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161.
J. N.C. Hill 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):4-31
The aim of this article is to consider how Algeria's most prized achievement and treasured memory – the FLN's victory over the French in the war of liberation – has helped stimulate and sustain the violence that has blighted the country since independence. It argues that successive governments have propagated a legend of the war that encourages and legitimises rebellion and armed resistance. By celebrating the actions and achievements of a committed band of revolutionaries they have established a precedent whereby it is every citizen's duty to oppose and resist an unjust government. Time and again therefore, insurgent groups like the FFS, MIA, and AIS have justified their actions and won popular support by portraying themselves as the early FLN's natural heir. 相似文献
162.
W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):573-587
After decades of fighting, the secessionist war between the government of Sri Lanka and the secessionist movement known as the Tamil Tigers of Eelam continues. Military operations have failed to achieve a decisive victory over the other side. This article aims to prove that the Sri Lankan civil war should be regarded as a war of attrition, as military actions have failed, and possibly will continue to fail, to produce a victor. 相似文献
163.
Charles W. Mahoney 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(5-6):916-940
ABSTRACTIn May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives. 相似文献
164.
Phil Reynolds 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):446-458
Personal cognitive processes inform how individuals understand their environment. Cultural variation, fundamental attribution error, causal attribution, and durability bias create obstacles to Western understanding of irregular war and have created a significant institutional bias in how the US military perceives its enemies- a perception only somewhat softened after a decade of irregular war. United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is in a better position to overcome these problems through persistent engagement. In the event of major conflict, environmentally sensitized military planners will be better able to achieve military and policy objectives. 相似文献
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167.
Miodrag Ivanovic 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(3):253-270
This survey article focuses on defence economics issues and provides data and analysis on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) defence policy, defence spending, the size of its armed forces, its defence industries and the cost of the civil war. The main section is devoted to the period from 1990 to the present and deals with the following aspects: the situation after the break‐up of the former Yugoslavia, general economic data; the cost of the civil war, the defence budget; the armed forces; the manufacture of armaments and the structure of the defence industry. 相似文献
168.
PAUL HALLWOOD 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(5):449-463
‘Greed’ vs. ‘grievance’ is weighed using a generally applicable methodology as motivations in the American War of Independence. Greed is quantified as the expected economic benefit of Independence – escaping colonial trade burdens and expected increased economic growth rates. Grievance is measured as willingness to pay to escape perceived political burdens. Quantification of the relative contributions is made possible by using estimates of expected war-costs. To the extent that the economic burden was insufficient to explain the War, the residual is ascribed to the grievance motivation. Both motives are shown to have contributed to the War, but grievance dominates. 相似文献
169.
Samuel Oyewole 《Defense & Security Analysis》2013,29(3):253-262
Boko Haram terrorism has been recognized by Nigerian President Jonathan as the most threatening and complex security issue in Nigeria since independence. In response, the Federal Government of Nigeria has committed itself to different counterterrorism measures, which are largely dominated by “hard politics” and military mobilization. Spending heavily on defense to upgrade military hardware and train personnel in a counterterrorism role, Nigeria has also boosted its strategic importance in the “Global War on Terror”. However, this attempt has become unpopular as it has failed to contain Boko Haram within a short time frame and has made insufficient headway against unabated terror, with human rights costs among the host communities and amidst a surge of stakeholders' discordance. As a matter of concern, this article seeks to assess Boko Haram as an opponent in Nigeria's war on terror (WOT) and to ascertain the challenges the country faces, the alternative measures open to it, and possible ways forward. 相似文献
170.
Christopher J. Eberle 《Journal of Military Ethics》2013,12(1):54-67
My aim in this paper is to reflect on a very narrow question: under what conditions might a cyber-attack provide a just cause for war? I begin by articulating what makes for a just cause, briefly address the problem of attribution, and then discuss three broad categories of cyber-attack: those that clearly do not satisfy the just cause requirement, those that clearly do satisfy the just cause requirement, and three ambiguous cases – the destruction of property, the emplacement of logic bombs, and the failure to prevent cyber-attacks. My conclusions are exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, partly by virtue of the extreme paucity of literature on the moral assessment of cyberwar. 相似文献