基于博弈论的装备采办成本控制问题研究

从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,以博弈论为理论工具,对武器装备采办过程中的生产成本控制问题进行了分析;建立了基于激励的生产成本控制模型,并对成本控制模型的特点进行了分析和解释;针对军方在激励合同执行过程中有可能出现的2类错误,对成本控制模型进行了优化。在非对称信息条件下,优化后的成本控制模型不但能有效减少2类错误的发生,而且可提高军方装备采办效用,减少代理方合同风险。     

基于博弈论的装备采购定价激励模型

不同的定价方式和定价参数的选择对于承包商会起到不同程度的激励作用。为提高装备采购效益,在承包商追求效用最大化假设的基础上,建立了装备采购完全信息动态博弈模型。对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究,证明了成本分担和固定价格的定价方式能够有效激励承包商提高自身努力水平降低成本,并提出了2种定价方式的参数定量计算方法。     

电子战条件下飞机敏感性分析及其减缩技术

介绍了电子战和飞机生存力及敏感性的内涵,构建了飞机敏感性量化评价指标层次体系。定性分析了电子干扰对雷达探测概率和导弹脱靶距离标准差的影响,并以算例说明了干扰效能的增大会引起导弹制导精度的降低和脱靶距离的增大,从而得出:电子干扰对飞机的敏感性和生存概率有重要的影响。引入了干扰效能因子的概念,并分析了将干信比J/S作为一种干扰效能因子考虑的可行性及优点。最后给出了降低飞机敏感性的电子战措施。     

基于敌后侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力打击战法*

对敌后侦察反军事诱骗的远程火力打击战法的定量分析是战役研究中尚未解决的关键问题之一,根据信息作战原理,运用仿真和统计学分析的混合方法,建立基于概率的二人非零和(TPNZS)非合作博弈模型,设计基于侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力打击战法,定量分析我方的敌后侦察和敌方的军事诱骗对远程信息与火力联合打击能力的影响,并对一个典型实例的初步试验及分析结果表明:与敌后侦察和军事诱骗有关的正确识别目标和错误识别目标的概率以及远程火力命中目标的概率是评估远程信息与火力联合打击能力的关键,而对评估结果进行博弈分析则是远程火力打击战法设计的关键,用识别正确目标和错误目标能力以及远程火力命中目标能力描述的基于敌后侦察与诱骗博弈的远程火力最优打击战法为Δ*=(0,Δ2*,1-Δ2*)=(0.0000,0.7727,0.2273),被打击方对远程火力打击的最优战法为π*=(π1*,0,1-π1*)=(0.8511,0.0000,0.1489)。     

攻击主动防御飞行器的微分对策制导律

基于微分对策理论设计了躲避护卫弹的同时攻击飞行器的制导律。根据传统的性能指标推导了该场景的微分对策制导律,并且根据权重系数的取值定义了三种制导律:最优追赶制导律、逃脱-追赶制导律和复合制导律。最优追赶制导律容易被护卫弹拦截,逃脱-追赶制导律容易造成导弹和飞行器的零控脱靶量急剧增大而使得攻击失败,复合制导律很难选择合适的权重系数。针对以上不足,提出了两种改进的制导律,并对该两种制导律的适用情况进行了分析。通过非线性模型仿真,验证了这两种方法的可行性。该两种制导律目的性强,攻击导弹可以躲避护卫弹进而攻击飞行器。     

Unity is the exception. Alliance formation and de-formation among armed actors in Northern Mali

Our paper investigates the political trajectories of armed actors in Mali since 2012, using recent theoretical advances on alliance formation and collapse in civil wars. Our paper establishes an analytically productive distinction between levels of wartime cleavages and factors shaping groups’ trajectories. Strategic alliances, we argue, emerge from anticipated benefits on the national political scene as well as in the local political economy. The two sets of considerations do not necessarily converge. This dual logic is studied through the cases of two armed groups, both siding with the government after originally aligning with jihadi and separatist coalitions respectively.     

基于储备模式选择的战备物资分类研究

对战备物资进行分类是选择储备模式的基础和重要前提。把战备物资分类问题抽象为战备物资的军事性和经济性评价问题,设计了物资分类评价指标体系,并对部分指标进行了说明;利用层次分析法确定各指标的权重,运用专家打分法完成指标打分,并对专家打分程序进行优化,增强战备物资分类的可操作性,由军事性和经济性两方面的得分确定战备物资所属类别;最后通过算例证明了分类方法的有效性。     

搜索路径给定时的搜索对策问题及其应用

搜索路径给定时的最优搜索方案问题,也可以理解为是关于搜索者和目标的二人对策问题,主要讨论了当搜索路径给定时的单个搜索者和单个目标的搜索对策问题。首先根据问题的特点,利用动态规划和迭代的方法,确定关于目标逃逸路径混合策略的最优分区,证明该分区是多面体凸集;针对目标不同逃逸路径的分区,求出搜索者的最大期望收益,再将问题转化为二人有限零和对策,计算出搜索者的支付矩阵,确定最优搜索策略。最后结合海军护航行动,对我舰载直升机搜索小型海盗船进行分析和计算,说明搜索路径给定时的最优搜索对策对于双方的资源分配和提高搜索效率具有一定的应用价值。     

From Rebel to Quasi-State: Governance,Diplomacy and Legitimacy in the Midst of Afghanistan’s Wars (1979–2001)

Abstract

How do warlords build their legitimacy and eventually exert authority? The case of Afghan leader Ahmad Shah Massoud demonstrates that warlords do not only build legitimacy through the internal provision of goods and services to the population under their control, but also build their legitimacy by projecting authority externally, through the development of their own form of diplomacy. In this article, I show that warlords develop complex and complementary legitimisation strategies that extend beyond their territorial realms to include consequential relationships with foreign actors.     

Nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare: coexistence or competition?

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war seem almost antithetical in their respective intellectual pedigrees. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time. Information or “cyber” weapons, at least for the most part, aim at sowing confusion or mass disruption instead of widespread physical destruction. Nevertheless, there are some intersections between cyber and nuclear matters, and these have the potential to become troublesome for the future of nuclear deterrence. For example, cyber attacks might complicate the management of a nuclear crisis. As well, information attacks on command-control and communications systems might lead to a mistaken nuclear launch based on false warnings, to erroneous interpretations of data or to panic on account of feared information blackout. It is not inconceivable that future nuclear strike planning will include a preliminary wave of cyber strikes or at least a more protracted “preparation of the battlefield” by roaming through enemy networks to plant malware or map vulnerabilities.