军事欺骗战法分析的数学方法-应用

针对军事欺骗战法定量分析困难的问题,采用基于贝叶斯统计推断和博弈均衡分析的数学方法,在理论上为解决此难题提供了一种可行的方法。该方法首先定义基本概率矩阵,然后根据贝叶斯原理为交战双方构造用于统计推断的主观概率矩阵,并在由两个主观概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链与实施军事欺骗机会之间建立对应关系,再将此关系推广到基本概率矩阵,即是否存在实施军事欺骗的机会将由基本概率矩阵元素构成的偏序链决定。对理论成果的初步应用表明：通过分析由战场情报信息构成的基本概率矩阵的偏序链,可以科学地运用军事欺骗和反军事欺骗战法。     

空降兵师(团)登岛作战兵力分配模型

通过结合空降兵师(团)级登岛作战的战术特点,确立了遮断点的单点和联合价值的指标体系,建立了以联盟博弈为基础的兵力分配初步模型,然后以Shapley值作为此联盟博弈的解,结合投放过程中的兵力损耗,得到一个合理的兵力分配方案,从而建立了师(团)级空降登岛作战的兵力分配模型和算法.     

面向战争设计工程的作战信息建模方法

首先对战争设计工程研究问题的思路进行了分析,给出了问题中存在的作战信息的结构.按照作战信息的结构,从实体、关系、任务、过程、交互5个方面,给出了作战信息的结构化、形式化建模的规范,主要为异质领域专家在理解问题、认识问题、表达解决思路中提供一定程度上的帮助,提高了战争设计工程的研究效率.     

基于成品油有限竞争市场的军油筹措战略研究

对国家成品油市场进行分析,认为目前国内成品油市场是典型的双寡头垄断有限竞争市场。通过对成品油市场主体厂商行为博弈的讨论,得出产量博弈的状况近期不会出现,价格博弈将使企业走入囚徒困境的结论。根据分析针对性地提出军油筹措战略,为相关决策提供参考。     

信息化条件下战斗SD对抗模型构建研究

信息向战术层面的渗透,从本质上改变了决定战斗胜负的关键因素.在分析信息化条件下战斗特点的基础上,采用系统动力学的方法和思想,提出并构建了信息化条件下战斗SD对抗模型,对信息化条件下战斗的基本过程进行了仿真模拟.模型较好反映信息化条件下战斗的本质.模拟结果可以为指挥员正确决策提供定量的理论支持.     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game‐theoretic model

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.     

Militias and the Politics of Legitimacy

Abstract

Militias and rebels depart from different angles when it comes to the politics of legitimacy. While rebels have to address the issue of legitimacy early on in order to gain popular support, militias can rely on some kind of ‘borrowed legitimacy’. Based on this observation, the paper introduces militias as special form of organised violence visible in many civil wars and fragile states as well as elaborates on the politics of legitimacy typical for militias. By distinguishing different forms of militia violence (counter-insurgency, counter-rival and counter-crime), the articles shows how militias respond to major challenges in legitimizing violent actions.     

The Clausewitzian fallacy of absolute war

Clausewitz was much preoccupied with the apparent contradiction between real and absolute war. Why did war in history so rarely exhibit the extremes of violence and energy implied in the pure concept of war? Clausewitz’s commentators have usually followed him in thinking that this was a genuine problem in need of a solution, but I want to question that view. I will argue that Clausewitz did not have a coherent philosophy of absolute war, and therefore the contradiction he posited between real and absolute war was equally meaningless – as, too, was his effort to resolve it by claiming that some real wars approached or even attained the absolute form of war. The real problem was not the opposition of real and absolute war, but the self-contradictory theory of absolute war.     

Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience

In June 2016, the Colombian Government and the FARC insurgent movement signed a ceasefire agreement, which brings the two sides one step closer to putting an end to over five decades of war. Unfortunately, Latin America has a rich history of insurgent movements, particularly during the cold war era, some of which continue to operate today. Most of these movements disappeared due to military operations, though some did so via peace negotiations. This essay aims to discuss the various ends of Latin American insurgencies to answer whether, indeed, insurgents can be negotiated with.