Rebels of the frontier: origins,organization, and recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban

The Pakistani Taliban, factionalized into some 40 groups, form a decentralized insurgent movement, often characterized by infighting, divergent motivations, and a shifting web of alliances. The Pakistani Taliban remain little understood because most scholars have avoided a serious treatment of the insurgent movement and instead focused on analyzing the geopolitics of the region and Pakistan's ‘double game’. This article seeks to fill this gap by dissecting the movement through selected theories of organization and mobilization. First, I explain the various dimensions of the conflict and the origins of the insurgency. Next, I discuss the Pakistani Taliban's political organization, categorizing it as composed of various warlord regimes. I further list the Taliban's component groups and numerical strength and chart the leadership structure. Lastly, I analyze insurgent recruitment strategies, accounting for the role of selective incentives, coercion, and genuine grievances.     

A more complex and conventional victory: revisiting the Dhofar counterinsurgency, 1963–1975

Following the emergence of a communist regime in South Yemen and the multiplication of subversive movements in the United Kingdom's Gulf protectorates, British policymakers genuinely feared the spread of communism throughout southern Arabia. Defeating the People's Front for the Liberation for the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) insurgency in Oman's Dhofar province was considered central to preventing such an outcome. In their pursuit of victory, British officers overthrew the sultan of Oman, escalated the war by conducting attacks in South Yemen, and, ultimately, appealed to Islam as a means of rallying support against communism. However, lessons learned in previous counterinsurgencies (Malaya, Kenya, and Borneo) proved of only limited value in Oman's physical and cultural environment. Unfortunately, none of these measures worked as anticipated. Only Iran's direct military intervention and the dramatic growth of Oman's financial resources after the 1973 oil crisis provided the resources to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Even so, victory was only achieved in 1975 because the rebellion's leaders unwisely attempted to oppose the Anglo–Omani offensives conventionally.     

Croatia's bitter harvest: Total National Defence's role in the Croatian War of Independence

Croatia's successful bid for independence was one of the defining moments of the immediate post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, the means that Croatia used to obtain independence remains relatively unexamined by academics. This article focuses on the early period of Croatia's bid for secession, and specifically the role that Yugoslavia's policy of Total National Defence played in facilitating its independence. Unlike in Slovenia, where the legacies of Total National Defence facilitated Slovenia's bid for secession, in Croatia the decision of its political leaders meant that the country largely neglected its positive legacies, resulting in a protracted four-year struggle.     

Explaining the impact of militancy on Iran–Pakistan relations

ABSTRACT

Sectarian militants have for years launched attacks from Pakistan across the border to Iran. Finding sanctuary in a neighbouring country can make the difference between success and failure for militants. Conventional wisdom holds that a lasting transnational militancy challenge would typically create serious interstate conflict. Militancy has triggered armed encounters between Iran and Pakistan. This article argues that despite some tension militancy has resulted in deeper cooperation in the ambivalent dyad. Both states’ overarching security concerns, having exhausted other options, the believed involvement of third-party states, and economic potential, have moderately alleviated negative pressure caused by militancy.     

AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL OF CAPITAL AND ARMS ACCUMULATION

This paper attempts to examine the effect of an anticipated foreign military threat on the steady‐state growth rate and the transitional behavior of the economy. The modeling strategy follows the Sandler and Hartley (1995 Sandler, T. and Hartley, K. 1995. The Economics of Defense, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  [Google Scholar]) and Dunne et al. (2005 Dunne, J.P., Smith, R.P. and Willenbockel, D. 2005. Models of military expenditure and growth: a critical review. Defence and Peace Economics, 16: 449–461. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) viewpoints to emphasize the role of national defense in affecting growth from the perspective of both the demand and the supply sides. We thus combine the public capital version of endogenous growth with a framework of competitive arms accumulation. It is found that the key factor determining the steady state and the transitional effects of a rise in the foreign military threat on the home weapon–capital ratio, the consumption–capital ratio, and the rate of economic growth, is the degree of relative risk aversion.     

基于CREAM的后方仓库叉车装卸运输弹药HRA评估

针对我军后方仓库弹药装卸运输环节对人员叉车操作的安全性需求,设计出了叉车操作测试场地路线,归纳总结了人员操作叉车进行弹药装卸运输环节中的安全失效形式及失效原因,构建了HRA评估数学模型．选取我军某后方仓库搬运机械建制班人员为对象,进行了实地测试,得到了弹药装卸运输环节的人为失误概率．测试结果表明,基于CREAM方法能够较好地解决后方仓库弹药装卸运输环节人为失误概率的量化问题．     

概念模型验证方法研究综述

概念模型验证是保证和提高仿真可信性的重要手段,是建模与仿真VV＆A中的重点和难点．首先将概念模型的验证方法划分为非形式化方法、静态方法、动态方法和形式化方法4类,并提出了一种基于本体推理的概念模型验证方法,然后对各种方法的基本思想、基本原理、基本过程、适用对象、优缺点进行全面的分析总结,明确了各种方法的优缺点和适用范围,为如何选用各种验证方法提供参考,也明确了下一步应重点研究的问题．     

基于DoDAF的远程目指系统作战体系结构

针对军事信息系统规模庞大、组成结构复杂以及越来越短的产品研制周期要求,在深入研究DoDAF（Department of Defense Architecture Framework）体系结构建模思想及理论的基础上,提出一种基于DoDAF的远程目指系统作战体系结构建模方法。通过分析作战体系结构产品的内涵,以及相互关联关系,给出了具体的体系结构设计步骤及产品实现形式。结合具体典型实例给出了体系结构产品的设计过程,最后通过动态仿真实验对所建立的模型进行了验证。实验结果表明,基于该方法建立模型合理可行、直观易懂、步骤简明清晰。     

THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, the group of stakeholders working to combat biological weapons (BW) proliferation has broadened to include new actors who have not traditionally focused on security issues, including organizations from the public health sector, researchers in the life sciences, and the biosafety community. This has had significant benefits for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the arms control establishment more broadly. However, the BWC's agenda has become increasingly dominated by issues of international health and global health security. By focusing solely on response strategies, the United States and other interested parties risk losing sight of other important elements of a counter-BW strategy, including deterrence and prevention. Focusing on public health-related issues to the exclusion of more traditional security matters puts the nonproliferation regime at risk, because it limits the amount of time that stakeholders have available to grapple with the critical questions facing the BWC and the biological weapons nonproliferation establishment—questions that must be answered if the regime is to survive.     

Models of scientific and technological review for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

ABSTRACT

Science and technology (S&T) review is key to anticipating developments in the life sciences that may benefit or run contrary to the aims of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. It serves as a mechanism for both preparing against novel biological threats and identifying the best opportunities for developing and sharing the life sciences to the fullest extent. In the age of rapidly advancing biotechnology, S&T review needs to be wide ranging, involve a diverse set of inputs, and be transparent about its methods and data. This viewpoint considers four models of S&T review and their capacity to respond to the challenge of the life sciences: standing advisory boards; ad hoc working groups; peer review; and wikis. It then identifies a hybrid model that is suitably broad, diverse, and transparent.