An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Designing and pricing menus of extended warranty contracts

Extended warranties provide “piece of mind” to a consumer in that product failures which occur after the base warranty expires are rectified at little or no cost. They also provide an additional source of revenue for manufacturers or third‐party providers, such as retailers or insurance providers, and help cultivate consumer loyalty. In this article, we analyze a number of extended warranty contracts which differ in design, including restrictions on deferrals and renewals. With the use of dynamic programming, we compute the optimal strategy for a consumer with perfect information and determine the optimal pricing policy for the provider given the consumer's risk characterization. We also provide insight into when different contracts should be issued. Finally, we illustrate how profits can be dramatically increased by offering menus of warranty contracts, as opposed to stand alone contracts, with the use of integer programming. Surprisingly, risk‐taking consumers provide the greatest benefit to offering menus. These insights can help a company develop a comprehensive warranty planning strategy for given products or product lines. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

某两栖车绕流场数值模拟研究及外形优化分析

运用多块混合网格,采用RNG湍流模型、流体体积法(VOF)和PISO算法对某型两栖侦察车带自由表面的粘性绕流场进行了数值模拟研究,数值方法采用相关试验数据进行了验证,误差在9%以内.针对模拟结果显示的影响其水动力特性的主要结构部位和外形参数进行了优化,并计算分析了轮穴、车体切角、车轮状态以及车首导流板对两栖车航行性能的影响.计算结果表明,改进后的车体绕流场特性得到了较大的改善,航速10km/h时减阻效果可达原车总阻力的69.2%,有效地提高了某型两栖侦察车的航行性能.     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

How pressure for change challenge military organizational characteristics

This article elaborates on how structural, normative and functional pressures for change may challenge military organizational characteristics. We problematize theoretically and exemplify empirically what consequences these pressures can have on military organizational characteristics, arguing that they constitute major challenges for managing in particular normative pressures for change. The empirical examples suggest that bureaucratic, hierarchical, narcissistic and greedy traits of the organization are challenged by normative pressures such as value changes and normalization. Another source of challenge is professionalization processes. Structural challenges, on the other hand, are managed by the organization and do not seem to inhibit the workings of organizational characteristics. The plausibility probe conducted questions the sustainability of military organizational characteristics in their traditional disguise, in particular due to legitimacy concerns. It is suggested that future research should be directed towards analyzing how military organizations manage pressure for change and whether their characteristics are questioned.     

基于作战能力的装备保障方法

分析了传统的武器装备保障方法对战时保障的不足,提出了基于作战能力的装备保障方法,阐明了该方法的主要思想.研究了通过建立任务-作战能力-装备及其功能结构之间的关联关系,识别装备保障需求的方法,并讨论了基于作战能力的装备保障中使用保障方案评价、维修保障方案评价、装备使用调配等重要问题.该方法的研究为一体化联合作战模式下装备保障研究工作建立了总的理论框架.     

通用武器装备供应系统设计中的硬、软系统方法整合研究

分析了硬、软系统方法应用的异同点,研究了将硬、软系统方法整合起来处理通用装备供应系统设计的问题,最后提出了系统设计的框架。     

装备物资铁路装载方案评价研究

构建了装备物资铁路装载方案的评价指标体系,其中,详细讨论了操作难度的定义方法;引入了一种改进的模糊综合评判方法,实现了对装备物资铁路装载方案的评价。     

装备物资供应保障中的装卸优化方法

装备物资装卸作为供应保障的一个重要环节 ,对装备物资保障效能的发挥有着极大的影响。综述了装备物资装卸过程中应遵循的原则和装卸搬运作业方法 ,提出了装备物资装卸的优化方法。