Lost through non-translation: bringing Clausewitz's writings on ‘new wars’ back in

While Carl von Clausewitz has generally been respected as one of the most profound philosophers of war, his expertise has been regarded as somewhat limited if not even irrelevant to the so-called ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War world. Many scholars in international relations have claimed that ‘new wars’ are essentially ‘post-Clausewitzian’ and ‘post-trinitarian’ in nature, meaning that they are no longer fathomable through a Clausewitzian framework. However Clausewitz's earlier writings were nearly exclusively dedicated to guerrilla warfare, or what he called ‘small wars’. These writings have been largely overlooked by many analysts of contemporary conflicts. By drawing on his rare and untranslated writings, the article uncovers a critical part of Clausewitz's expertise in asymmetric warfare and shows that, far from being irrelevant in an age where interstate warfare is increasingly being replaced by conflicts between states and semi-/non-state actors, Clausewitz's philosophical writings actually shed new light into the particular interactive dynamics generated during wars waged under conditions of asymmetry.     

从孙子兵法角度审视目标中心战的制胜机制

基于体系对抗的战争特点和我军作战实际情况,提出的目标中心战是现代作战思想的一次凝练及升华。它的制胜机制表现为三个层面：通过选择关键作战目标,提升体系对抗效能;通过影响目标系统功能,谋求局部对抗优势;通过融合体系要素,提高整体对抗能力。     

Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort

A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

猎击时敏目标的作战机理分析

美军在第二次对伊战争中,以比第一次对伊战争少得多的兵力,更短的准备时间和更少的消耗取得了更大的胜利,对比两次对伊战争中所用的兵器,坦克、主战飞机、战车、轻兵器等主战装备基本还是上次对伊战争的旧兵器,最大的变化是无人机的大量使用,情报系统、战术网络的提升,使战斗能力有极大的提高,这种由系统整合、提升信息化能力、改进指挥控制所产生的作战效能的提升是显著和有效的,代表发展战争潜力的方向。文中以美军对伊战争中主要的作战样式——打击时敏目标为作战想定,建立作战系统猎击时敏目标作战效能模型,对影响作战系统效能的各种因素作定量的分析,揭示作战效能提升的机理。     

紧密着眼战时需要,加强装备物流建设

装备物流的能力和水平,已经成为决定战争进程和结果的关键性制约因素.以武器装备保障为基础构建符合我国国情、具有我军特色的装备物流研究仍处于孕育阶段.从我军装备保障体系的特点出发,根据高技术战争的需要,论证了建设装备物流的必要性和建设基础,对战时装备物流建设要重点关注的问题进行了研究,同时对现阶段加强装备物流建设的做法进行了重点探讨.     

信息化战争中的纳米科技

纳米材料由于其独特的光、电、力、磁效应近年来受到人们广泛的关注,综述了目前国内外纳米科技的研究动态,着重介绍了现有纳米科技在高科技战争中的应用,及其潜在的发展方向．     

关于法律战的若干问题研究

在军事斗争中,我军应准确把握法律战的含义,使军事斗争与法律战有机结合。在信息化战争条件下,法律战正面临着前所未有的挑战。法律战只有与舆论战、心理战相结合,才能发挥出“三战”整体效益。军事优势是法律战获胜的前提和关键。武警部队应结合军事工作的基本特点,努力提高法律战的作战能力。     

网络游戏赌博性质分析

网络游戏产业快速发展的同时,赌博现象混迹其中。网络游戏赌博与传统赌博只是形式上的不同,其实质就是一种赌博行为。只有从教育、法制、监督、自律四方面综合治理,才能使这个行业健康发展。     

军用认知无线电网络中功率控制博弈算法的探讨

通过对比军用认知无线功率控制博弈模型与一些经典的功率控制博弈算法,提出了一种认知无线电网络中的功率控制的博弈算法。通过仿真结果性能分析,证明算法具有一定的优越性,并且能够为军事无线通信提供一定的理论依据和现实作用。     

Efficiency of equilibria in restricted uniform machine scheduling with total weighted completion time as social cost

In the last decade, there has been much progress in understanding scheduling problems in which selfish jobs aim to minimize their individual completion time. Most of this work has focused on makespan minimization as social objective. In contrast, we consider as social cost the total weighted completion time, that is, the sum of the agent costs, a standard definition of welfare in economics. In our setting, jobs are processed on restricted uniform parallel machines, where each machine has a speed and is only capable of processing a subset of jobs; a job's cost is its weighted completion time; and each machine sequences its jobs in weighted shortest processing time (WSPT) order. Whereas for the makespan social cost the price of anarchy is not bounded by a constant in most environments, we show that for our minsum social objective the price of anarchy is bounded above by a small constant, independent of the instance. Specifically, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 2 for the class of unit jobs, unit speed instances where the finite processing time values define the edge set of a forest with the machines as nodes. For the general case of mixed job strategies and restricted uniform machines, we prove that the price of anarchy equals 4. From a classical machine scheduling perspective, our results establish the same constant performance guarantees for WSPT list scheduling. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012