离散作战模型的连续化兰切斯特模型研究

通过兰切斯特方程的分析,定义了作战力量变换系数概念,推导出作战力量变换系数的兰切斯特方程,得到了衡量交战双方作战力量等效值,而作战力量变换系数的兰切斯特方程正是适用于离散型作战的兰切斯特作战模型,使具有深刻影响力的兰切斯特方程适用范围扩大到了交战双方离散数量型的作战领域,从而赋予兰切斯特方程新的生命,为复杂的格斗作战分析提供了新的工具。     

子弹均匀散布子母弹最有利火力分配方法

在将子弹均匀散布的椭圆区域等效转换为矩形区域的基础上,建立了适宽射向射击子母弹对矩形目标毁伤全概率计算的数学模型。通过函数转换和泛函分析给出了子弹均匀散布子母弹理想射击密度,得到了理想射击密度下对目标的毁伤概率计算公式。讨论了最有利火力分配方式的确定方法,给出了最优射向间隔和表尺差的计算公式,为便于实际应用,给出了最优火力分配计算中所需的3个参数的近似计算公式,最后给出了应用算例。     

大学自习教室优化设置研究

针对目前大学自习教室资源浪费普遍存在的现象,将学生上自习与否视为独立同分布随机变量,从自习教室的管理与维护成本、电费成本以及学生的满意度3个方面出发,建立了双目标随机规划模型,并在模型基础上提出了大学自习教室设置的一般方法。通过实例分析,对模型的正确性和有效性进行了论证。结果表明:在各种情况下,该模型都能很好地解决自习教室设置这一问题,并且能在学生满意度较高的条件下,节约能源13%以上。该模型可以有效地对自习教室进行优化设置,不仅提高了资源利用水平,而且节约了能源。     

Modelling international conflict under conditions of state level economic and political uncertainty

Formal models of international conflict have tended to concentrate on change across the security dimension, assuming that the state level economic and political dimensions are constant. However, the conclusion of the Cold War suggests that over the long run these dimensions are not constant; indeed, the development of economic power, state level limits on defence expenditures, structural impediments to economic change, and several other ‘constants’ clearly do have an endogenous role in international conflict. This paper suggests one strategy for their inclusion as a causal factor in conflict modelling.     

FOOD AID

Abstract

This paper seeks to critically appraise Africa's position within the United Nations Security Council from the inception of the UN in 1945 until the end of 2010, spanning the entire history of the world body. A few factors make such an appraisal a useful exercise. These include the ongoing debates about the reform of the Council in particular and the UN as a whole, and the growing interest that many African students and observers of and actors in international relations seem to have developed in recent years in the working of the world body. In this appraisal, emphasis will be placed on the origin and rationale behind the establishment of the Security Council as well as the use of the veto power by its permanent members, with a special reference to Africa.     

EXTRAORDINARY VISITS

North Korea has the bomb but not much of a nuclear arsenal. For fifty years, it pursued the plutonium path to the bomb in parallel with its pursuit of nuclear electricity. My visits to North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear complex provided a window to its plutonium capabilities. After having made six visits to North Korea, Pyongyang surprised me during my seventh visit last November by showing me a small, modern uranium enrichment plant, which I was told was needed for its new indigenous light water reactor program. However, the same capabilities can be used to produce highly enriched uranium bomb fuel. Following a pattern of having made poor risk-management decisions during much of the past twenty years of diplomacy dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, Washington remains in a standoff with Pyongyang.     

Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds

This article discusses a two‐player noncooperative nonzero‐sum inspection game. There are multiple sites that are subject to potential inspection by the first player (an inspector). The second player (potentially a violator) has to choose a vector of violation probabilities over the sites, so that the sum of these probabilities do not exceed one. An efficient method is introduced to compute all Nash equilibria parametrically in the amount of resource that is available to the inspector. Sensitivity analysis reveals nonmonotonicity of the equilibrium utility of the inspector, considered as a function of the amount of resource that is available to it; a phenomenon which is a variant of the well‐known Braess paradox. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Cost allocation of capacity investment games

Consider a manufacturer serving a set of retail stores each of which faces deterministic demands in a finite planning horizon. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the production capacity of the manufacturer is built, followed by production, outsourcing to third party manufacturers if necessary and distribution to the retail stores. Because the retail stores are usually managed by different managers who act as independent profit centers, it is desirable that the total cost is divided among the retail stores so that their incentives can be appropriately captured and thus efficient operations can be achieved. Under various conditions, we prove that there is a fair allocation of costs among the retail stores in the sense that no subset of retail stores subsidizes others, or equivalently, the resulting capacity investment game has a nonempty core, that is, the capacity investment game is a balanced game. In addition, our proof provides a mechanism to compute a fair cost allocation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 512–523, 2013     

基于记忆有理函数的功率放大器行为模型

针对功率放大器的非线性特性及记忆效应,提出了一种基于记忆有理函数的功放行为模型。在传统记忆多项式模型和无记忆有理函数模型基础上,构建记忆有理函数模型,并利用共轭梯度法辨识模型系数,同时比较不同记忆深度和不同非线性阶数下的归一化均方误差,获取最佳记忆深度和非线性阶数。采用多载波的WCDMA信号和MRF6S21140H功放来验证模型的有效性,并与记忆多项式模型、无记忆有理函数模型进行了比较。结果表明,记忆有理函数模型在减少系数数目的同时具有更好的逼近精度。     

层次分析法的水下航行器维修性指标分配方法

基于层次分析法的水下航行器维修性指标分配方法把层次分析法应用到水下航行器维修性指标分配方法中,即邀请专家对故障的检测和隔离方式、可达性、可更换性和测试的困难等级进行两两比较,得到评价矩阵,据此,可以得到分配结果.这种方法克服了按故障率和设计特性分配法在设计特性相差不大时存在的缺陷,把定性分析与定量分析相结合.在设计初期即明确设计目标,除了考虑到单元的故障率还兼顾了初期设计过程中的不确定性.将这种方法应用于某水下航行器的维修性分配,结果表明,该方法具有实用价值.