基于博弈论的装备采办成本控制问题研究

从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,以博弈论为理论工具,对武器装备采办过程中的生产成本控制问题进行了分析;建立了基于激励的生产成本控制模型,并对成本控制模型的特点进行了分析和解释;针对军方在激励合同执行过程中有可能出现的2类错误,对成本控制模型进行了优化。在非对称信息条件下,优化后的成本控制模型不但能有效减少2类错误的发生,而且可提高军方装备采办效用,减少代理方合同风险。     

基于博弈论的装备采购定价激励模型

不同的定价方式和定价参数的选择对于承包商会起到不同程度的激励作用。为提高装备采购效益,在承包商追求效用最大化假设的基础上,建立了装备采购完全信息动态博弈模型。对价格、成本、承包商努力程度和承包商效用之间的关系进行了研究,证明了成本分担和固定价格的定价方式能够有效激励承包商提高自身努力水平降低成本,并提出了2种定价方式的参数定量计算方法。     

Conflict dynamics and costs in the Greek Civil War 1946–1949

Using a new set of data from Greek Army sources, US military archives, and Communist Party documents, the paper provides a quantitative analysis of the armed confrontation that took place in Greece during 1946–1949. A dynamic Lotka–Volterra model is estimated, pointing to the existence of a conflict trap that explains the prolongation of the civil war and its dire consequences for the country. A regional analysis finds that the mobilization of guerrilla forces was crucially affected by morphology and the local persecutions of political rivals. Using neoclassical growth-accounting, the economic cost of the conflict is estimated to surpass an annual GDP, in line with similar findings in contemporary civil wars. The same framework is employed to assess the outcome in counterfactual situations discussed in this paper.     

A Critique of the Right Intention Condition as an Element of Jus ad Bellum

According to just war theory, a resort to war is justified only if it satisfies the right intention condition. This article offers a critical examination of this condition, defending the thesis that, despite its venerable history as part of the just war tradition, it ought to be jettisoned. When properly understood, it turns out to be an unnecessary element of jus ad bellum, adding nothing essential to our assessments of the justice of armed conflict.     

Case Study Commentary and Analysis: The Moral Sword of Damocles

Case summary, by James Cook (Case Study Editor):

In the final issue of the 2015 volume of the Journal of Military Ethics, we published a case study entitled “Coining an Ethical Dilemma: The Impunity of Afghanistan’s Indigenous Security Forces”, written by Paul Lushenko. The study detailed two extra-judicial killings (EJKs) by Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel in an area stabilized and overseen by a US-led Combined Task Force (CTF). To deter further EJKs following the first incident, the CTF’s commander reported the incidents up his chain of command and used the limited tools at his disposal to influence local indigenous officials directly. Apparently, the ANP unit took no notice. In his commentary on the case study, Paul Robinson considered moral compromise in war more generally. Coalition troops in Afghanistan, for instance, have encountered not just EJKs but also sexual abuse of minors, killing of non-combatants, kidnapping, torture, and widespread corruption. What should the soldier on the ground do if indigenous personnel violate Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) with impunity? Refusing to serve will not right or prevent moral wrongs, while staying on to fight the good but futile fight will mire the soldier in moral compromise. “?… [S]oldiers faced with this dilemma have no good options. The systemic failings surrounding them mean that it is probable that nothing they do will help”. In a concluding note, I suggested that while an individual soldier may indeed have no good options, as Paul Robinson suggests, that soldier’s military and nation at large are obliged to do what they can. At least, they must keep to the moral high ground so as not to give indigenous security forces an excuse to misbehave, and determine the nature of crimes such as EJKs: are they outlaw acts or in fact endorsed by the indigenous culture and perhaps even government? Below Colonel Dave Barnes, himself a veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom, analyzes Paul Lushenko’s case study at “?…?the local, tactical level: If a commander is in this situation – where her unit witnesses an EJK or other war crime – what should she do?”     

基于Multi-Agent的航空集群系统重构机理研究

集群作战是未来空中作战的主要样式,其重构机理的研究对于提升航空集群执行任务的整体性能以及在遭受攻击时的生存能力具有重要作用。从作战任务层面出发,对集群系统重构的定义以及类型、触发机制和基本原则进行了分析阐述;借鉴博弈论理论,将航空集群系统分布式重构问题映射为多Agent之间的合作-竞争问题,建立了基于Multi-Agent的系统重构模型,给出了重构的流程与算法,为航空集群系统自适应重构能力的设计实现提供了理论技术支持。     

不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈分析

在详细分析威慑与威逼区别的基础上,构建了不完全信息下军事威逼讨价还价博弈模型。按照最大期望效用准则,分析了不完全信息下军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的条件,研究表明:运用鲁宾斯坦经典讨价还价唯一完美均衡解,得出以下结论:争夺目标自身的效用越大,战争带来的声誉得益效用越大,军事威逼走向讨价还价阶段的可能性越大;一旦进入讨价还价阶段,威逼者会接受挑战者提出的方案,冲突将不再发生。     

电子战条件下飞机敏感性分析及其减缩技术

介绍了电子战和飞机生存力及敏感性的内涵,构建了飞机敏感性量化评价指标层次体系。定性分析了电子干扰对雷达探测概率和导弹脱靶距离标准差的影响,并以算例说明了干扰效能的增大会引起导弹制导精度的降低和脱靶距离的增大,从而得出:电子干扰对飞机的敏感性和生存概率有重要的影响。引入了干扰效能因子的概念,并分析了将干信比J/S作为一种干扰效能因子考虑的可行性及优点。最后给出了降低飞机敏感性的电子战措施。     

信息战的内容与现状

详细介绍了信息战的基本知识,重点分析了北约在科索沃的信息战的著名战例,对现代战争的信息战形式和措施也作了阐述。     

军用移动电站战伤修理的若干问题

分析研究了电站平时修理和战伤修理的主要区别,提出了电站战伤评估逻辑图和战伤修理方法。