多目标多决策者环境下防空反导装备体系资源分配与优化

作战体系具有层次高、规模大,各作战分系统间协调配合密切的特征。在作战任务中,这种多层次、多系统、多决策者、多目标的结构使得对各作战子系统的武器装备分配变得更为复杂。为解决此类复杂结构的优化问题,在层次化多目标分析方法基础之上,将层次系统的风险管理引入到模型中来,形成多目标多决策者资源分配模型多目标多决策者资源分配模型,用以解决在不确定风险环境下进行多目标资源分配的问题。利用MOMDRA模型建模空袭风险下防空反导体系的武器装备分配问题,在求解该模型的过程中采用系统分解的思路,利用权重法,站在不同决策者的角度得到该体系的Pareto最优资源分配方案,并通过一个实例来说明此方法的可行性。     

India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

During the 2016 American presidential campaign, Democrats and Republicans alike repeatedly raised concerns at the prospect of Donald Trump being in charge of America’s nuclear arsenal based on his seemingly unstable personality. Unfortunately, this emphasis on Trump’s character distracted attention from any in-depth investigation into his long-standing interest in nuclear issues. This article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by highlighting the nuclear legacy Trump will inherit from Obama, surveying his statements on nuclear issues over more than three decades, and providing an analysis of constraining factors on his administration’s nuclear agenda, particularly domestic institutions. It finds that most of Trump’s views on nuclear issues are relatively consistent with past Republican presidents. Where he is unique, however, is in his use of social media, which has potential implications on nuclear signaling.     

临近空间武器对预警探测制导技术的挑战

临近空间进攻武器具有速度快、射程远、机动性强的特点,对未来空天安全构成重大威胁.简要综述了国内外临近空间武器的发展现状、主要特点及特性,包括高超声速巡航导弹和高速滑翔弹头两大主要威胁,从预警探测和探测制导的角度,指出了预警探测制导技术在应对临近空间进攻武器上面临的严峻挑战,提出了对其关键技术和技术途径的几点思考.     

Russia,America and missile defense

Russia has sharply objected to US plans for ballistic missile defense. The Russian official explanation is that the real purpose of the US missile defense plan is to make it impossible for Russia to retaliate against a US nuclear (or massive conventional) attack, thus making Russia subject to military blackmail by the US. The Russian response has been the result of a sum total of various factors, mostly political and cultural, while the technical capabilities of the proposed system have played a secondary role.     

单一流空情生成模型仿真

根据单一流空情的特点,立足贴近实战的要求,分别建立了空袭批数模型、航路生成模型、批次序号模型、类别指数模型、任务指数模型、编队数目模型和干扰模型共7个模型,并且按人工给定航路的方法进行了单一流空情生成的仿真实验,验证了该模型与以往模型相比具有一定的进步性,对防空兵作战仿真系统的开发具有一定的参考价值。     

French Arms Exports and Intrastate Conflicts: An Empirical Investigation

The aim of this article is to evaluate how French Major Conventional Weapons (MCW) exports impact on the conflict intensity of recipient countries. The recent increase in French arms exports seems to contradict the French political discourse on the promotion of regional stability. We run zero-inflated ordered probit model in order to analyze the role of the arms trade on the intensity of civil conflicts in 144 countries from 1992 to 2014, using SIPRI and UCDP/PRIO data. Our results suggest that French MCW exports tended not to exacerbate intrastate conflicts during this period. This finding is robust to changes in the empirical framework. We propose two lines of explanations: France seems to be prone to choosing partners that respect human rights and selling more ‘defense-oriented’ MCW than the rest of the world.     

The rise and fall of counterproliferation policy

The US government initiated a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to address the concern that, in the post-Cold War years, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons would be widespread and create a significant challenge to the US military’s combat operations. In particular, non-nuclear states might use chemical or biological warfare agents against US forces with the belief that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in retaliation. Following the events of September 11, 2001, defense strategy and policy shifted to a wider view of the threat of adversarial use of “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and the term “counterproliferation” was replaced by “combating” or “countering WMD.” Over time, the Defense Department increasingly moved away from counterproliferation principles with the detrimental effect of losing capabilities that US forces still need for contemporary adversaries. This shift has been aggravated by other US government agencies’ use of “counterproliferation” in lieu of what would have been termed “nonproliferation” activities in the 1990s. The loss of clarity within the US government on these terms has led to the inability to focus the “whole of government” on this significant national security challenge. To alleviate this challenge, the US government needs a top-down initiative to refocus policy on the distinctly different aspects of WMD with respect to military combat operations, combating terrorism, and homeland security.     

Dirty war: chemical weapon use and domestic repression

The utilization of chemical weapons to quash domestic rebellion is a drastic action for a regime facing domestic challengers to take, especially given the reputation costs and risk of international intervention. However, recent developments have illustrated that some regimes have contemplated and implemented extraordinary measures (including the use of chemical munitions) to quash rebellion. This study addresses the question of why some states utilize chemical weapons against domestic challengers while others refrain from this level of state repression. I argue that the utilization of chemical weapons has both domestic and international elements. Specifically, that ethnic cleavages that lead to secessionist challenges and factors associated with inter-state rivalry impact the likelihood that a state utilizes the employment of chemical munitions. I test my argument and other explanations regarding repression with a casestudy approach utilizing captured Iraqi Government documents comparing Iraq’s Al-Anfal campaigns with developments during the recent Syrian Civil War.     

A Reversal of Fortunes? Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Europe and East Asia1

ABSTRACT

The extended deterrence relationships between the United States and its allies in Europe and East Asia have been critical to regional and global security and stability, as well as to nonproliferation efforts, since the late 1950s. These relationships developed in different regional contexts, and reflect differing cultural, political and military realities in the US allies and their relations with the United States. Although extended deterrence and assurance relations have very different histories, and have to some extent been controversial through the years, there has been a rethinking of these relations in recent years. Many Europeans face a diminished threat situation as well as economic and political pressures on the maintenance of extended deterrence, and are looking at the East Asian relationships, which do not involve forward deployed forces as more attractive than NATO’s risk-and-burden-sharing concepts involving the US nuclear forces deployed in Europe. On the other hand, the East Asian allies are looking favorably at NATO nuclear consultations, and in the case of South Korea, renewed US nuclear deployments (which were ended in 1991), to meet increased security concerns posed by a nuclear North Korea and more assertive China. This paper explores the history of current relationships and the changes that have led the allies to view those of others as more suitable for meeting their current needs.