基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略

以无人车集群系统协同监视再入体着靶过程为任务背景,开展智能集群自组织策略相关技术研究。设计无人车集群执行再入体着靶协同监视的集群行为模式;针对协同监视过程中的集群聚集行为,提出基于合作博弈的智能集群自主聚集策略。各智能体以实现群体聚集为"合作目标",以降低自身能量消耗为"竞争目标",开展博弈;基于微粒群算法规划局部路径,最终使群体系统涌现出聚集行为。仿真实验验证了设计的自主聚集策略的有效性。     

The Clausewitzian fallacy of absolute war

Clausewitz was much preoccupied with the apparent contradiction between real and absolute war. Why did war in history so rarely exhibit the extremes of violence and energy implied in the pure concept of war? Clausewitz’s commentators have usually followed him in thinking that this was a genuine problem in need of a solution, but I want to question that view. I will argue that Clausewitz did not have a coherent philosophy of absolute war, and therefore the contradiction he posited between real and absolute war was equally meaningless – as, too, was his effort to resolve it by claiming that some real wars approached or even attained the absolute form of war. The real problem was not the opposition of real and absolute war, but the self-contradictory theory of absolute war.     

军事云环境下基于动态博弈的资源调度方法

针对军事云环境下联合指挥资源调度优化问题,综合考虑了多部队任务需求,多目标优化,多部队资源竞争等约束条件,运用动态博弈理论及方法,建立并提出了一种基于完全信息扩展博弈的资源调度模型及方法,提高了资源调度效率,兼顾了多部队利益,增加了联合作战效益。最后通过实验验证了其有效性及准确性。     

作战实验组织实施框架设计

为了规范指导实验人员有效开展作战实验,对作战实验组织实施框架进行了设计。通过忽略不同实验的细微差别,抽取作战实验组织实施的公共模式,从实验团队角度明确规定了实验的关键步骤,规范了实验组织实施过程和里程碑工作。能有效指导将实验对象的概念理解映射到实验系统中进行具体实验,保证了实验的成功实施。     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

Rendezvous search on labeled networks

Two players are independently placed on a commonly labelled network X. They cannot see each other but wish to meet in least expected time. We consider continuous and discrete versions, in which they may move at unit speed or between adjacent distinct nodes, respectively. There are two versions of the problem (asymmetric or symmetric), depending on whether or not we allow the players to use different strategies. After obtaining some optimality conditions for general networks, we specialize to the interval and circle networks. In the first setting, we extend the work of J. V. Howard; in the second we prove a conjecture concerning the optimal symmetric strategy. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 256–274, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10011     

空降兵师(团)登岛作战兵力分配模型

通过结合空降兵师(团)级登岛作战的战术特点,确立了遮断点的单点和联合价值的指标体系,建立了以联盟博弈为基础的兵力分配初步模型,然后以Shapley值作为此联盟博弈的解,结合投放过程中的兵力损耗,得到一个合理的兵力分配方案,从而建立了师(团)级空降登岛作战的兵力分配模型和算法.     

面向战争设计工程的作战信息建模方法

首先对战争设计工程研究问题的思路进行了分析,给出了问题中存在的作战信息的结构.按照作战信息的结构,从实体、关系、任务、过程、交互5个方面,给出了作战信息的结构化、形式化建模的规范,主要为异质领域专家在理解问题、认识问题、表达解决思路中提供一定程度上的帮助,提高了战争设计工程的研究效率.     

空天防御作战规划问题研究

从技术与作战结合的角度,系统分析空天防御作战系统和对抗特点等问题,构建了"态势组态—目标排序—目标分配—冲突动态最优预测"新型作战规划方法,提出"博弈控制理论与方法",论述了空天防御作战规划方法论。对空天防御作战规划理论研究有一定参考价值,为发展空天防御作战规划系统提供了研究思路和技术支撑。     

War,vagueness and hybrid war

It has frequently been observed in the literature on hybrid wars that there is a grey zone between peace and war, and that hybrid wars are conflicts which are not clear cases of war. In this paper, I attempt to illuminate this grey zone and the concept and nature of war from the philosophical discussions of vagueness and institutional facts. Vague terms are characterized by the fact that there is no non-arbitrary boundary between entities which lie in their extension, and entities which do not lie in their extension. I apply a theory of vagueness to notions such as “war” and “peace” and go on to suggest that the exact boundary for what counts as a war or not is arbitrary. However, the context in which the conflict occurs determines a range of possible locations for this boundary. The most important contextual parameter is in this respect how the parties to the conflict themselves conceptualize the conflict. I suggest that this can in various ways help us understand grey-zone conflicts.