁的加固效果受初始荷载的影响,初始荷载越小,加固效果越好;对纵向侧贴碳纤维布施加预应力,能够大幅提高钢筋混凝土连续梁的抗弯承载力,与未加固梁相比其抗弯承载力提高了65%以上;有限元计算结果与试验结果的荷载-挠度曲线吻合较好,两者的抗弯承载力相差不超过10%。所得结果可以为类似加固设计和试验提供参考。     

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply to Rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson's (2012a, b) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.     

A three‐stage procurement optimization problem under uncertainty

This article examines a problem faced by a firm procuring a material input or good from a set of suppliers. The cost to procure the material from any given supplier is concave in the amount ordered from the supplier, up to a supplier‐specific capacity limit. This NP‐hard problem is further complicated by the observation that capacities are often uncertain in practice, due for instance to production shortages at the suppliers, or competition from other firms. We accommodate this uncertainty in a worst‐case (robust) fashion by modeling an adversarial entity (which we call the “follower”) with a limited procurement budget. The follower reduces supplier capacity to maximize the minimum cost required for our firm to procure its required goods. To guard against uncertainty, the firm can “protect” any supplier at a cost (e.g., by signing a contract with the supplier that guarantees supply availability, or investing in machine upgrades that guarantee the supplier's ability to produce goods at a desired level), ensuring that the anticipated capacity of that supplier will indeed be available. The problem we consider is thus a three‐stage game in which the firm first chooses which suppliers' capacities to protect, the follower acts next to reduce capacity from unprotected suppliers, and the firm then satisfies its demand using the remaining capacity. We formulate a three‐stage mixed‐integer program that is well‐suited to decomposition techniques and develop an effective cutting‐plane algorithm for its solution. The corresponding algorithmic approach solves a sequence of scaled and relaxed problem instances, which enables solving problems having much larger data values when compared to standard techniques. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Should competing firms reveal their capacity?

In this article, we explore when firms have an incentive to hide (or reveal) their capacity information. We consider two firms that aim to maximize profits over time and face limited capacity. One or both of the firms have private information on their own capacity levels, and they update their beliefs about their rival's capacity based on their observation of the other firm's output. We focus on credible revelation mechanisms—a firm may signal its capacity through overproduction, compared to its myopic production levels. We characterize conditions when high‐capacity firms may have the incentive and capability to signal their capacity levels by overproduction. We show that prior beliefs about capacity play a crucial, and surprisingly complex, role on whether the firm would prefer to reveal its capacity or not. A surprising result is that, despite the fact that it may be best for the high‐capacity firm to overproduce to reveal its capacity when capacity information is private, it may end up with more profits than if all capacity information were public knowledge in the first place. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

军用电子机箱模态分析及测试

对某军用电子机箱的固有频率从有限元分析和模态试验测试两个方面进行研究,并将理论分析结果和模态试验测试结果进行对比,确定了电子机箱的固有模态.为今后电子机箱的设计提供了参考依据,为仿真分析提供了有效的有限元建模方法.