基于HLA和仿真网格的空间预警系统建模/仿真

采用面向对象的方法对弹道导弹防御系统的重要组成部分——空间预警系统进行分析、建模,在基于HLA和仿真网格的支撑环境中,建立其仿真系统,根据实体和局域网间耦合程度需要,采用不同的网络通讯机制,并联接相应的计算机生成兵力系统。系统可分析空间预警系统的原理、配置方案,进行弹道导弹探测与参数估计,战场态势多维信息显示。     

一种Hough变换航迹起始参数空间划分方法

针对Hough变换参数空间间隔尺度对发现概率的影响,分析了基于Hough变换航迹起始方法在存在正态分布的系统噪色、观测噪声和无噪声3种情况下参数空间矩形带宽度的划分对发现概率的影响,提出了可以补偿测量噪声的参数空间划分方法,仿真结果验证了此方法的有效性和可行性。     

试论价层轨道的杂化——兼论杂化轨道理论与价层电子对互斥理论的统一

在分子结构理论中,杂化轨道理论在多原子分子的空间构型被实验确定后,能够根据一定的假设给出合理的解释;价层电子对互斥理论主要用于预测分子或离子的空间构型,但其假设有些生硬、推理不够严密,对VP与电子对空间构型之间关系的推导比较繁琐,不易理解,也不能很好地解释一些多原子分子(如PF5、IF7等分子)中存在键长不等的现象。两种理论在各自的领域都取得了很大的成功,也各有其不足之处,一直未能统一。价层轨道杂化理论正是在综合了这两种理论的优点之后得到的。该理论在假设较少———即假设中心原子的价层轨道在成键时都要发生杂化,该假设与实验事实完全相符———的前提下,利用立体几何学原理对多原子分子的空间构型进行了非常简洁的推导,其结果不仅可全部继承前两种理论的成功之处,而且还能解释多原子分子中出现的键长不同、存在异构体等现象,这是其独到之处,也是其创新之处。     

India’s nuclear counter-revolution: nuclear learning and the future of deterrence

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India’s ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India’s learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own “revolution,” in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi’s emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning.     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.